THE JOURNAL OF LIBERTARIAN STUDIES

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW

VOLUME VII, NUMBER 1 SPRING 1983

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies is published quarterly by the Center for Libertarian Studies, a nonprofit, privately supported institute dedicated to research and scholarship and the ideal of a free society. Annual subscription rates are $25 for institutions and $17 for individuals. Non-U.S. subscribers please add postage as follows: $4 for surface delivery; airmail, $6 for Canada and Mexico, $10 for others. (U.S. dollars only, please.) Address inquiries to *The Journal of Libertarian Studies*, P.O. Box 4091, Burlingame, Calif. 94011. Copyright 1985 by the Center for Libertarian Studies. ISSN 0363-2873.

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Beginning with Volume Seven, the publication

of the Journal of Libertarian Studies

will be semi-annual.

The *Journal of Libertarian Studies* is abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts, America: History and Life, Political Science Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts,* and *The Philosopher's Index.*

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

Public Goods and Externalities: The Case of Roads*

by Walter Block

The Fraser Institute, Vancouver

When government monopolization of the roadways is discussed by economists, the "externalities" argument is usually raised. The argument is said to be simple, clear, and irrefutable. In fact, none of these terms really apply. Let us consider the argument closely.

The externalities argument is based upon a distinction between private goods and services, the use of which benefits only the consumer in question, and public or collective goods, consumption of which necessarily affects the welfare of third or "external" parties. For example, externalities are said to exist when Mr. A paints his house and neighboring householders benefit as a result.[1] Housepainting is contrasted with completely private goods such as bread, which adds to the well-being of only those who purchase and consume it.

The distinction is often made in terms of excludability: in the case of private goods, the consumer is able to exclude all others from the benefits; in the case of public goods, he is not, and so some of the benefits "spill over" onto third parties. A typical textbook makes the point in the following way:

> For a good, service, or factor to be "exclusive", everyone but the buyer of the good must be excluded from the satisfaction it provides. A pair of sox, for example, is a good which is consistent with the exclusion principle. When you buy the sox, it is you alone who gets the satisfaction from wearing them—no one else. On the other hand, a shot for diphtheria is a "commodity" which is *not* subject to the exclusion principle. While the person inoculated surely get(s) benefits from having the shot, the benefit is not exclusively his. Having become immune to the disease, he can't communicate it to other people. They cannot be excluded from the benefit of the shot even though they do not pay for it and even though the person receiving the shot cannot charge them for it.[2]

Even at this introductory level an objection must be made. There are any number of external economies, neighborhood effects, spill-overs, benefits to third parties, which flow from the purchase and use of supposedly private goods. Take, for

*The author wishes to express his gratitude to Charles G. Koch and Edward H. Crane III of the Cato Institute, without whose efforts this work could not have been undertaken, and to Brian Summers of the Foundation for Economic Education for helpful suggestions.

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example, the paradigm case of a private good, socks. First, there is a health question. People who do not wear socks are liable to colds, sore feet, blisters, and possibly pneumonia. And sickness means lost days of work and lost production; it means possible contagion (as in the diphtheria case); it may result in rising doctor bills and increased health insurance premiums for other policyholders. Increased demand for doctors' time and energy will result in reduced medical attention for others. There is, in addition, an aesthetic problem: many people take umbrage at socklessness. Restaurants often forbid bare feet, presumably in the interests of retaining their more sensitive customers. Not wearing socks is also interpreted by some as a disturbing political statement, like flag or draft-card burning. Many mothers—a third party, if ever there was one—rejoice when their "hip" sons finally don footwear. That benefits of sock-wearing "spill over" to these mothers cannot be denied.

The problem is by no means limited to the socks example, for *all* so-called private goods affect second or third parties in some way. The reader is challenged to think of any item the use and purchase of which is not affected with a public interest, i.e., which does not similarly have spill-over effects on other people.

Misguided though the definition may be, the externalities argument still has strong influence. Many economists continue to claim that to the extent that externalities are present, "market imperfections" are created and government action is justified to remedy the situation.

I. External Economies

Leaving aside these objections for the time being, let us consider the externalities argument as it applies to roadways. The argument assumes that roadways are an instance of positive externalities. Any entrepreneur who constructs a road will have to bear all the costs (of labor, materials, etc.), just as in any business, but since highways are an external economy, he will be unable to reap rewards proportional to the benefits provided. For example, benefits would spill over to those who own land near the highways, in the form of increased value (i.e., the road builder cannot charge the beneficiaries for these gains). Other benefits would be enjoyed, for free, by people who simply prefer more and more highways. Nor could the road owner exclude from increased benefits those who gain from the resulting cheaper transport in the form of lower prices for shipped merchandise.

The claim is that private road builders, responsible for all of the costs but only partially compensated (through fee charges) for providing the benefits, would underinvest. The marginal dollar, therefore, would have a higher return in highway investment (were all benefits to be considered) than it would in alternative outlets.

This argument is sometimes put forth in terms of social and private returns. Private returns—the difference between the outlay and revenue which accrue entirely to the individual entrepreneur—are said to be lower than social returns—the difference between the costs and the benefits for society as a whole. In both cases, the builder—whether an individual business or society as a whole—must pay the

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full costs of the highway; but it is possible only for society as a whole to derive the full benefits. The entrepreneur, being limited to the tolls he can collect, is unable to capture the gains in terms of increased land values, etc., which spill over onto the remainder of the population.

Given this alleged tendency of the market to underinvest in highways, the argument from externalities concludes that it is the government's obligation to correct matters by subsidizing road building, or, more likely, by building roads itself. Consider the following argument made by Bonavia:

> The extreme *laisser-faire* doctrine of non-interference by the State depends upon the assumption that social and private net returns are identical—that self-interest is equated with the common weal.
>
> We are only concerned here with one aspect of positive intervention by the State—namely, through investment in transport. It is clear . . . that the object of State investment is to secure output of a kind whose private net returns are lower than its social net returns, and which accordingly tends to be less than it would be under ideal conditions. A railway, for example, may yield high prospective social returns, and yet, in a community chronically short of capital, offer lower private returns than other industries. The State may then find it advisable to invest the communities' resources in railway construction.[3]

This argument is erroneous, for its conclusion does not follow from its premises. Even if we accept the view that private road ownership will indeed result in underinvestment, it does not logically follow that government must step into the breach and make up the deficit. The contention that government should involve itself with the private economy is a moral conclusion, one that can be reached only if there are ethical arguments in the premises. But the science of economics must of necessity be value-free.[4] Therefore, no strictly economic argument can ever establish the legitimacy of government intervention into the economic sphere.

Can we interpret the argument as leading to the conclusion that, since the market will underinvest, given externalities, government action will correct the misallocation of resources by adding to the mileage of road construction? This will not work either. On the one hand, the addition of government investment in roads may decrease the amount of private investment,[5] so that the total amount of road building, private plus public, may fall below the previously established market level and thus worsen the so-called original underinvestment in roads. On the other hand, government, unshackled by any market test of profitability, may so expand the scope of road building that a resultant overinvestment may ensue. If so, a new misallocation will emerge, with an overinvestment substituted for an underinvestment. Further, even if government action results in the correct amount of total road mileage, government management of its domain may be so inept as to erase any allocation gains. If any of these eventualities obtains, and there is little reason to think not, then the argument fails.

There is another flaw in Bonavia's view: his notion of a "chronic shortage of capital." Economies are *always* short of capital in the sense that people would

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prefer to have more; this is because capital is an economic good. If capital is not in short supply, it becomes a free good, or a general condition of human welfare, and thus is not amenable to economic analysis. If, however, "chronic shortage of capital" is meant to distinguish poor from wealthy economics, then it is irrelevant to the issue of externalities. The presence of neighborhood spill-overs has to do only with whether third parties are affected, and they will occur or fail to occur regardless of the wealth of a society.

The externalities argument for governmental roads, although widely acclaimed in the modern era, is by no means recent. On the contrary, it is a hoary tradition. Jackman, writing of England in the mid-1830's, referred to the argument "that [only] those who used the roads should [financially] sustain them," saying:

> But the fact is that it was not alone the carriers, but the public as a whole, that reaped the benefits from good roads, and therefore the upkeep of the roads should not be a charge upon those who used the road, but upon the public treasury, for all derived the advantages from them. It was, therefore, inevitable that in time the turnpike gates should be taken down and a more equitable method adopted to secure the end desired.[6]

The American Henry Clay wrote that it is

> very possible that the capitalist who should invest his money in [turnpikes] might not be reimbursed three per cent annually upon it; and yet society, in its various forms, might actually reap fifteen or twenty percent. The benefit resulting from a turnpike road made by private associations is divided between the capitalist who receives his toll, the land through which it passes, and which is augmented in its value, and the commodities whose value is enhanced by the diminished expense of transportation.[7]

The major flaw in the externalities argument is, as we have seen, the fact that it is vulnerable to a *reductio ad absurdum,* for indeed there is precious little (if anything) that is *not* an example of an externality. And unless we are willing to follow the internal logic of the argument and hold that government is justified in taking control of practically every aspect of our economy, we must, perforce, pull back from the conclusions of the argument from neighborhood effects.

Gabriel Roth wrote the following concerning external economies:

> It is sometimes suggested that roads should not be charged for because they provide "external economies", that is, benefits to the community which cannot *in principle* be recouped from road users. For example, it is said that the construction of the Severn Bridge will stimulate economic activity in South Wales, that the benefits from this increased activity cannot be reflected in the tolls collected on the bridge, and that therefore there is no point in charging a toll.
>
> While this argument is good as far as it goes, it applies in the case of all intermediate goods and services. There is no reason to suppose that the benefit to the community from a new or improved means of transport is greater than the benefit from an improved supply of electricity or steel. Unless it can be shown that roads are a special case, the "external economies" argument . . .in the case of roads becomes a general argument for subsidizing *all intermediate goods and services.*[8,9]

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Shorey Peterson is another economist who seems to understand this point, though he is reluctant to accept its full implications:

> Actually it is easy to endow much of private industry with great collective significance, if one is so inclined. There is no greater social interest than in having the population well fed and housed. The steel industry is vital to national defense. Railroads perform the specific social functions credited to highways. The point is that, in a society such as ours in which an individualistic economic organization is generally approved, it is usually deemed sufficient that an industry should develop in response to the demands of specific beneficiaries, and that the social benefits should be accepted as a sort of by-product. If the steel industry, spurred by ordinary demand, expands sufficiently for defense purposes, further development because of the defense aspect would be wasteful . . . .
>
> Thus if highways, when developed simply in response to traffic needs, serve adequately the several general interests mentioned above, no additional outlay because of these interests is warranted.[10]

On one hand this is a very welcome statement, for it clearly sets forth the thesis that the externalities argument for government intervention into the highway industry must be opposed. If we were to allow state takeovers in all areas with "great collective significance," there would scarcely be any private enterprise left in our "individualistic economic" system.

On the other hand, Peterson seems unable to carry through his own logic. In the sentence omitted from the above quote, he states: "But if, as in the case of the American merchant marine, the ordinary demand is not believed to bring forth what some collective purpose requires, additional investment on the latter account is indicated." He thus denies practically everything he stated before, for there will always be some "collective purpose" which "requires" additional investment on the part of the state because of externalities. If additional state investments in the American merchant marine are indeed indicated for "collective purposes," even though it is now as large as voluntary payments from satisfied customers would make it, then why is not a governmental takeover of the food and housing industries warranted? After all, there is no question, as Peterson himself has pointed out, that food and housing are imbued with the public, collective interest.

William Baumol is one who does not seem to be aware of this problem. In fact he carries the externality argument to almost ludicrous lengths in contending that population growth, of and by itself, is a justification for increasing the scope of government operations because of the neighborhood effects it brings in its wake.

> Thus, increasing population adds to the significance and degree of diffusion of the external effects of the actions of all inhabitants of the metropolis, and thereby requires increasing intervention by the public sector to assure that social wants are supplied and that externalities do not lead to extremely adverse effects on the community's welfare.
>
> Indeed, the very growth of population itself involves external effects. New residents usually require the provision of additional services and facilities—water, sewage, disposal, road paving, etc., and this is likely to be paid for in part out of the general municipal budget.[11]

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The obvious question that cries out for an answer is: Why should we single out government services tinged with externalities, such as water, sewage, and road paving, as examples of areas requiring growth, given population increases? Why not also include services and goods that are usually forthcoming on private markets? As we have learned from Peterson, "There is no greater social interest than in having the population well fed and housed." It surely cannot be denied that a lack of food and shelter will create all sorts of negative externalities. Were a population to be deprived of these necessities, disease, famine, and death would soon appear, commerce would grind to a halt, and the economy, indeed the very society, out of which all external benefits flow, would soon end. How can it be, then, that an increase in population does not create the need for government takeovers of the farming and housing industries, to mention only two, even *before* the stepped up and continued nationalization of such paltry things as sewage and paving, as called for by Baumol? Can it be because we have all witnessed the doubling, redoubling, and doubling again of the U.S. population, since the level attained in the 1770's, with no apparent harm to the nation's farms or construction firms, externalities notwithstanding? Can it be that we are simply unused to the idea of a market in road paving, water, and sewage? Such shall be our contention.[12]

The unique power of the *reductio ad absurdum* is that it casts doubts on the externalities argument, as used by Baumol, Roth, and Peterson. If a nationalized industry can be justified on the basis of externalities, but this phenomenon applies as well to areas where no one wants to see the spread of government enterprise, then one may question just how seriously its advocates take their own argument. They cannot have it both ways. Either externalities justify state enterprise on roads and in practically every other industry as well, or they justify it in no case. It is completely illogical to apply an argument in one case and to fail to apply it in all other cases in which it is just as relevant.[13]

II. External Diseconomies

One phenomenon that particularly infuriates those who see externalities as a justification for intervention is the fact that, under congested road conditions, each additional motorist imposes extra costs on all others, costs which he does not take fully into account, resulting in uneconomic use of resources. Roth states the problem as follows:

> the level of traffic flow will depend on decisions taken by individuals taking account of the costs and benefits *to them* associated with road use. But from the point of view of the traffic as a whole this is an unsatisfactory state of affairs, for the individual road user when making his decision does not—indeed he cannot—take into account the costs imposed by him on others. He assesses his private costs but ignores the road use, congestions and community costs. It follows that so long as the volume of traffic in conditions of congestion is determined by each road user considering only his own costs and benefits, traffic volumes will be larger, and costs higher, than is socially desirable.[14]

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And A.A. Walters expresses it this way:

> Under congested conditions an additional vehicle journey will add to the congestion. The vehicle will get in the way of other vehicles using the road and will cause their costs to increase as they waste more time in traffic jams and incur higher maintenance costs per mile in the dense traffic. Thus the decision by a vehicle owner to use a congested highway involves all other users in increased operating costs.[15]

Unquestionably, under present conditions motorists do indeed ignore the costs they impose on other drivers with respect to overcrowding. Frequently a driver takes account of congestion costs imposed on *him* by others in that he tries to avoid being ensnared in tie-ups if possible. But to suggest that a commuter would refrain from traveling out of fear of slowing down others is ludicrous. The traffic jams endemic to urban rush hours are eloquent testimony to this fact.

Why does such antisocial behavior take place on our highways, and not in other areas where it might be expected? The reason is that our roadway network is in a state of chaotic non-ownership, run by the government, while other settings in which such behavior might be expected, but does not appear, are run by private enterprise.

We can ask, for example, why it is that economists of the Roth-Walters-Haveman stamp never spare a worry about movie goers who impose crowding costs on others? Why do not the "externality economists" wax eloquent in describing the individual movie goer (or opera patron, punk rock devotee, supermarket shopper, hotel patron, department store customer, airplane traveller, or indeed any person who utilizes a resource which is actively sought by many others at the same time) who shows callous disregard for the costs he imposes on others?

One reason is that the institution of private property[16] is allowed to function in these other areas, so that the so-called externalities can be internalized. Externalities are said to be internalized when A, the source of the externality, and B, the recipient, interact on privately owned property, and can be appropriately penalized or compensated for the externalities through fees imposed by C, the owner. In the case of non-ownership of the roads, which presently obtains, each additional driver, A, imposes congestion costs on all other drivers, B, and there is little or no reason for A to desist. But if the road were privately owned, then it would be possible (and indeed profitable) for the owner, C, to reduce negative externalities such as crowding, by raising charges for rush-hour use. C's profit potentialities are in direct proportion to the smooth functioning of the roads; and the fewer the negative externalities, the more attractive will his place of business be, and the more he can charge for additional amenities.

This relation may be difficult to perceive in the case of roads, for we are not accustomed to thinking of roads in terms of private ownership. Let us consider, then, an example which will make the process clearer. A loudmouthed swaggering drunkard is an external diseconomy on a public (unowned) street. He frightens passers-by, but as long as he does not violate any law, no incentive to forbear is

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placed upon him. Let this same worthy put in an appearance in a nightclub, however, and he is no longer an external effect on his fellow customers. He no longer can adversely affect them and expect to be free of countersanctions. He has now been transformed into an "internal" financial liability to the nightclub owner. It is no longer true that A can act without "tak[ing] into account these costs imposed by him on others," for C, as the owner of the premises, has the lawful right to force A to take account of these impositions, by throwing him off the premises if need be. In the private club, the victims (B) of A's unsavory actions cease to bear the complete burden. Though they are the initial sufferers of A's excesses, it is the work of a moment to depart for greener nightclub pastures. The real loser is C, who stands to lose not only revenue, but his entire investment, should his nightclub become known as one that tolerates the likes of A. The existence of bouncers and private guards shows that nightclub owners take seriously the threat of external diseconomies offered by the drunkards of the world.

The drive-in movie furnishes us with a case in which external economies were successfully internalized. When pornographic films were first shown at outdoor theaters adjacent to highways, they created quite a stir. Row after row of tractor-trailers were seen parked at the shoulders of roads, their operators perched atop their cabs to view without paying admission. These spectators, B, received the positive externality (namely, the view of the screen) from A, the theaterowners. Had this situation been permitted to continue, it might have created an under-investment in outdoor theaters, compared with the case in which all spectators were forced to pay admission. Needless to say, it did not long continue. In quite short order the owners in question erected higher fences, forcing all those who valued the view to pay for it. No longer was A conferring a benefit on B, unable to charge him for it. With the advent of the fence, the truck drivers' free view was cut off. The choice open to B was to see the movie and pay for it, or to not pay and not watch. If non-excludability is the hallmark of the externality, then the ability to exclude non-payers from the benefits, as here afforded by the fence, is the key to the internalization.

The objection has been raised that a private market in roads would result in underinvestment because the private developers would not be able to reap benefits of their efforts associated with increased land values and lowered costs of transporting goods. Rejecting free enterprise, most economists call instead for increased property taxes on the increased site value of land abutting a highway by the amount of gain attributable to the increased benefits conferred on the property by the road.[17] As we have seen, however, this argument is without merit. External benefits do not lead to underinvestment. On the contrary, the prospective road builder can recoup the gains by internalizing the potential externality. The ease with which this can be done is evident when we reflect upon the fact that, before the actual building process begins, the entrepreneur is the only one who knows where the road is scheduled to be located (or even that a road is intended to be built at all). All the prospective builder need do is buy up territory likely to gain in value from his road at the old, low prices, which do not reflect the increased values likely to be imparted by the highway.[18]

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The logic of this argument is not lost upon mainstream economists. For example, Cooper perceptively states:

> In the immediate vicinity of a transportation corridor, urban land values tend to increase at a much higher rate from the beginning of facility construction until some time after the facility is in operation. Increases that are more than double or even triple the prevailing growth rate are common. A strong rationale exists for public rather than private realization of this increase in land value. It is argued that, because the taxpayers' money earned the increment, the taxpayers should receive the return. This rationale could justify the purchase of a right of way somewhat wider than needed for actual facility construction, thereby achieving greater flexibility with respect to mode choice and design.[19]

The only problem with this statement, from our point of view, is that Cooper ignores the possibility that the capitalist, too, could purchase "a right of way somewhat wider than needed for actual facility construction." If there is any question about which institution, private enterprise or government, would be better able to predict which land would benefit, and to keep plans in secret until the actual purchase was made, etc., there seems little doubt that the market would win hands down. The profit and loss test alone should ensure this.

However, the problem goes deeper. It is widely claimed that the market cannot function, given external economies. It is then argued that the government could act so as to dispel the positive externalities. *A fortiori,* we must conclude, the market can also internalize these externalities, and more effectively to boot.

III. The "Evil" Free Rider

The indictment against private ownership of roads is sometimes reversed. Instead of the highway owner being accused of not building enough, the non-highway-user who benefits without cost is castigated as a "free rider" who "refuses" to pay for the benefits he receives. But certainly he has not asked for these benefits, and in no case can it be alleged that he has contracted for them.

Let us now consider the gains imparted to the consumers of final goods who benefit because goods can now be more easily shipped. If too large a proportion of the benefits created by the highway are provided free of charge, consumers will gain from lower-priced goods, but a private concern may be unable to cover its costs. But through the advent of externality internalization, the road owner will receive payment for the benefits he is providing. The process is simple. All that the road owner need do is charge a price for highway usage roughly conformable to the savings in transport fees created by the facility. The road will still benefit its users (the shippers) and their customers (the final consumers), but there will be no benefits seeping out, or spilling over, as it were, for "free." Such benefits will be paid for, given a price that makes it still profitable for a trucker to use the road. This point is made by Brownlee and Heller as follows:

> That highways may cut transportation costs undoubtedly is true; but this truth does not warrant special taxes for highways purpose levied against per-

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> sons who do not use the highways. Insofar as truckers pay for using the highways, those persons not directly using the highways can help pay highway costs indirectly through the price system. If appropriate charges for highway use were levied against the military, nonusers would also pay indirectly for the highways from general tax funds spent by them for highway services. The alleged benefits of highways to those who do not use them directly are primarily illusions arising from failure to charge highway users appropriately for the services provided by the highway system.[20]

Without this insight, one might assume that highways necessarily involve the creation of an external benefit by the road building company to the advantage of the rest of the public. According to this reasoning, to the extent that highways are important for the national defense effort, the population at large gains a measure of security from them. But the Brownlee-Heller statement shows this argument to be false, for if the military, like anyone else, were required to pay for (potential) road use, then roads would be no more of a positive externality than shoes, lead, paper, or any other material used by the army.

The Brownlee-Heller statement has not gone unchallenged, however, in the economic literature. According to William D. Ross:

> The highway users cannot theoretically or practically be assessed the full cost of providing low traffic volume connecting highways and access roads and streets. Some of the benefits of such roads are realized in forms other than the direct use of these roads, but the benefits are more than "illusions arising from failure to charge highway users appropriately for the services provided by the highway system." Some nonhighway-user revenues are necessary if adequate support for highway improvements is to be provided.[21]

But Ross's response is unsatisfactory. He fails to cite any theoretical reason why the overwhelming majority of benefits (or at least enough to make road building profitable) cannot be captured in revenue to the private road owner. We have seen how the entrepreneur would be able to capture the increased values of land by purchase at the old, lower prices. And the same principle can be applied to other important sources of externalities. Nor has Ross succeeded in countering the Brownlee-Heller contention that a price charged for highway use would end the free benefits provided to those who use roads indirectly. Indeed, he ignores this point.

Ross does point out a practical problem: "As a practical matter, utility of service or value of service cannot be used as a basis for pricing highway services to the highway user except in the very limited case of toll roads." But modern innovations in electronic counting mechanisms and computers have taken the force out of this argument, if it was ever valid. We must conclude that the external benefits in this case are, in the words of Brownlee and Heller, "illusions arising from failure to charge highway users appropriately for the services provided by the highway system."

Let us take a quite different case. An attractive woman sauntering down the street in a miniskirt provides an external benefit.[22] She is a delight to other pedestrians, yet she is unable to charge them for these viewing pleasures.[23] The

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recipients, according to the theory, however, are the "free riders," who benefit without paying their "fair share" of the costs. Ought they to be forced to pay? Although examples cited by the advocates of the view that free riders ought to be made to pay for benefits received are usually far more sober, the miniskirt case is perfectly analogous. In all cases, the so-called free rider's benefits come to him unsolicited. If it is ludicrous to insist that he pay for an uninvited view of a woman's legs, it is equally so to insist that he be charged, via tax payments, for the losses accompanying "transport of all types."[24] And to call such forced payment "justified," as is often done, is to be guilty of a clear violation of "wertfrei" or value-free economics. No value judgments whatsoever logically follow from strictly economic postulates. Since we are here concerned only with what economics, not ethics, can teach us, we do not consider the question of what, if anything, would justify the extraction of coercive payments from free riders. We must content ourselves with the observation that the receipt of unsolicited services certainly cannot do so.

If the free-rider argument were really valid, it would open up a Pandora's box of truly monumental proportions. For example, a hoodlum could approach anyone walking along some street, smile at him,[25] and then ask the recipient of the smile for a payment of any arbitrary amount (for the value of the benefit that the free rider supposedly enjoys has not been established by any proponent of this view). If the honest burgher refuses to pay, the hoodlum has as much (or as little) right to force him to do so as does Smerk, or his agents, the government, to compel the average citizen to pay for the benefits he receives from "transport of all types."

The so-called free-rider problem would not be limited, however, to such fanciful examples, for our lives are riddled with such phenomena. As Murray Rothbard has written:

> The difficulty with this argument is that it proves far too much. For which one of us would earn anything like our present real income were it not for external benefits that we derive from the actions of others? Specifically, the great modern accumulation of capital goods is an inheritance from all the net savings of our ancestors. Without them, we would, regardless of the quality of our own moral character, be living in a primitive jungle. The inheritance of money capital from our ancestors is, of course, simply inheritance of shares in this capital structure. *We are all, therefore, free riders on the past. We are also free riders on the present,* because we benefit from the continuing investment of our fellow men and from their specialized skills on the market. Certainly the vast bulk of our wages, if they could be so imputed, would be due to this heritage on which we are free riders. The landowner has no more of an unearned increment than any one of us. Are all of us to suffer confiscation, therefore, and to be taxed for our happiness? And *who* then is to receive the loot? Our dead ancestors who were our benefactors in investing the capital?[26] (emphasis added)

IV. Public Goods

Another line of attack on the possibility of a free market in roads is that centered around the concept of "public" or "collective" goods. A pure public good is defined

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by Haritos as one, such as an outdoor circus, or national defense, "which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such goods leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good."[27] The polar opposite of this is the pure "private consumption good, like bread, whose total can be parcelled out among two or more persons, with one man having a loaf less if another gets a loaf more."[28]

Samuelson acknowledges the polar aspects of this partition of goods: "Obviously I am introducing a strong polar case . . . . The careful empiricist will recognize that many—though not all—of the realistic cases of government activity can be fruitfully analyzed as some kind of a blend of these two extreme polar cases."[29] As we saw in the case of the socks, there is no clear dividing line between the two categories and, furthermore, no criteria by which the disinterested observer can objectively distinguish between a private good, a public good, and a blend of the two. Let us consider three examples.

First, to the extent that bread is a source of external economies it is a public good, rather than a private one, since these external benefits are "enjoyed by all in common." In other words, while the bread itself may be a private good in that if one person has more, someone else necessarily has less, the bread *plus* its inseparable neighborhood effects is a collective good, since the externalities from the bread that benefit Mr. D do not in any way subtract from those enjoyed by Mr. E. Mr. D's gain from the externalities, again in Harito's words, "leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good."

Secondly, contrary to what might be assumed, an outdoor circus need not be a collective good at all. If a fence is placed around the festivities and a charge is levied for admission, the external benefits will no longer seep out onto the general public. In addition, if no one in the neighborhood likes circuses, then it is not a good at all. However, if so many people like circuses that crowding results, then it will not be true that one person's enjoyment of the spectacle will not detract from another's. Rather, in the press for a good view, one person's good position will necessarily entail a poor one, or none at all, for another.[30]

A third case, national defense, is one of the reddest of red herrings. This case is of such wide renown and so hoary with tradition that it has gone almost completely unchallenged. But in fact national defense does not fit well with the definition of a public good. One problem stems from differing tastes: not everyone views national defense in the same light. In the words of Rothbard, "an absolute pacifist, a believer in total nonviolence, living in the [sheltered] area, would *not* consider himself protected . . . or [as] receiving defense service."[31] Far from being a collective *good,* so-called defense would be considered a liability. Furthermore, defense protection is supplied through the intermediation of physical tangible goods and services which are very certainly limited in supply—if one person or locale has more of them, another must have less. According to Rothbard: "A ring of defense bases around New York, for example, cuts down the amount possibly available around San Francisco."[32]

Furthermore, contrary to the definition of public goods, the positive external effects of national defense can be largely internalized. While it might not be possible

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to exclude all non-payers from protection, there is no evidence indicating that internalization could not be made to work reasonably well.

How might this work? We might divide the country into sections according to the alacrity with which most people in an area are likely to welcome a private defense agency dedicated to their protection from foreign enemies. Thus, Orange County, California, parts of Arizona, the far west, and the old south might be considered highly interested in safeguarding their liberties in such manner. Mid-Pennsylvania, home of the pacifistic Mennonites, Amish, and other Pennsylvania Dutch peoples, along with the upper west side of Manhattan, and Ann Arbor, Michigan, strongholds of liberalism and anti-war sentiment, would very likely be lukewarm in their reception of such an enterprise. The rest of the country would fall somewhere in between these two extremes.

One manner of internalization of the externalities, on what we might call the "macro level," would be the use of restrictive covenants. People could simply refuse to sell their homes (or rent their apartments) to those who would not agree, and also hold all future owners to agree, to a contract calling for payments to a defense company. Although there might be a few holdouts and recluses, most people in these areas would soon find it in their interest to subscribe. And in the same manner, the areas of the country with a less developed preference for such services would tend to have commensurately less defense provision.

On what might be called the "micro level," the defense company might at some point announce that those who had not paid for service would no longer be protected by its personnel. The company would, of course, continue to protect their own dues-paying members, and indiscriminate attacks on the neighborhood would be repelled. Any attacks which interfered with paying customers would be liable to retaliation from the defense company. But, of course, an attack pinpointed against non-payers, which did not at all interfere with customers, would be ignored by the company. Given these conditions, the provision of defense service loses most of its qualities of being a public good.[33] People who paid for the service would receive it; others would not. As in so many other cases, the notion of a collective or public good is an illusion created by the absence of an actual market. Effective operation of the market depends on excludability. But the important point is that *excludability is not an inherent characteristic of goods.* Rather, the ability to exclude non-payers from benefits is something that can be *learned,* that *must* be learned, if the market is to operate. We cannot first prohibit the operation of the market (by government pre-emption), and then conclude that a market could not function, because of its inability to exclude beneficiaries who do not pay. Of course it would be very difficult for a market which hitherto has been prohibited to suddenly begin effective operation (and it is much more difficult, as we have seen, to *envision* the operation of such a market). But this difficulty is not the result of anything intrinsic. It is because the erection of bigger and better fences, the creation of more sophisticated jamming devices, etc., can come only with practice; if there is no market in operation, there is no chance for the experimentation with the skills, institutions, and management requisite to its development.

Bish and Warren assert that all "public or collective goods . . . are 'non-

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packageable'; that is, in principle, no one can be excluded from consuming them.''[34] But they are incorrect. As we have seen, even in the case of national defense, the paradigm case of the collective good, there exist potential methods and institutions for excluding non-payers.[35] There is nothing in principle to prevent excludability—there is only a lack of a past history of market operation in this area and the limited powers of imagination on the part of economists.

An interesting sidelight on the definitional problem of using national defense as an example of a public good is considered by Charles M. Tiebout. Tiebout contrasts national defense with radio broadcasting, which he holds is *not* a collective good.

> There seems to be a problem connected with the external economies aspect of public goods. Surely a radio broadcast, like national defense, has the attribute that A's enjoyment leaves B no worse off; yet this does not imply that broadcasting should, in a normative sense, be a public good . . . . The difference between defense and broadcasting is subtle but important. In both cases there is a problem of determining the optimal level of outputs and the corresponding level of benefits taxes. In the broadcasting case, however, A may be quite willing to pay more taxes than B, even if both have the same ''ability to pay'' (assuming that the benefits are determinate). Defense is another question. Here A is not content that B should pay less. A makes the *social judgment* that B's preference *should* be the same. A's preference, expressed as an annual defense expenditure such as $42.7 billion and representing the majority view, thus determines the level of defense. Here the A's may feel that the B's *should pay* the same amount of benefits tax.[36] (Emphasis added)

Troubling and puzzling is the importation of value judgments into the analysis. It would appear that the concept of ''public good'' was offered in a scientific, not a normative sense. What, then, are we to make of the statement, ''Broadcasting should, in a normative sense, be a public good.'' In the spirit of the definitions offered, one would have thought that broadcasting (or any other service or good) either is or is not a public good, and that normative judgments were beside the point. This is not the case, however, for later in the quote we learn that A's ''social judgment'' is all that is necessary to justify that B ''should pay'' for national defense. But what is a ''social judgment'' as opposed to, for example, a ''private judgment''? And by what authority can A, a mere individual, make a ''social judgment,'' whatever that is? Suppose that it is A's considered ''social judgment'' that B should, through taxes, pay for can openers. Does that judgment automatically convert these implements into collective goods? Moreover, why need we assume that A is content that B pay less taxes for radio, but not for defense? May we not reverse this and assume that although A is willing that B pay less for defense, he is not so inclined when it comes to radio? Is there anything intrinsic to the goods ''radio'' and ''defense'' that precludes this reversal? And if A's preferences were indeed reversed, would this prove that radio, rather than defense, is a ''true'' collective good?

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Perhaps we should reckon with the institution of "democracy," for Tiebout cites majority support for A's preference. It is majoritarianism, then, that puts the winning side in a position to label its view a "social judgment." But this is very far indeed from the initial definition of a collective good. If this is all his argument amounts to, Tiebout might just as well have spared us all the rigmarole about externalities, public goods, and the fact that A's enjoyment leaves B no worse off. All he need have said is that, if and when, for whatever reason, a majority of the eligible voters decides that any particular good ought to be provided by the government, why then, so be it.

V. Signposts and "Free" Goods

If classifying a good as "public" implies that one person's utilization of that good does not detract from another's, then defining roads as a "public good" presents another problem. If, on congested highways, any one motorist imposes costs on all others, the classification of roads as a public good fails. Conversely, if roads really are an example of a public good, then, by definition (but contrary to evidence), one motorist cannot impose costs on others in overcrowded conditions.

According to Samuelson, "no decentralized pricing system can serve to determine optimally [the] levels of collective consumption." And why is this so? "It is the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given collective consumption activity than he really has."[37] It is for this reason that Savas holds that "public goods are properly paid for by the public at large, for their benefits cannot be charged to individual consumers or small collective groups."[38]

For a more elaborate rendition of this point of view, we turn to Haveman:

> The posting of signs on a highway, for example, is a public good. The benefits cannot be denied to anyone who travels the road. Similarly, when a society provides national defense, the benefits accrue to all of its citizens. Because it is so costly to ration the system of city streets once it has been put into place, they, too, are public goods.
>
> Because one can not economically be excluded from the benefits of a public good once it has been provided, private firms have no incentive to produce and market these commodities. Any potential buyer would refuse to pay anything like what the commodity is worth to him. Indeed, he would be likely to express an unwillingness to pay anything at all for it. He would reason: "If I simply sit tight and refuse to pay, I may get the benefit of the good anyway, if someone down the line provides it for himself—after all, it's a public good." However, if each buyer reasons this way (and presumably he will), the good will not be provided. Public goods will only be provided if collective action, usually through a government, is taken. Only through collective action can the availability of worthwhile public goods be assured.[39]

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Needless to say, there are many compelling problems with this argument. As we have seen, highway sign-posting is a public good only when private ownership is forbidden and no price is charged. It becomes a private good just as soon as the externalities are internalized by the market. It is easy to see this point. No one, after all, would call signs in a privately owned department store public goods. Yet the benefits of the signs, usually posted on each floor as well as on elevators and escalators, indicating the departments located on the various floors, "cannot be denied to anyone who travels" in the store. Is there a case, by analogy, for making government responsible for informing people where dresses, sportswear, and household utensils can be found?

Let us turn now to the doctrine of revealed preference. It, too, has serious flaws. It is our contention that, government interferences into the market apart, *all* external benefits, spill-overs, etc. will tend to cease to exist, provided they are significant enough to make it profitable for private enterprise to internalize them. For example, if the costs of building a tall fence around the drive-in theater are lower than the (discounted) value of the additional receipts the owner expects to receive as a result of its construction, then he will build it. If the costs exceed the benefits derivable, he will not build the fence. But if the benefits to be received are so low, then the externalities and spill-overs are not likely to discourage the businessman from providing the service in the first place.

It has been objected that the government can provide the internalization for free and may thus be more efficient than the market (profit and loss incentives notwithstanding). Let us construct an example. Suppose that in a society of 100 people each would benefit from the provision of a "public good" to the extent of $10. And let us also suppose that the cost of providing the good, in terms of alternatives foregone, is only $50. Thus, with a total benefit of $1,000, less a cost of $50, there would be a $950 profit in this enterprise. The only problem is that, while each of the 100 people would indubitably benefit to the tune of $10, we must also consider the cost—let us assume, $1,000,000—of erecting a fence sufficient to exclude these people from enjoying the benefits for free. Therefore, it cannot be a paying proposition for free enterprise. But what will government do? Rather than wastefully spend the $1,000,000 on the fence, the state simply recoups the $50 cost by taxing $.50 from each of the 100 people, and then provides the service to all comers "for free."

Can we, as strictly value-free economists, conclude that the government will maximize utility by so acting? I submit that we cannot. We cannot, unless, in addition to all the facts heretofore presented, we assume that none of the 100 people will resent being forced to contribute to the scheme via compulsory taxes. And this we have no reason to do. In other words, even while maintaining the assumption that each person values his benefits from the project at $10, and that each realizes that the government's plan will cost him well as everyone else) only $.50, it is still conceivable that a person will so resent being forced to do something, even "for his own good," that the costs to him will vastly exceed the $9.50 gain he stands to capture.

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To deny this possibility is to make an implicit assumption of the validity of interpersonal comparisons of utility. In order to justify government action on utility grounds in this case, one has to assume either that all 100 people are identical, as far as utility is concerned, or, at the very least, that the benefits derived by the 99 outweigh the psychic income losses of the one malcontent. In fact, the assumption of interpersonal utility comparison is not merely implicit in the thinking of mainstream economists. Samuelson, for example, speaks of a "social welfare function that renders interpersonal judgements,"[40] and then proceeds to draw an indifference curve map encompassing the utilities of two or more different people.[41]

This procedure is scientifically invalid, however, as there are no units with which to measure or compare happiness or utility. We may, in ordinary discourse, say that one child likes pickles more than another and that therefore, should any temporary household shortage arise, the "pickle lover" should get first crack. But in so speaking we do not have in mind any units of happiness. We do not imagine that one child loves pickles to a degree of, let us say, 48.2 happiness units, the other child only 24.1 units, and that therefore the first child likes pickles exactly twice as much as the other.

Rothbard tells us that

> there is never any possibility of *measuring* increases or decreases in happiness or satisfaction. Not only is it impossible to measure or compare changes in the satisfaction of different people; it is not possible to measure changes in the happiness of any given person. In order for any measurement to be possible, there must be an eternally fixed and objectively given unit with which other units may be compared. There is no such objective unit in the field of human evaluation. The individual must determine subjectively for himself whether he is better or worse off as a result of any change. His preference can only be expressed in terms of simple choice, or *rank*. Thus, he can say, "I am better off" or "I am happier" because he went to a concert instead of playing bridge, . . . but it would be completely meaningless for him to try to assign units to his preference and say: "I am two and a half times happier because of this choice than I would have been playing bridge." Two and a half times *what?* There is no possible unit of happiness that can be used for purposes of comparison, and hence of addition or multiplication. Thus, values cannot be measured . . . . They can only be ranked as better or worse.[42]

If, then, it is impossible to make interpersonal utility comparisons, we cannot, as scientific economists, conclude that government intervention in "public goods" production will unambiguously lead to an increase in welfare.

VI. Measuring the Unmeasurable

In order to avoid these difficulties, the neighborhood effects economists have attempted to measure externalities. Large numbers of impressive statistics have not been forthcoming however. Rather the work of these economists has been sort of a "meta-measurement," a prolegomenon to any future measurement; benefit measures have been developed and discussed, but no one has, as yet, offered any

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definite findings which purport to gauge external benefits received with any degree of exactitude. Mohring, in a typical statement, writes: "the benefit measures developed in this paper ignore externalities—plus or minus, pecuniary or technological. My basic excuse for this shortcoming is the conventional one: the data required to place dollar values on externalities are lacking."[43]

There is indeed a lack of data placing dollar values on externalities. The problem would appear to be, judging from the above quote, a mere accident: economists have, for some (implicitly) unimportant reason, not yet begun the actual measuring. But in this age of statistics, this is indeed puzzling. Surely a few economists should have taken time out to measure such important data.

Actually, of course, the problem is far more intractible. What is being proposed by those who would attempt to measure the value of externalities is simply the measure of utility. But as we have seen, such an undertaking is impossible and hence doomed to failure. Utility is a subjective phenomenon, rooted in individual preference. There are no units with which to measure utility, a fact that appears to be no more than a slight annoyance to those who would measure it.

In a second attempt, Mohring and Harwitz inform us that in questions of highway benefits "reliance is placed entirely on the body of theory that would likely be used by an economist in attempting to place a value on a dam, a steel mill, or any other productive investment."[44] But this, too, fails. First, the economist, qua economist, simply has no special aptitude as an appraiser of real estate, factories, or any capital good. This is the job, rather, of the businessman, or entrepreneur, whose success depends on his acuity in making such determinations. No theoretical economist, empirical economist, historical economist, nor any other kind of economist, qua economist, has any practical training or experience as an appraiser. Second, there is no "body of theory" that can be used by an economist (or by anyone else) in determining the value of a capital asset. The value the market places on an asset depends upon what people plan to do with it, with its complements and substitutes, upon the reactions consumers are expected to have toward the finished product; it depends upon the course of new discoveries and inventions, upon wars, famines, storms, and so forth. Some people are better able to anticipate the future course of the market than others; but such people are successful entrepreneurs, not economists or other social scientists. But Smerk nevertheless suggests in his book on urban transport:

> External costs and benefits, many of them of a nonpecuniary nature, should be weighed along with the pecuniary costs and revenues internal to the project. Some of the external factors to be considered will be: 1. Over-all freedom of movement; 2. Gains or losses to central city businesses in terms of customer traffic; 3. Gains or losses in travel time for subway riders, public transport riders in general, and motorists; 4. Gains or losses in real estate values; 5. Effects on air pollution and other amenities.[45]

As a statement of the measurement task, Smerk's is par for the course. It is really no more than an exhortation that measurement be undertaken, and a specification of some of the facets to be measured. But it does not help us to overcome

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any of the problems involved. Indeed, it underscores them. How, for example, would we approach a calculation of the value of increasing "over-all freedom of movement"? Even if we choose to ignore the lack of a unit of pleasure and the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility, the task is insurmountable. Nor is his specific suggestion for measuring the benefits of a belt highway in terms of "the resulting increase in sales"[46] of much use. Smerk seems to be saying that we can measure the external benefits of a belt highway by noting the sales of the relevant stores before and after its construction and simply attribute the difference to the road. But there is no constancy in human affairs, and other factors may well have intervened between the first measurement and the second. Tastes and fashions, consumer knowledge concerning alternatives, the prices of substitutes and complements, zoning laws, the alacrity with which laws are enforced—all of these might have changed in the interim. Thus, to ascribe all measured change to the belt highway would be illegitimate. Moreover, the use of econometric techniques, which are commonly employed for purposes of this sort, are unsuitable.[47] Perhaps their most important drawback is that they rely on the facile assumption that discrete, unique, non-repeatable events (e.g., a presidential election, or the economic effects of opening a road at a particular time and place) can be abstracted from to produce a series of random events (i.e., all presidential elections, all road openings). This assumption is necessary for econometric equations; but if applicable anywhere, they are applicable only to truly random events such as flipping a coin or tossing dice.

In terminology employed by Mises, what we have here is a confusion of class probability ("We know, or assume to know, with regard to the problem concerned, everything about the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena; but about the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements of this class") with case probability ("We know, with regard to a particular event, some of the factors which determine its outcome; but there are other determining factors about which we know nothing").[48] Road openings and their effects on sales are, at best, amenable to study in terms of case probability. Econometrics, however, can function only in a milieu of class probability. It is therefore inappropriate to use econometrics in measuring a new belt highway's effects on sales.

VII. Revealed Preferences

We now return to our second criticism of the Samuelson-Savas-Haveman assertion that the market will fail, in the case of public goods, because economic actors will fail to register their true preferences. The basic drawback of this approach to the question of "revealed preference" is the vantage point from which the decision-maker is viewed. Let us, then, focus our attention on how these economists view market participants who refuse to voluntarily purchase the public good on the market. Under their theory a market actor would have as his constant refrain, "Let George do it." Unwilling to spend his own money on a good which he may enjoy through the payment of others, this person contributes to the unlikelihood of private provision of that good.

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An embarrassing question arises: How does the economist propose to determine the preference scales of market participants? It might be suggested that each individual knows his own preference ranking by introspection, and that the rest of us come to know it by simply asking him. Both, however, are incorrect. The latter, the questionnaire method, may easily be dismissed. The empirical unreliability of questionnaires and public opinion polls alone should give us pause for thought. Furthermore, the fact that people lie clearly invalidates this method as a good foundation for scientific economics.

It might be argued nevertheless that the individual himself surely knows his own preferences by introspection. Our answer, once again, is no. The evidence of impulsive buying is overwhelming. How many of us have walked down the street with nothing further from our minds than the purchase of an ice cream cone, only to find ourselves, seemingly without any conscious volition, plunging hand into pocket, relinquishing the required sum, and avidly eating away? Is it that we "really" or "unconsciously" were thinking of ice cream? While that could be true, it need not be. Regardless, however, of the exact psychological mechanics involved, it is clear that, before the purchase, introspection might well have failed to reveal the hidden desire. We must therefore conclude that, in at least some cases, the individual economic actor may not know his own value scales. Motivational advertising, to the extent that it is efficacious, is further evidence of the fact that introspection will not necessarily dredge up the true preferences of the individual. The buyer may think he knows what he wants, but in reality, according to this argument, some of his tastes are at the beck and call of Madison Avenue, and not amenable to his own consciousness.

If true value-rankings can be scientifically discovered neither by introspection nor by questionnaire surveys, how can they be? The answer is through market purchases and sales, or more generally, through observation of human action. Ludwig von Mises expressed this idea as follows:

> It is customary to say that acting man has a scale of wants or values in his mind when he arranges his actions. On the basis of such a scale he satisfies what is of higher value, i.e., his more urgent wants, and leaves unsatisfied what is of lower value, i.e., what is a less urgent want. There is no objection to such a presentation of the state of affairs. However, one must not forget that the scale of values or wants manifests itself only in the reality of action. These scales have no independent existence apart from the actual behavior of individuals. The only source from which our knowledge concerning these scales is derived is the observation of a man's actions. Every action is always in perfect agreement with the scale of values or wants because these scales are nothing but an instrument for the interpretation of a man's acting.[49]

In our previous example, all the prior introspection and questionnaires in the world would not have ineluctably established that the buyer valued ice cream over the money it cost. It was his action alone, in making the purchase, which established that, at least at the time of purchase, the buyer actually valued the ice cream more than the money spent.[50]

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Let us consider a possible challenge to this view. Suppose the ice cream buyer is actually an economist intent upon proving Mises's argument false. Suppose, further, that he hates chocolate and that to refute Mises's theory he goes to the candy store and purchases chocolate. Would he then have demonstrated Mises's theory as wrong by virtue of its implication that he valued the hated chocolate more highly than the money paid for it?

There is more than one way to handle this challenge. First, we might deny that the purchaser really hates chocolate. Following a strict interpretation of Mises, we can reason that whatever his past relationship with this particular treat, his present purchase reveals either that he has changed his taste or that at least he prefers it to the money he exchanged for it. His action has spoken, in this interpretation, louder than all his protestations to the contrary.

Secondly, and perhaps in the present scenario more straightforwardly, we can reinterpret the good that was actually purchased. What was really bought was not only chocolate, but chocolate plus the pleasure of "proving Mises wrong." If it had been a question of the chocolate alone, a true chocolate hater would not have purchased it perhaps at any positive price. It was the compensatory pleasure of attempting to disprove the thesis (that only human action establishes value orderings) that more than made up for the disutility of the chocolate. And if the person went so far as to eat the hated chocolate in order to prove his point, our interpretation would still apply and would be fully consistent with the Misesian view.

The trouble with the revealed preference doctrine put forth by Samuelson, Savas, and Haveman is that it assumes a preference ordering on the part of the general public which is completely divorced from actual choices and actions. There is no room in scientific economics for "true preferences" which are not embodied in action. Samuelson may contend that "it is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals"—i.e., signals which underestimate that person's true value for the collective good—but he cannot show that his interpretation has any scientific validity. This is not to say that his statement is meaningless. Indeed, in the ordinary discourse that has room for measured and interpersonal utility comparisons, it is perfectly sensible. But if we are to remain true to the strict discipline of economics, we shall have to relinquish such loose talk from our vocabulary. There is simply no action that anyone can take which would demonstrate the truth of Samuelson's contention. Samuelson might reply, with an admission that he is citing inaction, not action; a refusal to purchase, not an actual purchase. The problem, though, is that (temporary) nonaction is consistent with all too many other things. No one can logically reason from the fact that a person is not buying something (a "public good") to the conclusion that he really relishes the service in question and is seeking a "free ride." It may be that he simply does not *want* it. We can speculate at length about the different reasons people have for not buying something (distaste, ignorance, the desire to "free ride"), but we cannot as scientific economists conclude from the fact of non-purchase that the person "really" values the good.

If we could legitimately reason in this manner, the sky would be the limit. Once

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we leave the solid foundations of preferences revealed in market action, the imagination is left free. Some contend that parks, roads, and national defense are public goods and would receive underinvestments in a free market. But using the same reasoning, one might hold that Edsels, pickle-flavored ice cream, and kerosene lamps are presently victims of vicious underinvestment because people are secretly waiting for everyone else to buy first, so that they can be free riders. All of these claims have the same logical status. Each is conceivable and expressible in ordinary discourse. But none is supported by demonstrated preference. We must regard all of them as scientifically invalid.

VIII. Isolability

Another argument for government provision of roads, closely allied to the externalities argument, might be called the isolability condition. According to this line of thought, a good or service comes properly under the province of the marketplace only if its benefits can be isolated and imputed to specific individuals. Otherwise its benefits are said to be "diffused," and the good in question must then be supplied by government. As stated by one advocate of this position: "If it were agreed that the benefits from highway improvements are so diffused among inhabitants of a state that it is impossible to isolate individual beneficiaries, . . . [then] highways should be supported from the general fund."[51]

One problem with this reasoning is that if there is really no one person willing to step forward and declare himself a beneficiary, then there remains a serious question as to whether there really are any beneficiaries. As we have seen in the discussion on revealed preference, the only secure evidence of actual benefits is market action—the actual payment by consumers for goods delivered or services rendered. If payment is not forthcoming, then it is only idle speculation to suppose that there are hordes of beneficiaries who are unwilling to reveal their interests through market action.

Secondly, if one is free to justify government roads on this ground, then one is free to defend any state action on the same ground: "X really benefits the masses, although no one person will exemplify this through voluntary payments; the problem is that the gains are diffuse, so that no one beneficiary can be isolated. Therefore government involvement in the provision of X is justified." We would not for a moment accept this argument were it applied to any good or service that the government is not now engaged in supplying. As a defense of the status quo, however, its defects are more difficult to see.

This argument can also be attacked on a third ground. Most contemporary economists are comfortable with the phenomenon of continuity in economics. For example, revenue curves and cost curves are usually drawn as smoothly continuous, presumably depicting economic action as taking place in a series of infinitely small steps. The doctrine of "diffused benefits" is entirely in keeping with this tradition, for here, too, an infinitesimal benefit, so small as to not even be noticeable to the presumed beneficiary, is regarded as "real"; indeed, it is seen as justifying government involvement in the economy.

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It is true that such a conception of the universe is exceedingly helpful in the employment of the mathematical tools of analysis, especially differential calculus. This no doubt explains, at least in part, the popularity of smooth curves, and the acceptability of diffuse, infinitely small gains. However, as Rothbard states, "we must never let reality be falsified in order to fit the niceties of mathematics. In fact, production [and, similarly, benefits from the actions of others or of oneself] is a series of discrete alternatives, as all human action is discrete, and cannot be smoothly continuous, i.e., move in infinitely small steps from one . . . level to another."[52] Strictly speaking, either a gain is noticeable to the presumed beneficiary, or it is not part of his realm of human action at all. If a person makes no notice of something, then for him it is not an element that can affect his choices. And if it cannot enter into his economic decision making, it is irrelevant.

An implicit justification for government activity here is that, while the benefits to any one person in a group are indefinitely small, once their benefits are added up they become substantial. This may work, under some assumptions, in physics and other natural sciences. But in economics, where human action is the touchstone, it is nonsense to posit that a phenomenon which is of no benefit to any one individual can be of substantial importance to a group of such individuals. If no one person can be shown to gain from these "diffuse benefits," it cannot be claimed that the whole group somehow gains.

IX. One Man's Meat Is Another's Poison

Let us consider now a shortcoming, previously alluded to, in the public good view: that tastes differ and that what may be viewed as a benefit by one person may be seen as something to be avoided by another. Samuelson replies to this objection as follows:

> Even though a public good is being compared with a private good, the indifference curves are drawn with the usual convexity to the origin. This assumption could be relaxed without hurting the theory. Indeed, we could recognize the possible case where one man's circus is another man's poison, by permitting indifference curves to bend forward. This would not affect the analysis but would answer a critic's minor objection.[53]

While it is true that, in a formalistic sense, indifference curves could be drawn as concave to the origin to represent disutility, garbage, or negative feelings toward the "good" in question,[54] this answer will not suffice. When we reflect on the fact that Samuelson's use of the concept of public goods to justify government takeovers is based on the assumption that such takeovers will maximize everyone's welfare, we can see the weakness of this answer. A person for whom a good or its presumed external benefits are in fact disadvantageous will actually lose by its subsidization. To the confirmed pacifist, for example, the expenditure of ever more billions of dollars for military purposes leads to increased disutility. And to add insult to injury, Samuelson's argument is used to justify taxing the pacifist, supposedly for his own benefit, to cover the costs of those increasing expenditures. What we have, then, is a situation which forces a person to pay for the provision of a good that he regards as a "poison."

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No minor rearrangement of an indifference curve can erase the harm done to a man so confronted. At best, Samuelson's suggestion of permitting the indifference curve to bend forward provides a means of representing the problem—a geometrical way of stating the dilemma—but hardly a solution to it. It is as if, in response to a complaint that the economy is constantly in a state of disequilibrium, Samuelson were to offer to draw supply and demand curves, showing price to be other than at their intersection. Such a drawing would be an illustration of the difficulty, not a solution to it. It cannot seriously be maintained that a man's lot will be bettered by forcibly extracting his money in taxes, if it is intended that these funds be spent on a good that for him is detrimental. The objection cannot be dissolved by pointing out that the situation where one man's circus is another man's poison can adequately be *portrayed* by forward falling indifference curves.

X. Is Group Action Irrational?

We next consider a version of the public good argument put forth by Mancur Olson. It is his contention that "unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests." And, as a corollary, only "groups composed of either altruistic individuals or irrational individuals may sometimes act in common for group interests . . . even when there is unanimous agreement in a group about the common good and the methods of achieving it."[55]

Olson limits his analysis to groups whose avowed purpose is the furtherance of the economic well-being of their membership: "The kinds of organizations that are the focus of this study are *expected* to further the interests of their members."[56] A group such as a "lobbying organization, or indeed a labor union or any other organization, working in the interest of a large group of firms or workers in some industry, would get no assistance from the rational, self-interested individuals in that industry."[57] Olson accounts for this situation by invoking neighborhood effects and public goods. He writes:

> Some goods and services . . . are of such a nature that all of the members of the relevant groups must get them if anyone in the group is to get them. These sorts of services are inherently unsuited to the market mechanism, and will be produced only if everyone is forced to pay his assigned share. Clearly, many governmental services are of this kind.
>
> It would obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were possible, to deny the protection provided by the military services, the police, and the courts to those who did not voluntarily pay their share of the costs of government, and taxation is accordingly necessary. . . . A common, collective, or public good is here defined as any good such that, if any person X_i in a group $x_1, \ldots x_j, \ldots, x_n$ consumes it, it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group.[58]

And further:

> To be sure, for some collective goods it is physically possible to practice exclusion. But . . . it is not necessary that exclusion be technically impossible; it is only necessary that it be infeasible or uneconomic.[59]

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We have already touched upon the case of unfeasible excludability in our numerical example (in Section V). There, we concluded that the value-free economists could not justifiably deduce that government action, albeit "cheaper," would unambiguously increase utility. Now we must consider Olson's assertion that economic rationality and market action are incompatible. We must ask whether market action in the case of collective goods can function only if the economic actors are altruistic or irrational. We must ask if a large group of individuals can collaborate in the provision of a good whose benefits, once created, cannot feasibly be limited to cooperating members.

In fact, there are literally hundreds of groups now in existence which meet Olson's definition. Labor unions, charities, businessmen's associations, and civic organizations are numerous. Contributions to artistic and musical societies are in abundance. As I write this, a local non-profit radio station is featuring "160 uninterrupted hours of J. S. Bach" and asking for funds. If contributors respond generously, such programming can continue to exist. But each potential contributor may reason that, if many others give, he himself will not be excluded from the benefits. And the same applies for the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the N.A.A.C.P., disease research foundations, etc.

In a recent year, the United Way charity alone raised $1,039,000,000 for such purposes as individual and family services, hospitals and health, social adjustment, and community organization. The American National Red Cross reported donations received totalling $248,700,000, as well as the involvement of 4,262,000 participants in its blood donor programs. And, in this era of government assumption of increasing numbers of functions previously in the private domain, private philanthropy funds were in a recent year as follows: individuals, $21.4 billion; foundations, $2.0 billion; business corporations, $1.2 billion; and charitable bequests, $2.2 billion.[60] One might want to discount some of the corporate giving as motivated by tax incentives, which no doubt did play a role. But the generous financial outpourings from concerned individuals provide ample evidence of the charitable impulses of many of the American people.

Are we to assume, on Olson's theory, that no rational, self-interested persons are involved in these enterprises? I think not. Rather, it seems clear that Olson is guilty of a stipulative re-definition of some rather slippery words such as "rationality," "self-interest," "altruism," and so on. Specifically it would be inconsistent with his theory to suggest that a rational, self-interested person might be interested in the welfare of others to that extent that he derived pleasure from an increase in theirs. But why should this suggestion be considered unreasonable? Olson has definitionally precluded such motives from the realm of the rational.

It might appear that Olson is on firmer ground in using the term "self-interested." Dickens's Scrooge, after all, was not known for his charitable instincts. But on consideration, it does not seem correct to so restrict the word "self-interested" to those who take only their own happiness into account, and no one else's. Surely the word is sufficiently elastic to include as "self-interested" a person who includes the welfare of others around him, such as the members of his

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immediate family, in his own utility calculations. Doesn't Papa Scrooge ever worry about how Li'l Scrooge is making out?

If we are wrong in this contention, and it is somehow shown that true self-interest is limited to consideration of one's own pleasure and no one else's, then Olson's view is of course correct. But even then, Olson's position is much less powerful than he seems to believe, for all we are left with is the argument that those individuals who are strictly self-interested will be unable to coalesce into groups which can work for common ends. But since there cannot be more than a minute proportion of people who really take into account no one's happiness but their own, this would seem to be but a slight impediment to the smooth functioning of cooperative groups.

Another problem with Olson's hypothesis is that it ignores the role of the entrepreneur.[61] To be sure, it is difficult to rouse large numbers of individuals for collective action. And it is difficult to convince people to contribute to the production of any good whose benefits they will receive whether they contribute or not. The entrepreneur is not faced with this problem, however. If the entrepreneur sees an opportunity for profit, he seizes it, presenting a *fait accompli* to the consumers. In the case of a "public good," of course, the businessman will first have to take steps to ensure that there will be sufficient funds forthcoming to defray expenses and leave a profit. Olson argues that in the case of public goods, if one person in a group consumes the service, then it cannot feasibly be withheld from others. The entrepreneur will strive to deal with this challenge by lowering the costs of exclusion of non-payers to the point at which potential revenues warrant investment. The feasibility or unfeasibility of exclusion is not predetermined, but rather a function of market operation. If hitherto government-monopolized markets were suddenly opened to the domain of the entrepreneur, the number of goods and services to which Olson's definition applies would be sharply reduced.

Indeed, the key to excludability may be as cheap as it is obvious. We have seen how a simple announcement of discontinuance of protection for non-contributors might work in the case of defense. Fire protection would probably fall into the same mold. Let just one house burn down, with the private fire department and its apparatus on the scene but refusing to quench the flames—all because the owner not only did not keep the company on retainer, but also refused to meet a "special, emergency price"—and let this event be widely reported by the media, and fire protection would probably cease, from that moment on, to be an example of Olson's public goods.

XI. The History of Private Roads

Perhaps the most telling argument against the externality and collective goods thesis as applied to the provision of roads is the sheer weight of historical experience to the contrary. Roads are nowadays generally considered a paradigm case of public goods, for the very possibility of privately operated roads is dismissed. Yet, prior to the latter part of the nineteenth century, private roads, highways, turnpikes, etc. played an important role in world commerce.

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Privately owned and operated turnpikes were the backbone of the highway network in England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Exact statistics for this time period are unfortunately difficult to come by. However, since the formation of each new turnpike required a specific Act of Parliament, the number of such acts provides "a fairly reliable, though rough, estimate of the progress that was taking place."[62] According to Jackman, the number of such parliamentary acts throughout England in the two decades from 1751 to 1770 was twice as great as the number passed during the previous fifty years. In the north midland counties, the number rose from 55 in the earlier time period, to 189 in the latter. And from the first half of the eighteenth century to the forty-year period after the mid-century mark, there was a 388% increase in the number of such acts passed.[63] And if the percentage increase figures are impressive, the base is no less so. Says Sir Alker Tripp, "it is computed that more than a thousand Turnpike Acts were passed between 1785 and 1810, and that in all there were more than four thousand acts of this character."[64]

From the perspective of history, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that private turnpikes were the norm. For example, in the view of Shorey Peterson:

> But history shows, if two notable instances establish a rule, that when highways come to play a major part in transportation, the view of them in strict collective terms breaks down both in theory and in practice. This was true in the 18th and early 19th centuries when the growing commerce of the Industrial Revolution turned to the public roads for accelerated and cheapened movement. The local governments were unable to take care of the traffic; and turnpike trusts of a quasi-private nature were set up to exploit the discoveries of Telford and McAdam on a business basis. Toll gates might seem offensive by customary usage, but there was effective logic in the idea that highway service, unlike other basic government activities, might be developed by ordinary investment standards and financed by specific beneficiaries, rather than the general public.[65]

If every dirt track, muddy path, narrow passageway, and winding route were counted, of course, the actual mileage of public highways was far in excess of the turnpikes. Jackman, citing two historical reports, calculates that in 1820, "out of a total length of about 125,000 miles of road, only a little over 20,000 miles, or roughly, one-sixth of the whole, was turnpike; and even by 1838 there was only 22,000 miles of turnpike, while the amount of ordinary highway was computed as not less than 104,770 miles."[66]

These statistics are, however, misleading in terms of the actual importance played by the turnpike system, for highway mileage is not a homogeneous commodity. Miles cannot be equated one to another. On the contrary, some mileage is more strategically placed, is of better quality, and supports more important and valuable traffic. And in each of these respects the (quasi) private turnpikes surpassed the public highway system. In terms of strategic location, for example, Jackman tells us that "the greatest industrial and commercial centres at this time [1838] were linked up by practically continuous turnpike roads."[67] In comparison, the less industrialized areas of the country were served by the parish highways. Although these

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served "large and important sections" of the country, the typical rate of industrialization and commercialization was lower there. Further, the parish, or public highways, in comparison with the turnpikes "were generally in a bad state."[68] And, as for the quality of traffic, "turnpike roads were constantly treated by the legislature on the assumption that the traffic upon them was more important than the traffic upon an ordinary highway."[69]

The early American experience of private road building was entirely in keeping with that of England.[70] Replying to the view that individual investment in roads would have to make way for societal or public investment, Wooldridge had this to say:

> Exactly the opposite situation prevailed for most of the important roads of the nineteenth century. From 1800 to 1830 private investment poured into thousands of miles of turnpikes in the United States, notwithstanding the miniscule return the capital earned, and hundreds of turnpike companies built roads that carried the rivers of emigration to the old Northwest and the products of the newly settled states back to the seaboard. For the first third of the century, constructing the roads that were the only means of transportation to and communication with most parts of the West remained a function of private capital. An occasional exception, like the famous National Road going west from Cumberland, Maryland, was a deviation from the norm.
>
> The history of the grandfather of all the turnpike companies, the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Corporation, chartered in 1792, has much in common with all the rest. Pennsylvania had no desire on principle to commit its program of road building to private enterprise, and in fact had resorted unsuccessfully to several other expedients before chartering its first turnpike company. That was the pattern in most of the states where the companies later flourished; in the late 1700's, the states tried lotteries, forced road service from local landowners, grants-in-aid to localities, and even offers of large acreages to contractors if they would build roads to the interior. All these measures failed, as well as the routine expedient of levying taxes and spending them on the highways of the states. None of the states' financing schemes could begin to supply the volume of capital necessary for the improvements the people were more and more vociferously demanding as they in ever larger numbers pushed to the West. An economist might have told the states that if the people needed roads that badly, it ought to be a simple matter to levy sufficient taxes to pay for them, but then as now political reality was not always conducive to economic models, particularly when the people using the roads were often using them to leave the states. *In view of the durable consensus on the necessity of publicly financed roads that developed well before the end of the nineteenth century, it is a little ironic that the private road companies should have been chartered only because it proved impossible for the states themselves to raise enough capital to build the roads everyone seemed to want.*[71] (Emphasis added)

Although the early part of the nineteenth century was the heyday of private road construction, similar efforts are to be found much later on. The Lincoln Highway, for example, was built in the twentieth century.[72] Although not privately owned, its impetus, and much of its financing, came from private sources. The

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idea for a road across the United States was first presented by Carl Fisher in 1912 to a body of automobile and allied businessmen, who, as we can imagine, had an immediate and pressing interest in the construction of highway mileage. And there were dozens of private contributions, including $300,000 from Goodyear and $150,000 from Packard, although these were given to various state governments for actual construction.

Furthermore, if the existence of externalities are held to be an impediment to the private construction of roads, then the existence of private *railroads* throughout American history must be counted as evidence to the contrary, for the external effects are virtually the same in the two cases. Yet the existence of externalities has never acted as a barrier to private railroad construction. Indeed, as of 1950, there were some 224,000 miles of railroad track in operation,[73] virtually all of it privately owned; this is truly ample testimony to the fact that the existence of claimed externalities has not interfered with the construction of substantial railroad mileage.

XII. Conclusion

Finally, even if the externality–public good argument for government intervention were correct, it would be problematic because it can so easily lead to abuses. All sorts of state activities could, on the same grounds, be demanded by those who advocate an ever larger role for government. Baumol warns of this when he says: "The presence of external effects and other grounds for increased governmental intervention need not constitute a license for petty bureaucrats and others to impose their view of virtue and good living on a recalcitrant public."[74]

The problem is, of course, that many governmental operations, supposedly justified on public goods grounds, do not really involve externalities, even in the view of the proponents of this view. Says Peterson, for example:

> But government does not limit itself to activities which are purely of this type [collective or public goods], or, necessarily, even approximately of this type. For a variety of reasons, it may, and often does, enter fields where the principles of the private economy can and do operate, wholly or in considerable degree. This happens when a government undertakes to supply water or gas or electricity or street railway or bus service, when it markets forest or mineral products from the public domain, or even when it provides postal service.[75]

Peterson might well have included the provision of highways in this regard. Savas makes a different but related point:

> public goods are properly paid for by the public at large, for their benefits cannot be charged to individual consumers or small collective groups. However, from this reasonable arrangement, it is easy to leap to the unwarranted implication that public goods paid for by the public through payments to the public tax collector must be provided to the public by a public agency through public employees. There is no logical reason for the mode of payment to bear any relation to the ultimate mode of delivery of collective goods.[76]

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Here, again, we find the government, seemingly basing its actions on the "scientific" arguments from externalities, somehow overstepping these bounds. And we know that this trend is widespread. Modern government has undertaken a myriad of tasks unrelated to the collective good argument (or any other arguments we have discussed here), as Peterson has indicated. As Savas suggests, even when the collective goods argument does apply, the ensuing state involvement monumentally oversteps the bounds set by it. In how many cases does the government limit its activities merely to ensuring that the good is produced? Quite to the contrary, in the transportation sector, as in many others, the government has undertaken the direct provision of the service by a public agency, through public employees.

Given this state of affairs, it behooves us to question the role played by the collective goods argument. Is it, as is implicitly maintained by its adherents, an intellectually sound defense of government activities? Or is it no more than an apologetic for programs which would have been embarked upon regardless of the availability of the argument—and which were actually begun long before the argument was conceived?

NOTES

1. Externalities are usually separated into external economies (positive externalities) and external diseconomies (negative externalities). Although considered by most economists as virtually the same (i.e., as merely opposite sides of the same coin), in our view positive and negative externalities are conceptually different and in need of separate treatment. See Murray N. Rothbard, "Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution," *Cato Journal* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 55–99.
2. Robert H. Haveman, *The Economics of the Public Sector* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970), p. 25. Robert L. Bish and Robert Warren ("Scale and Monopoly Problems in Urban Government Services," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 8, no. 1 [September 1972]: 97–122) define public goods in terms of excludability: "Public or collective goods in economic terminology are 'non-packageable'; that is, in principle, no one can be excluded from consuming them."
3. Michael R. Bonavia, *The Economics of Transport* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954), pp. 48–49. Consider also this statement: "Transportation almost always involves rather strong . . . externalities of one sort or another, so that unsubsidized private operation involves necessarily higher prices, in order to break even, than would be conducive to the most efficient utilization of the facilities" (private correspondence, September 6, 1977, from William Vickrey to the present author).
4. See Murray Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State* (New York: D. Van Nostrand and Co., 1962), p. 883. Also Walter Block, "On Value Freedom in Economics," *American Economist* 19 (Spring 1975).
5. Whenever government competes in the market, it has a chilling effect on private investment in that area, for the government can underwrite its losses out of tax proceeds, and a market enterprise cannot. In this paper we assume the plausibility of a private market in road building. For further explication, see Walter Block, "Free Market Transportation: Denationalizing the Roads," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1979): 209–38.
6. W. T. Jackman, *The Development of Transportation in Modern England*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1916). p. 261.
7. Cited in William C. Wooldridge, *Uncle Sam, the Monopoly Man* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1970), p. 129.
8. Gabriel Roth, *Paying for Roads—The Economics of Traffic Congestion* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 20–21.
9. Roth unfortunately contradicts himself several pages later. Even though he is unwilling to accept the implication that government becomes involved in the production of all "intermediate goods

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and services," he states: "As roads benefit non-motorists by providing facilities for pedestrians and cyclists, and access to properties of different kinds, . . . there is a logical case for charging non-motorists for the use of the roads" (*Paying for Roads,* p. 43). There would be no problem for Roth if the non-motorist he advocated as liable for tolls were limited to cyclists and pedestrians. Although they are certainly non-motorists, it is no less sure that these two groups do use the roads. This interpretation will not do, however, for Roth raises this point specifically in order to justify property taxes as a source of road funding. But property taxes are paid by landowners, who are not to be confused with motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists (although there is obviously an overlap). In basing road charges on property ownership, Roth is using the very externality argument which he had earlier seemed to reject.

10. Shorey Peterson, "The Highway from the Point of View of the Economist," in Jean Labatut and Wheaton J. Lane, eds., *Highways in Our National Life: A Symposium* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 196. See also Herbert Mohring, "Urban Highway Investments," in Robert Dorfman, ed., *Measuring Benefits of Government Investments* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1965). Mohring states that "the aesthetic, humanitarian, and other 'non-market benefit' arguments that are often used to justify subsidies to such areas as education, research, and the arts seem to apply little to transportation" (pp. 231–32).
11. William J. Baumol, "Urban Services: Interactions of Public and Private Decisions," in Howard G. Schaller, ed., *Public Expenditure Decisions in the Urban Community* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963), p. 8.
12. For the same logical error, although presented with a slight variation of emphasis, see George M. Smerk, "Subsidies for Urban Mass Transportation," *Land Economics* (February 1965), where he states: "External economies abound from the provision of transport. In other words, there are many gains and costs which are not realized in pecuniary terms by the enterprise in question, since by its very nature transport confers substantial benefits upon non-users. . . . Assuming operation of public transport to reflect the general interests of the public, transport output therefore seems most justifiably geared to a point of equality between social costs and benefits rather than strict and sole adherence to the forces of the market as expressed in purely pecuniary terms" (p. 63). Assuming, however, operation of merry-go-rounds to reflect the general interests of the public, and assuming also, as is the case, that these mechanisms, too, are replete with external benefits, does it follow that merry-go-round output therefore seems most justifiably geared to public rather than private enterprise? If so, then it would seem that there is nothing that cannot be claimed for government operation.
13. It would be consistent, although nonsensical, to accept the externality argument in favor of government road monopoly—and nationalization of all other industries wherein externalities obtain—as well. For opposing positions, however, the reader might consult F. A. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom* and *Collectivist Economic Planning,* and three books by Ludwig von Mises, *Bureaucracy, Planning for Freedom,* and *Human Action.*
14. Roth, *Paying for Roads,* p. 34. Haveman writes the following: "when the next semi-truck pulls onto the freeway with the effect of delaying your arrival and that of all other freeway motorists, you and your fellow drivers are the objects of a spill over cost. It is characteristic that . . . the person harmed bears identifiable 'costs' for which he is *not* compensated. Moreover . . . this person would be willing to pay something to avoid bearing the spill over cost" (*Economics of the Public Sector,* p. 34).
15. A. A. Walters, *The Economics of Road User Charges,* International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Staff Occasional Paper #5 (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), p. 11.
16. If the government charged a price for highway use, such a user fee might deter congestion and lead motorists, in effect, to take account of the congestion costs they impose on others. For an analysis of why a privately owned road system is preferable even to a government pricing mechanism, see Block, "Free Market Transportation."
17. Winch, for example, calls for "taxes aimed to recoup from property owners the costs of the road attributable to the traffic which has conferred benefits on that property" (David M. Winch, *The Economics of Highway Planning* [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963], p. 130).
18. He may not be able or even willing to purchase *all* of the land that may conceivably be benefited

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from his construction, but this will not affect the viability of private roads anymore than will the advent of helicopters, able to see over even the highest of fences, ruin the possibility of a private market in outdoor movies.

19. Norman L. Cooper, *Urban Transportation: An Answer* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1971), p. 23.
20. O. H. Brownlee and Walter W. Heller, "Highway Development and Financing," *American Economic Review* 46 (May 1956): 236.
21. William D. Ross, "Comment," *ibid.*, p. 257.
22. To most males, that is. In the eyes of competitive women, homosexuals, perhaps, and strict, fundamentalist clergymen, presumably, she is anything but. (We deal in Section IX with the question of one man's meat being another's poison.)
23. Even such an externality can be internalized by the ever watchful and vigilant marketplace. For an account of how this is accomplished by the management of Maxwell's Plum restaurant, in New York City, see *New York* magazine, March 1978, and for a similar account involving Sardi's restaurant, see *United* magazine, November 1982.
24. Smerk writes: "As the general public benefits from an increased supply of transport of all types, tax receipts from the general public may with justice be used to make up losses" (George M. Smerk, *Urban Transportation: The Federal Role* [Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1965], p. 230).
25. Or do anything else, whatsoever, that could theoretically be interpreted as being of benefit to the free rider. Remember, it has not been proven that the free rider must admit to being a beneficiary. Smerk and other writers have been willing merely to assume that the general public benefits from an increased supply of transport.
26. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State,* pp. 888–89.
27. Z. Haritos, "Theory of Road Pricing," *Transportation Journal* 13, no. 3 (Spring 1974): 54.
28. Paul A. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (November 1955), p. 350.
29. *Ibid.*
30. On this point, see Stephen Enke, "More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics: A Rejoinder," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (May 1955), pp. 131–33; Julius Margolis, "A Comment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (November 1955), pp. 247–49; and Charles M. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," *Journal of Political Economy* (October 1957), p. 417.
31. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State,* p. 884.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 885.
33. This is not meant as an exhaustive brief for a free market in defense services. Such treatment would take us far beyond the scope of this paper, but the interested reader can consult Murray N. Rothbard's two books, *For a New Liberty* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), chaps. 11, 13, and *Power and Market* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for Humane Studies, 1970), chap. 1; as well as Wooldridge's *Uncle Sam, the Monopoly Man,* chap. 6.
34. Bish and Warren, "Scale and Monopoly Problems," p. 100.
35. For examples of excludability of road users, see Haritos, "Theory of Road Pricing," pp. 55–56.
36. Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure," p. 417.
37. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics* (November 1954), pp. 388–89.
38. E. S. Savas, "Municipal Monopoly vs Competition in Delivering Urban Services," in Willis D. Hawley and David Rogers, eds., *Improving the Quality of Urban Management,* vol. 8, *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews* (London: Sage Publications, 1974), p. 483.
39. Haveman, *Economics of the Public Sector,* pp. 42–43.
40. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition," p. 351.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
42. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State,* pp. 15–16. See also John V. Krutilla, "Welfare Aspects of Benefit Cost Analysis," in Schaller, *Public Expenditure Decisions,* p. 227; and Edward F. Renshaw, "The Economics of Highway Congestion," *Southern Economic Journal* (April 1962), p. 374. Winch writes that "unless we make some assumption about interpersonal comparisons

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[of utility], economics can offer no help in problems of policy such as that of highway planning" (*Economics of Highway Planning*, p. 38).

43. Mohring, "Urban Highway Investments," p. 231.
44. Herbert D. Mohring and Mitchel Harwitz, *Highway Benefits* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1962), p. 7.
45. Smerk, *Urban Transportation: The Federal Role*, p. 236.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
47. See Bruno Leoni and Eugenio Frola, "On Mathematical Thinking in Economics," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 1, no. 2 (Spring 1977): 101–10; Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (1949; Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), pp. 107–115, 350–52; and Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 277–80.
48. Mises, *Human Action*, pp. 107, 110.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 94–95.
50. Rothbard asks "by what mysterious process the critics know that the recipients [of external benefits] would have liked to purchase the 'benefit.' Our only way of knowing the content of preference scales is to see them revealed in concrete choices. Since the choice concretely was *not* to buy the benefit, there is no justification for outsiders to assert that B's preference scale was 'really' different from what was revealed in his actions" (*Man, Economy, and State*, p. 890).
51. D. Netzer, "Toll Roads and the Crisis in Highway Finance," *National Tax Journal* 5, no. 2 (June 1952): 109.
52. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, p. 643.
53. Samuelson, "Diagrammatic Exposition," pp. 350–51. Neither will Tiebout's attempted reformulation do: "A definitive alternative to Samuelson's might be simply that a public good is one which should be produced, but for which there is no feasible method of charging the consumers" ("A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure," p. 417). We can ask Tiebout (and Samuelson, too) how we can *know* that consumers really value a good for which they have no way of registering a demand. If there is no feasible method of charging a consumer, then he can never make his desires known.
54. This is not the time to expound on the general difficulties of indifference curve analysis. It is worth noting, however, that it is impossible to reveal indifference through the usual market procedures of buying or selling. Thus, an economics based on the view that preference orderings are seen only in human action must entirely reject indifference curve analysis. For a full exposition of this point, and a general discreditation of indifference as an economic category, see: Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State*, pp. 265–67; and Walter Block, "On Robert Nozick's 'On Austrian Methodology,'" *Inquiry* 23: 422–37.
55. Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 2.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
60. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).
61. For an excellent exegesis of the importance of the entrepreneur, see Israel Kirzner, *Competition and Entrepreneurship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
62. Jackman, *Development of Transportation*, p. 233.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 233–34.
64. Sir Alker Tripp, "The History of the Modern Highway in England," in Labatut and Lane, *Highways*, p. 43. According to Sidney and Beatrice Webb (*English Local Government* [New York: Longmans, Green, 1922], pp. 155–59), toll roads, or turnpikes, were in operation as early as 1662 and 1670 but did not achieve a modest frequency until 1691. The earliest historical example on record, however, seems to be much earlier: "Authority seems to have been given in 1267 to levy a toll in Gloucestershire Manor" (*ibid.*, p. 157).
65. Peterson, "The Highway," pp. 192–93.
66. Jackman, *Development of Transportation*, p. 234. The two reports he cites are "Report from the Committee of the House of Commons to Consider Acts Regarding Turnpikes, Roads, and

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Highways, 1821" and "Report of the Royal Commission on the State of the Roads, 1840." The Webbs give rough support to these estimates in stating that 23,000 miles of roads were administered by the Turnpike Trusts in 1835. They add the fact that, in the same year, 1,100 Turnpike Companies collectively levied an annual revenue of more than 1.5 million sterling and had a debt of £7 million. (Webb and Webb, *English Local Government*, p. 152.)

67. Jackman, *Development of Transportation*, p. 234.
68. Brit. Mus., T. 1157 (4), "Highways Improved," p. 2, quoted in *ibid.*
69. Joshua Scholefield and Archibald W. Cockburn, eds., *Pratt and MacKenzie's Law of Highways*, 18th ed. (London: Butterworth, 1932), p. 467, quoted in Tripp, "The History of the Modern Highway," p. 43.
70. See also Bonavia, *Economics of Transport*, p. 53, concerning the Italian experience with private roads, or *autostrade*.
71. Wooldridge, *Uncle Sam, the Monopoly Man*, pp. 129–30.
72. See *The Lincoln Highway*, Lincoln Highway Association (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1935).
73. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976*, p. 604.
74. Baumol, "Urban Services," p. 14.
75. Peterson, "The Highway," p. 192.
76. Savas, "Municipal Monopoly," p. 483.

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

G. Stanley Hall: A Priestly Prophet of a New Dispensation*

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I

Shortly before he died, G. Stanley Hall (1844–1924), who played a leading formative role in American psychology, wrote:

> In the views I have attained of man, his place in nature, his origin and destiny, I believe I have become a riper product of the present stage of civilization than most of my contemporaries, have outgrown more superstitions, attained clearer insights, and have a deeper sense of peace with myself. I love but perhaps still more pity mankind, groping and stumbling, often slipping backward along the upward Path, which I believe I see just as clearly as Jesus or Buddha did, the two greatest souls that ever walked this earth and whom I supremely revere.[1]

G. Stanley Hall had been to the mountaintop, he had seen the promised land, he had as it were "achieved another new birth superimposed on that of adolescence."[2] He had achieved a new vision, and thus a new birth, the birth of a "superman." Hall believed that like Jesus and Buddha before him he was called to preach a new gospel, a new dispensation which would lift "Mansoul" to its next higher stage of evolutionary development. That new dispensation was, for Hall, the "New Psychology" which he helped structure and create. Thus in the end, Hall saw himself as a prophet of a new faith, indeed, a new religion. He had pierced the veil of appearances, he had seen the path that "Mansoul" must take if it was going to avoid "slipping backward along the upward path."

Only a year after Hall wrote those words, his remains lay in state. As the local minister rose to eulogize his memory he started out with every apparent intent of praising him. Shortly, however, the minister lost control of himself and ended his eulogy by severely attacking Hall, thereby creating somewhat of a small scandal.

*The original version of this paper was presented at the Eighth Libertarian Scholars Conference, November 1981, in New York City. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Geoffrey Lasky, Chris Shea, and Judith Mogilka for their research assistance, as well as to numerous faculty and students at the University of Illinois for their helpful criticism and dialogue.

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Yet it was appropriate, if not customarily proper, for a Christian minister to attack Hall for the beliefs that he had propagated. Hall had passed beyond Christianity, beyond the faith of his fathers, toward a new heretical faith which he thoroughly believed represented the wave of the future. It was just a few years earlier that Hall had published his two-volume work on *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology* (1917). A close friend advised him, "that it were better that he had died than write so blasphemous a book."[3] It is not surprising that the minister lost his composure, thereby unleashing a controversy which in itself very well symbolized Hall's life.

Hall was never a stranger to controversy. For example, it was Hall who stood up in a professional meeting and pointed out to Josiah Royce that his "theory of idealism was similar to, and no better than, masturbation."[4] It was the same Hall who, as a bright young student with unconventional ideas, so startled his congregation of faculty and students with his trial sermon at Union Theological Seminary, that the faculty member whose custom it was to criticize, despairing of mere criticism, knelt and prayed for his soul.[5] Well he might have, for neither the mind nor the soul of G. Stanley Hall would ever long embrace orthodoxy or be free of controversy.

Aside from Hall's unconventional religious ideas, he was unquestionably a trailblazer of American psychology. He was the first person in the United States to receive a Ph.D. in psychology (under William James), the first president and founder of Clark University, the founder of the psychological laboratory at Johns Hopkins, the founder of the American Psychological Association, and the originator of a number of journals, including the *American Journal of Psychology, Pedagogical Seminary, Journal of Religious Psychology,* and the *Journal of Applied Psychology.* Perhaps more importantly from the standpoint of education, he can broadly be considered one of the founders of educational psychology and, more specifically, of the child-study movement which by the twentieth century evolved into the field of child psychology. A good case can also be made that Hall was one of the key founders of genetic psychology in America. His study of the child, the adolescent, or the adult was always conducted within the structural framework of biological and cultural evolution. For good or ill, his primary research method remained historical. Hall, however, was just as much a purveyor of unconventional psychoreligious pedagogical thought as he was a founder of organizations.

G. Stanley Hall had a profound effect on the shape of American psychology particularly in the areas of child psychology and adolescent development. Through more than 11 books, hundreds of articles, and 2,500 lectures in over forty states, as well as the effect his teaching had on thousands of students, Hall made an impact on American educational thought which was powerful and lasting.[6] As founder of the child study movement which became the Department of Child Study of the National Education Association in 1893, Hall directed the attention of educators toward child growth and development. When this movement began to decline after the first decade of the century, many of Hall's students became leaders in the new field of child psychology. Among the most important of these was Arnold Gesell

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who not only fully adopted his mentor's view of the recapitulation theory, but also went on to coin the term "maturation," which reflected Hall's emphasis on the integration of physiological and social growth.

Perhaps Hall's most important work came in 1904 when he helped shape America's conception of adolescence with his two-volume work entitled *Adolescence, Its Psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education.* This massive work of 1,337 pages sold over 25,000 copies.[7] The most influential books on psychology, however, remained those written by William James. Merle Curti once estimated that nine-tenths of American teachers who studied psychology at all in the period from 1890 to 1910 read James. Although James's two-volume *The Principles of Psychology* and his *Psychology: The Briefer Course* may be considered benchmarks for the field of psychology in the 1890's, it is important to recognize that the term "adolescence" does not appear as a significant category in either work. It was Hall, rather than James, who helped create adolescence as a distinct discipline of psychology and it was Hall who substantially shaped its content.

The professionalization of the category of adolescence took place during the period when child labor laws were being enacted and compulsory education laws were being enforced. The high school was also coming into existence and was the most rapidly growing educational institution of the first half of the twentieth century. Delayed entrance into the job market meant delayed entrance into adulthood. Adolescence also meant that awkward state of being sexually mature according to nature while remaining socially immature according to the needs of society. The professional psychologist of the twentieth century not only helped mediate the problem by propounding the "scientific" existence of adolescence, but also propagated the illusion that it was in fact caused by nature itself. More than any other single individual, Hall helped conceptualize that development. To be sure, not all of Hall's ideas were accepted by other educators, yet in a very real sense, he pointed the way. William H. Kilpatrick seems to have been correct when he asserted, "America believes, as does no other country, that education must be based on a study of psychology. That this is so is due in no small degree to the influence of President Hall."[8]

Hall's profound influence upon the fields of psychology and education came not only from his extensive organizational activities and writings, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, through his teaching and lecturing. Hall was a charismatic personality who left a significant imprint on his students. One of his students, Lewis M. Terman, who influenced the testing movement and study of the gifted child, spoke of Hall as a "source of inspiration." Another, Arnold Gesell, who left his mark on early childhood study, said of Hall, "There were giants in them thair days!"[9] There were still others who felt more atune to the Hall student who said, "I only touched the hem of his garment, and yet it was a healing touch. I would not give the months I spent at Clark for any other period of my life."[10] As hundreds and then thousands of his students who had "touched" the hem of his garment took up posts in normal schools, universities, and child development

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institutes around the country, they invited Hall to give literally thousands of sermon-like lectures to ever wider audiences of uninitiated early childhood teachers.[11] Thus this priestly prophet of a new dispensation preached a gospel of a new psychology, a new faith, indeed, a new religion across an economic, social, and religiously troubled cultural landscape. This paper, then, will focus primarily on some selected key tenets of Hall's psychoreligious ideology, considering both the personal and cultural conditions which seemed to play a part in the development of this new dispensation, and will attempt to critically analyze some of the social significance these ideas have had in the context of twentieth-century history.

II

Hall, like his mentor William James, lived and felt the tension existing between a God-centered world view which appeared to be on the wane and a man-centered scientific world view which appeared in the ascendant. Although both men perceived the same problem, each man responded to it differently. James's peculiar personality structure as well as his unique personal family experience led him in his search for resolution of the tension between these two world views to adopt, as he did in *Varieties of Religious Experience,* a pragmatic, therapeutic justification for religious beliefs. He did so, it seems, out of his own admitted personal need to have meaning inherent in his universe. His "God," his "More," one recalls, was a "helping," a healing "More," which made it possible for James to travel that dark, lonely road back to mental health. Thus James pragmatically opened wide the door of religious belief. Virtually any belief could be counted as true so long as it "works." The meaning of "works" was to be found in the criteria of "help" or healing. Thus one might conclude that a mystical experience like that which James had was true for the individual. Hall disagreed with this thinking and saw James as a mystic who was "hungry for the supernatural," whose very "splendid individuality also passionately craves immortality."[12] Hall further complained that James virtually expelled "every sexual element from religion,"[13] whereas Hall pictured himself as laying considerable stress on the subject. Hall thoroughly rejected James's pragmatic epistomology as well as his personal quest for immortality.

From James's perspective, Hall seemed to seek an "ultra phenomenal identity." Here he was perceptive. James came to the *Varieties of Religious Experience* position having had a mystical experience and having felt its healing effect. He thus came to the conclusion that there just might be something "More" to the universe, even immortality. Hall, however, as a naturalistic evolutionist believed

> that the soul is freighted with traces of everything that life has experienced from its first dawn, that the experience of the individual now is the tiniest outcrop in consciousness of his entire psychic life. Hence he does not bank much upon the philosophy of experience, but regards the mind from the natural history point of view and says that nine-tenths of all our processes are submerged.[14]

Thus, Hall accounted for all the strange religious rites, practices, and beliefs of mankind as links in the great evolutionary chain of being and saw Christianity as

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one, but "consummate religion" based on love, which could not adequately be studied or fully understood without taking into account not just the great ethnic religions "but the very lowest savage forms" as well. Hall furthermore believed that James saw religion as primarily the individual's "inner life and struggle from the efforts of the soul to become at one with itself."[15] While Hall conceded that that, too, was the case for him, he also insisted that religion was "the largest thing in the world including all aspects for truth which the scientist feels and the desire for purity."[16]

Thus Hall passed beyond Christianity, beyond a belief in the supernatural, beyond a belief in personal immortality. This became clear when in *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology* he sought to psychoanalytically explain away the divinity of Christ. The new faith that Hall came to preach was the faith that, "Man is the only divinity, or at least God is only a collective term for man."[17] What immortality one might gain was only a collective immortality to be found in the concept of "Mansoul." To Hall, all scientific evidence pointed to the fact that the only life that existed after death was to be found in the next generation, which carried with it the whole history of the racial experience. With a Vico-like timelessness Hall's scientific genetic psychologist, as the high priest of "Mansoul," could read and ultimately understand the total anthropological record of life from the lowest form of amoebic life to the highest development of a superrace. Thus through this superior scientific knowledge of the past, the present might be understood and the next higher stage of evolution might yet be collectively realized. This, then, was a glimpse of that "ultraphenomenal identity" which James thought he saw in Hall.

Hall's disagreement with James was more than a personality difference. In philosophic and religious outlook, they were poles apart. As early as 1891, when reviewing James's *The Principles of Psychology,* Hall praised James for his breadth of view and numerous insights but went on to criticize his work for being too introspective and not based substantially enough on hard experimental data from the laboratory. The new psychologist, Hall insisted, is a scientific researcher who is imbued with the "spirit of reverence, and a sense of unity and law at the root of things" which is "religious to the core, in every sense which the best philosophy of religion makes basal."[18] "Psychology," he further asserted,

> is even to be the means of rescuing religious oracles from degredation and re-revealing them as sublime ethnic verbal editions of God's primative revelation in his works. It will also show what is in man, and may some day become veritable anthropology, the science of man in fact as well as in name, a gospel of love and work, where the heart is not subordinated to the head, and the emotions are not slighted, or the great ethical lesson of hereditary good and ill, psychogenesis and adolescence doubted and disparaged . . . . the new psychology of the present and future is based less upon introspection than upon observation, experiment and experience, individual and ancestral.[19]

Hall thus rejected James's psychology as largely misdirected. By the opening of the century, James had lent his support to both psychical research and

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Emmanuelism. In a draft article on "Eddyism and Emmanuelism" in 1909, Hall critically and pointedly attacked James's pragmatic solution to the religious crisis of the times.[20]

Pragmatism, Hall argued, is "roughly speaking the doctrine that the criterion of truth is practicality, as we said, that is true that works well and that is truest that works best. This is a new touch-stone or test of truth very distinct from many others that have been proposed: viz, the easiest and simplest way of thinking the universe coherent, with a system of reason, clearness and certainty, and all the rest."[21] What "works well" is ultimately that which helps one "attain pleasure and escape pain; to live and not to die."[22] In other words, if a belief in God, the virgin birth, St. Christopher, or any kind of fetish worship has a healing effect, it therefore works and is therefore true. James's pragmatic test of truth, when applied to religious experience, Hall argued, would lead directly to the justification of Eddyism and Emmanuelism as well as any other kind of faith-healing cult. "Just as Eddyism is absolute idealism taken literally and put to work, so Emmanuelism is pragmatism taken literally and put to work. Just as pragmatism is the inevitable consequence of absolute idealism, so Emmanuelism is the inevitable consequence of Eddyism. Both are the shadows of things academic thrown athwart the popular mind."[23] Continuing in this vein, he argued that the church might open "a department of comparative therapeutics" where definite information might be obtained to determine the healing power of "fetishism, atomism, invocation of ancestors, incantation, or Christian doctrines."[24] Pushing his point even further, he said, "In a word, if Hoodooism works better, then if we converted the Hoodooist into an Emmanuelist and his patients into church patients, so that the healing power would be lost, would not some truth also be lost if pragmatism be sound?"[25] Thus he concluded that in the field of therapeutics, "Emmanuelism is the department of applied pragmatism, the theoretical part of which is on the other side of the Charles."[26]

The pragmatist, Hall insisted, held a basically selfish view of knowledge in which the investigator "goes in for truth because of what he can get out of it."[27] While the test of truth for James is to be found in its "cash value," the pragmatic investigator, Hall argued, invariably asks, "What is there in it for me or mine? Its only possible morals is Eudaemonism. Its religion is to get post-mortem pleasure and avoid post-mortem pain. It seeks God to enjoy Him, to use Him, and profit by Him in this world and the next, to enlist Him to work serviceably."[28] In contrast to James's therapeutic faith in something "More," Hall argued the case of the realist by arguing that truth "is not a matter of taste or of personal edification; but that which holds for all, everywhere, at all times, and under all conditions."[29] In the end truth may not heal, and may, in fact, be nauseous if not lethal. In the broadest sense of the term, the "pure science"[30] researcher functions beyond pleasure and pain, good or evil. Reflecting his own views, he wrote:

> No one has known what real truth is who is not convinced of something that is independent of all, even the highest anthropomorphization, something that would be the same for all conceivable persons or orders of being, the same

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> if man had never existed or that would survive if he were to become extinct, something utterly indifferent to all his wants, prayers, or pains. Even if no such truth is yet attained, the belief that it exists, because possible, makes pragmatism only a philosophy of pedagogy, of the stages of Wärden, evolution, or recapitulation. It deals with the phenomena of the way and not with those of the goal.[31]

From the perspective of "true" philosophic thought, however, "Man must believe in something absolute, non-relative, subspeciaternitis, something above volition and desire. He at least tends to believe in that which at its highest parallels and participates in being."[32] The new scientific psychologist thus will not rest easy with pragmatic truth but will cut beyond the veil of appearances and continue his quest for "evolving a larger composite photograph of the entire kingdom of man's soul."[33] Hall's scientific psychologist had passed, he believed, beyond the old philosophies of idealism, realism, and pragmatism, the last of which only "fits old men and over-ripe civilizations."[34] Turning directly to James and Dewey, he asserted that pragmatism

> is an asylum for those who have long and earnestly striven with the riddles of the Sphinx and found them insoluble, who have much preferred the pursuit of truth over its possession and had but little experience with the latter, who have seen the fondest hopes of their prime decay, who have, to be more definite (like James), been ignored by their tribe in Germany, and who so condemn the choicest products and methods of Teutonic philosophy, or like Dewey have found that too many of the problems he most loved to cultivate were aborting, or like Schiller that the systems in which they were reared were slowly losing vitality and interest.[35]

While Hall seemed to confuse philosophy with personality, he firmly believed that his conception of the new psychologist as a scientific researcher was a conception born to a new stage of evolution, the superman stage, which was in tune with youth itself and the coming new order.

Hall's reaction to Eddyism and Emmanuelism, however, was more than a reaction to James's pragmatic philosophy of religion. More importantly, it reflected the sensitivity which Hall shared with James concerning what really was at stake in the contest between a scientific naturalistic interpretation of human experience and the traditional religious interpretation.

For Hall, this most fundamental issue was reflected in the birth of the new Christian Science faith of Mary Baker Eddy. As evolutionary doctrine swept the cultural belief system of the West, the rising scientific secular explanation for human affairs seemed more and more plausible. Even the traditional conception of sinful behavior often seemed better explained as sickness. Under these circumstances, many in the traditional Christian faith reached back to attempt to recover the faith of the early Church fathers and with it the healing function of the early Church. The teaching and preaching of Mary Baker Eddy fell on welcome ears. The very use of the two terms which many found a contradiction in terms—Christian and Science—was a masterpiece in symbolic construction. Christian Science seemed

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to fit the times and, especially, the American cultural landscape. Hall argued that the rise of Christian Science on American soil was entirely understandable, for it incorporated both the absolute idealism that was implicit in New England transcendentalism and the Yankee practicality which ideologically took the form of American pragmatism. When James spun out the pragmatic roots of his faith in terms of healing and Bronson Alcott asserted that "a thing is in fact only a think,"[36] the twin roots of Christian Science were thus firmly set in fertile American soil.

As Hall put it, "If mind, idea, or God is all in all, it follows that there can be no real error or sin and so no true defect or disease."[37] While most Christians believe evil is the absence of good, some further believe that, like evil, defect or disease can have no intrinsic reality. Mrs. Eddy was the "boldest of idealists" because "she takes the idealistic theory of knowledge, on the one hand, and the healing ministry of Jesus, on the other, literally and puts them to work in the service of man. Never was there such a masterpiece of pragmatism. Not only is it true because it works well; but because it heals, it seems personally true to those who could never otherwise have understood."[38]

Eddyism, Hall argued, was the "crassification" of idealistic metaphysics and the healing ministry of the early Church. For Hall, the turning back to the early Church, and its traditional function of faith healing by casting out demons and calling for divine intervention, is only a way of cutting behind the more excellent way of science on the one hand, and the more sophisticated cultural complex theological interpretation of Scriptures on the other. "But for the masses and for the half cultured, it is a fortress of refuge. They can now be both Christian and scientist in a cheap and easy way, and glimpse and feel in their vague, dumb, essentially vulgar wise, the verities of both."[39] This movement, he argued, is propelled by the strongest of all motives, "to be well." Here, too, is to be found the impulse of the "Yogas" and the "Mahatmas," as well as other "faith healers." Emmanuelism as a healer's ministry is, he argued, only a weaker version of Eddy's idealism and faith healing. They stop short of Eddy's logic and fall back on the traditional Christian Church practices when it becomes convenient.

The issue between a "man-centered" view of the universe and a "God-centered" view was implicit in the argument over whether Christian Scientists and other irregulars should be prohibited from practicing medicine. Exactly where the roles of the medical doctor and the religious doctor began, and where they left off, was not at all clear. Hall was highly critical of a practice in Boston which required patients received by Emmanuelists to have been diagnosed beforehand and referred to them by a family physician. This made the psychotherapeutic healing ministry of the Church dependent on the secular medical physician. Hall fully appreciated the problem that the modern scientific approach to healing was at odds with the traditional function of the Church. Clearly a supernatural vs. a naturalistic diagnosis was at stake: was the afflicted individual to be accounted sinful or was he or she sick? Standing on the brink of that wide and deep chasm which separates a naturalistic world view from a supernaturalistic view, Hall took his stand implicitly on the naturalistic side and went on to finally argue explicitly that that was

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the only "real" side. First he chided both sides for their failure to train their experts properly. Neither the minister nor the physician, he argued, has the expertise necessary for the task. In these matters "only the trained and experienced psychologist is competent. And it is to him and not the clergy that the chief appeal should be made."[40]

> The patient's consciousness must often be operated on and reconstructed in the way demanding the utmost expert skill. The average medical practitioner is usually quite as incompetent to make this diagnosis as the clergyman is to apply the cure; and error is dangerous in both processes. This, then, is the place for the psychological clinic. Unfortunately, neither in theological seminaries nor in medical schools is psychology generally taught; and the members of each profession are therefore incompetent to orient themselves properly in this vast and complex field. It would seem almost a commonplace that those whose profession it is to cure or save souls should have given a little attention to the study of what the soul is; and it would seem equally obvious that, as there are mental complications in every disease almost no attention is paid to this subject in medical education.[41]

At the very time Hall was writing this, William James was writing to John D. Rockefeller and asking for a million dollars to support the care of the insane. In the decades ahead, the mental hygiene movement would take form, supported by foundations, just as the psychological training of doctors would be sponsored and nourished by the foundations, bringing into existence the professional psychiatrist.[42]

Hall argued that the upper, more culturally sophisticated classes ought to learn an object lesson from the emergence within their midst of such sects as Christian Science and Emmanuelism. Hall believed the three great dangers which they must learn to resist in the future were: "1. the dreamy metaphysics that exalts mind as something supreme and aloof from matter rather than its yoke-fellow in the world; 2. a habit of gross, literal verbal interpretation of scripture that sometimes falsely passes for orthodoxy; 3. a medical therapy that, however erudite, addresses the body only."[43]

His solution to the problem was, then, as follows: "Each camp—doctors, philosophists, religionists—should admit its own share of responsibility for this curious excrescence of culture, and also at the same time should profit by the modicum of truth in and go on to develop a therapy that does justice to the psyche, a thought system that does justice to the soma, and a faith that not only comports with but supports science."[44] Man is, as Schleiermacher and Hegel have each shown, delicately balanced upon a sense of utter dependence on the ultimate powers that rule the world. Power is conceived of respectively as "God or laws of nature, on the one hand, and a sense of freedom and independence, on the other."[45] Hall argued:

> Man is the only divinity, or at least God is only a collective term for man. Now the average man oscillates more or less between, but usually well within, these extremes. Perhaps he is rather humble toward what he feels above and arrogant to what is beneath him. Religion inclines him toward the dependent, and science toward the independent, term of these antitheses.[46]

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The faith curist, Hall contended, tends to rely too much on supernatural intervention and thus dissuades the sufferer from taking the hygienic action necessary to work out a cure. Often the cure depends upon the strengthening of character, and thus a religion of the heart which overflows into free and easy helping can be most destructive. Jesus freely healed the sick "without price and effort on their part."

> The new ecclesiastical dispensaries should surely now require more of their patients than Jesus did of His. To faith must be added works, and the diligent use of all the now multifarious means of betterment: regular living, wholesome diet, plucky, hand-to-hand fights with temptation, turning on of every interest and instinct, the assiduous development of poise and self-control, perhaps change of inveterate habits by a strong, imperious, old-fashioned act or resolve of pure will.[47]

This was Hall's regime of strong, robust, virile living which he later elaborated in his work, *Morale* (1920). For Hall, however, the fundamental role of the Church was not that of healing:

> Again, freedom from all suffering, distress, and even health itself, precious as it is,—these are not the highest things in the world. The church does not exist chiefly to relieve pain or to cure ailments. Its higher function is to minister to the betterment of the soul and to improve morals, to make men more manly and women more womanly, and to make the world nobler, kinder, and purer.[48]

While the Church may act to relieve misery it must act to "advance righteousness; it must improve the best to elevate the race in every humanistic virtue. It should do its noblest work for those who are themselves best endowed and in the best health and environment, and be a potent agency in advancing the kingdom of the super-man who is slowly evolving a higher human type from the finest specimens of the *genus homo* now existing. If it saves the weakest and worst only, it does perhaps a sorry service to human evolution."[49] Often he argued that pain is the best tonic or "pedagogue." What we needed, he insisted, was a more "virile Christianity." Hellfire, pain, and suffering are needed for most to be moved to greater action. The Church's mission, therefore, must be protected from those who would feminize the Church with a loving, easy-going, "mollycoddling Saviour that merely speaks peace to his soul without arousing and arming him to fight."[50] The truly virile Christian, "does not wish to be a chronic beggar, even for healing grace or any other favors from heaven."[51]

The new "therapeutic dispensation" must be brought into the service of an evolving Mansoul. "Although science is rapidly enlarging its domain at the expense of faith the vast majority of Christian people do not and will not think rigorously or judge sensibly about biblical or ecclesiastical matters. So long indeed have men been forbidden to use their reason here in fields that they have grown unaccustomed to do so."[52] Thus it is that religion had become the cultivator of the irrational flying in the face of common sense as well as science itself. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that church people

> easily accept absurdities like spiritism and Eddyism; and it is they especially who consult those who advertise short and easy methods of cure, to the utter

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> abandonment of all their critical faculties. Slowly expelled from physical nature, miraculous agencies have been driven to their last shelter in the subconscious regions of the human soul, and here in Emmanuelism, their refuge and stronghold, they resist the advances of the youngest and highest of all sciences, psychology, which is destined sooner or later to reign supreme and alone in this field.[53]

James took a far more sympathetic approach toward the Emmanuelist movement, arguing that some "healing" and therefore some possible "good" may come from ministers practicing therapy. Hall and Freud took the opposite view. Both had rejected the supernaturalistic explanation for human phenomena.

Hall believed that great chasm between the natural and the supernatural would be closed when scientific psychology, as the new dispensation, superceded the whole domain of religion. Once this had happened, he believed, we would have one world where the God of Mansoul is worshipped for what He truly is: man as a being who is potentially capable of becoming a superhuman being.

Psychology, then,

> lays upon itself the problem of explaining on rational grounds even the lofty and intricate activities of faith, to understand inspiration, to give the *rationale* of all that is supernatural, to formulate the mysteries of atonement for the soul and therapy for the body, and to annex the whole domain of religion as its own, until most truly pious man will be most ashamed to believe what is intrinsically preposterous, and the laws of mental hygiene itself will forbid this type of thought now so common among exigites and apologists of accommodating and making surds seem rational, of peddling and compromising as if there were two very distinct world orders instead of one only, and keeping ignorance and superstition in countenance in place of better knowledge. Any natural, psychic activities can suspend or alter the laws of the cosmos.[54]

Unlike James, who stood at the same precipice, and for whatever personal reasons thought he saw something "More," Hall knew that what he saw was only the mirror image of "Mansoul" in himself. James still wished to straddle both worlds. Hall, on the other hand, had passed beyond the world of his childhood and into the world of twentieth-century evolutionary, naturalistic humanism. Hall clarified his position best in saying, "When psychology has expelled the last vestige of magic from religion and taken its place, then only shall we have a psychotherapy that is true to its name."[55] William James could not have made this statement. In retrospect it is clear that the directors of the Gifford lectures had missed a significant opportunity when they failed to invite G. Stanley Hall to follow the James lectures on the *Varieties of Religious Experience* with a series of Hall lectures on the religious contours of Mansoul. In many ways, Hall had more to say on the subject of religion than James.

III

It is not at all surprising that Hall's ideas about religion and psychology should turn out to be so very different from his mentor's. Even though Hall was a student of James and both were born and bred in that same bracing New England atmosphere

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which had produced Emerson, Thoreau, Hawthorne, as well as Melville, and both men could equally romanticize the plight of the poor,[56] James's personal and social environment was vastly different from Hall's. Unlike Hall, James was born into wealth and suffered from an overzealous, permissive, yet all-controlling, loving father whom he could not bring himself to hate. James grew to manhood in the midst of Swedenborgian mysticism and had a lively cosmopolitan, intellectual and cultural homelife. From his earliest years, James traveled to and from Europe, and was at home on both sides of the Atlantic. He met virtually all the cultural leaders of America as well as western Europe. The opportunities for intellectual and cultural growth were abundant. Shortly after receiving his M.D. degree in 1869, he suffered a severe emotional breakdown, the effects of which would from time to time incapacitate him, yet not restrict him from becoming the most outstanding leader in American philosophy and psychology of his time. Thus, James was reared in an upper class, urban, cosmopolitan environment which made him at home in the life of most urban centers of the western world.

In striking contrast, G. Stanley Hall was brought up in a rural atmosphere on a number of farms near Ashfield, Massachusetts. His father was a hardworking, fairly aggressive, outspoken man who instilled into his family the puritanical virtues of work and thrift. His mother was a loving, kind, religiously guilt-ridden, and highly puritanical woman with a keen sense of duty beset by a personality which compelled her to shrink from conflict. As a child, Hall learned just how difficult it was to eke out a living on that rocky, hilly countryside of Ashfield. There he learned to romanticize the harsher dimensions of life as he grew deeply attached to his mother.

It was his mother who urged him to take up the ministry, while his father wished him to work the farm. It was his mother in whom he confided and it was she he romanticized into virtual Madonnahood. Hall's adult conception of the proper role of women was no doubt dictated by the way he had romanticized his mother. She became for him the ideal woman: quiet, religious, lovingly kind, always understanding and eager to avoid conflict. Hall surmised that he had inherited from his mother his reluctance for combat, while he believed he had inherited from his father his drive to do and act with determination. Throughout, it is clear that he loved and idealized his mother, but just barely respectfully tolerated his father. As a youngster he traveled with his father on his daily chores and often listened to the barnyard chatter when neighbors gathered. Looking back over these early years from an adult perspective, he firmly believed that he had had the very best educational experience possible.

In earlier years, Hall had been embarrassed, however, when he and his father drove their hogs to market through the center of the town, just as he was when his father spoke up in public gatherings. Later he was embarrassed when he had to introduce his parents to his teacher, Mark Hopkins, while attending Williams College. These kinds of embarrassments, then as now, are not uncommon among lower class youth who become socially mobile. Out of such an environment, Hall nurtured a life-long inordinate drive to succeed.

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At Williams College, Hall had a religious conversion experience which turned out not to be very traumatic. After receiving his A. B. degree from Williams in 1867, he attended Union Theological Seminary until 1869 where he eventually received a B.D. degree.[57] At Union he was introduced to New York City's urban environment. There he did missionary work in the slums, preaching to "fallen" women and attempting to persuade them to mend their ways. The famed preacher, Henry Ward Beecher, made it possible at this time for Hall to visit Germany and encouraged him to do so. Germany opened up a completely new way of life for Hall, both intellectually and socially. Upon his return to Union the following year, he stayed with the Seligman family of New York City serving as a tutor and then went on to teach at Antioch College. In 1876 Hall enrolled at Harvard where he took the first Ph.D. degree in psychology under William James. On borrowed money, Hall then returned to Germany, where he became deeply engrossed in the intellectual culture as well as the sexual and social life of the community. After his staid New England environment, his life in Germany was a freeing and opening experience. Hall returned from Germany with an American bride. By this time he was deeply in debt and barely making ends meet by lecturing at Harvard and Williams. In contrast to James's situation, Hall's younger years were marked by financial struggle. Both Charles Eliot Norton and William James helped persuade President Gilman that Hall was the right man for the new job at Johns Hopkins. There he founded the first psychological laboratories. Thus, Hall was 38 years old before he settled into his first really permanent position. By 1888, he moved to Worcester, Massachusetts, where, with the donations of Jonas Clark, he founded and became the first president of Clark University.

When approaching the height of his career, he met with misfortune. Within a period of two years both his parents died. This was followed shortly thereafter by the accidental asphyxiation of his wife and daughter in their home. No sooner did this all happen than Jonas Clark began to withhold financial support from the university, leaving Hall embroiled in a battle to maintain the university in spite of severely limited resources. Personnel problems at the university multiplied when William Rainy Harper raided Hall's faculty for the new University of Chicago. Under these trying circumstances, Hall continued to manage Clark University, work on the Child Study Movement and found the *Pedagogical Seminar Journal.* His life, however, continued to be marred by tragedy. Hall would not remarry until 1899 when he chose Florence Smith, who ten years later had to be committed to an insane asylum for arteriosclerosis.

Throughout these years of personal crisis Hall nevertheless continued a very productive career in which he clashed over and over again with his professional colleagues on a variety of issues, and the evidence strongly suggests that, unlike James, Hall did not have an emotional breakdown which would incapacitate him in his work. Dorothy Ross, Hall's biographer, attempts to make the case that Hall suffered from a manic-depressive problem. Her argument is based largely on Hall's admission in his autobiography that he had moods and cycles in his life which if carried to extreme could be pathological. To be sure, Ross correctly notes that

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Hall passed through a crisis period in his life in the early 1890's, but this crisis was induced by a set of unfortunate personal circumstances unrelated to his personality. The remarkable thing is that Hall managed to stay as sane and productive as he did under such trying circumstances. Ross's case seems strained. The fact that Hall wrote with a good deal of hyperbole does not indicate that Hall had a hyperpersonality condition. Otherwise one would, it seems, have to indict an entire generation of writers who wrote in this grand style. Hall wrote in this much exaggerated fashion most of his life. He wrote as he lectured—in a charismatic fashion—making ample use of emotionally charged symbols. While it may be the case that Hall was emotionally repressed, as Ross further claims, it also is the case that he had very clear outlets for expressing his emotions in his teaching, lecturing, and writing and remained constantly open to new experiences.

Hall was a complex person. The product of a puritanically repressed background, Hall learned to lie at a relatively early age. It is interesting to note that, while Hall was explaining and justifying his learning to dance to his father on highly moral grounds, he was at the same time drinking beer and carrying on a very active sexual life with a number of women. Propelled by a distinct distaste for conflict, he further cultivated his ability to lie, an ability which in later years got him into numerous difficulties with his professional colleagues. Hall carried on a secret life. He was at home in virtually all the bawdy redlight districts of the major cities of western Europe and America. He loved prize fights and took lessons in all kinds of exotic dancing, just to get the feel of it. While Hall's secret excursions into the redlight district often smacked of voyeurism, Hall insisted he was merely carrying out his scientific study of humanity from the underside. The psychologist, he claimed, must know humanity in its fullest, most complete form. Hall was always open to new and different experiences.

Considering his penchant for new experiences, it is little wonder that it was through Hall's efforts that Freud and Jung were brought to America and introduced to American audiences. Shortly after Freud's visit to America, Hall's seminars took up the topic of psychoanalysis and the interpretations of dreams, studying the works of Freud, Janet, Jung, Adler, and others. Hall became so fascinated by the psychoanalytic process that he began analyzing himself. After some difficulty he finally decided to enlist expert help. He wrote a chapter for his autobiography detailing this analysis but then had second thoughts and decided to destroy it.

Although never the rational thinker that Freud was, nor ever as convinced of the importance of sex in the total analysis of the unconscious, Hall nonetheless experimented with psychoanalysis and attempted to make use of it. For example, in 1913 he wrote Dr. William Allen White:

> We had last year a Dream Club of advanced students, which resulted in all studying their dreams, out of which I got some genetic and other conceptions. We have a Freud and Catharsis Club too which is thrashing out considerable material.[58]

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However, to White's request for an article on the subject he said, "I do not feel mature enough in the subject yet."[59] In a previous correspondence with White, it seems clear that Hall was working toward his own particular brand of psychoanalysis. White wrote:

> In your letter to me sometime ago you said that you felt that the Freudians had not seen the full application of their work in all its breadth, that in dream analysis for example they had not seen the genetic implications.[60]

Despite his lack of clinical therapeutic experience, which he regretted, Hall pushed on to pursue his study of the unconscious and its implications for his overall psychological study of the religion of Mansoul. His efforts were uniquely different from Freud's for, as Hall put it:

> As Freudians find sex, so our analysis finds religion at the root of all. Religion is a passion of the soul comparable in universality and intensity with sex, like it subject to and even made morbific by repressions. Like sex too, religion has left the soul full of its secondary qualities which it originated and inculcated, but has often left later to stand for themselves, so that their *de facto* religious origin is not apparent. As much all over the aesthetic field is due to the long circuiting of sex, so speculative philosophy is only the long circuiting of religion, and its sublimation into the intellectual field. As the root impulse of sex is to propagate another generation, so the root impulse of religion is to prolong the life of the individual by getting his soul born into another world.[61]

Hall thus used Freud's material in a very different way. His efforts along these lines bore fruit in his major, two-volume work *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology* (1917) in which he attempted to psychoanalyze away the divinity of Christ.[62]

Hall was still experimenting with the use of psychoanalytic procedures when he wrote *Recreations of a Psychologist* (1920). Following in the well-worn path of Schopenhauer and Otto Rank, Hall played with the psychological meaning of the double turned onto himself. Thus, in his chapter "How Johnnie's Vision Came True," one meets Hall's *anima* and *animus* atop Mt. Hatch with the role of his father and mother clearly in view. Eventually the two were reconciled into one personhood. In the later decades of his life, Hall made extensive use of Freud, Adler, Jung, and other analysts, though never to the satisfaction of any one of them.

Nevertheless, in one of his last letters to Freud he made the following comment: "But your own achievements are far and away beyond those of any psychologist of modern times; in fact history will show that you have done for us a service which you are not at all extravagant in comparing with that of Darwin for biology." Continuing, he reflected on his personal indebtedness to Freud:

> I think I have read about everything you have ever written, although in my limitations, there is much that I did not understand, and a little which, if I did understand it aright I have to question. Nevertheless, I owe to you almost

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> a new birth of intellectual interest in psychology, as is perhaps best shown in my Jesus Book, which, without this, would not have been written.[63]

Although Hall was indebted to Freud, he was also indebted to many others. Hall fashioned his own unique vision of Mansoul from material he freely borrowed from those who impressed him. In a real sense Hall's two-volume work on *Adolescence,* his two-volume work on *Jesus,* and his work on *Morale,* correctly subtitled "The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct," while drawn from a variety of sources can also be read as a comprehensive overview of his faith in Mansoul, of which he believed himself to be a prophet:

> The true psychologist born and bred, yearns with all his heart for a deeper understanding of man and of all his psychic life, past and present, normal and morbid, good and bad, at all stages of his life . . . . He feels a peculiar urge to be intensely human and to glimpse, feel, or strive in his own brief little life for everything possible to man's estate . . . . Thus he is called today to be a sort of high priest of souls as in an earlier age the great religious founders, reformers, and creators of cults and laws used to be, for the day of great leadership in these fields seems to have passed.[64]

As a prophet and high priest of a new faith, Hall embraced the new sciences of anthropology, ethnology, and psychology, and further believed that the greatest knowledge which men can command is that of the evolutionary stages of the race which are implicit in each person's soul. For some, that knowledge is possible, for others it is not. Hall believed that one could look into one's own soul and there see the soul of all humanity. Hall railed all his life against absolute Berkeleian idealism and the cultist mysticism to which he thought it would lead. Hall's own idealism was tuned into his biologic nature, with its own "delicious mysticism" from which he would read the "true" story of mankind, not from viewing humanity from afar, but from the sensual biological inside. With Hall one begins to see what it means to think with one's blood. It is from inside the self that both the past and the future of humanity is to be read. Just as all great nineteenth-century figures believed that the key to humanity and its progress was to be found in mankind's history,[65] so too, Hall believed that the genetic history of the race, from the slime of the sea to the temple of the superman, held its highest knowledge. Some could read that history correctly, while others could not:

> Genetic sense or the vitalistic category of *werden* is, in men of true sympathy, so strong that they *have* to believe not only in anthropomorphization but in animism, if not, indeed, in hylozoism. This gives us a new orientation toward both origins and destinies and shows us that the highest knowledge of anything is a description of its evolutionary stages.[66]

Some men lose their connection with their past and the spirit of the true *Volk.* Without it they cannot lead; with it they can move mountains.

> Those who lack this sense have lost rapport with childhood, even their own, and with arrested and undeveloped souls everywhere. To maintain this vital contact is essential for all teachers and leaders of men or for success in

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> literature, art, poetry, politics. Here one must know how life and the world seem from under the smallest and thickest skulls. It is the secret of the charm of writers like Goethe, Tolstoi, Dickens, Hugo, and Strindberg . . . .it enables us, when the problems of life become too hard, to retreat or regress to a more juvenile point of view and flee for a time from reality without the danger of becoming permanently arrested like dementia praecox cases, but rather to be refreshed and reinvigorated as by an Antaeus touch of mother earth and to gain strength for a fresh advance, which thus gathers to itself a new supply of momentum from the whole upward push of the *élan vital,* which is behind us all.[67]

To look inward is to look backward in communion with mother nature, as "when the overstrained city man goes back to the farm of his boyhood and reverts to the simple life, getting into close contact with mother earth, children, and animals, and giving way to all the inherited reactions of the human soul to the fresh and first-hand impressions of nature."[68]

Hall had drunk deeply from that strange neo-romantic well of primitive Volkish German culture and had applied it freely to his own New England countryside. Hall stayed in touch with his childhood, with his primitive, savage ancestry. Throughout his life he periodically returned to his family farm where he used to play as a child, strip off all his clothes and roll down the hillside. He thus tuned himself into his true nature by turning off the "inherited reactions of the human soul" which were really only the more recent civilized accompaniments of his Mansoul. Here, Hall was very specific:

> I finally several times enjoyed the great luxury of being in complete undress, and of feeling pricked, caressed, bitten and stung all over, reverting to savagery as I had often done as a boy by putting off civilization with all clothes and their philosophy. It was a curious experience of lightness and closeness to nature.[69]

While these experiences may have had some therapeutic validity for this fifty-five-year-old President of Clark University, they represented much more. They were, in fact, his way of connecting his soul to Mansoul as it lay dormant in his rural childhood environment. It was the vehicle by which he believed he could freely move back to the primitive, savage stage of the race and even beyond when life first took shape. Periodically, Hall pierced what he believed was the veil which separates the time-bound consciousness from the timelessness of the unconscious. Thus he tuned into the cosmic landscape of Mansoul. Hall's descriptions of those trips into his childhood past were marked by a remarkable vigor and clarity which at times strikes one as almost photographic.[70] He had a tremendous desire and longing for the presumed safety and security of his romanticized past, a past which he freely fabricated.

While it may seem a bit strange for the President of Clark University to be rolling down the hillside in the nude, recapturing his youthful vigor, it is not so strange in light of the many unconventional psychotherapeutic practices that have flowered in more recent popular culture. As noted earlier, for Hall this was more

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than therapy; it was the very mechanism by which he tuned into his evolutionary past. The practices and experiences he described were not new to those who had studied Volkish culture in Germany, nor were they new to certain groups within the larger youth movement in Europe much of which had its origins in the same impulse: the desire to rid one's self of the dead accretions of bourgeois civilization while experiencing the more authentic sensations of a primitive past. In many ways Hall's essays remind one of Marcel Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past.* Proust's quest, like Hall's, was a search through the labyrinth of the Vico-like timelessness of the unconscious self for the reconstruction of a more real, true, universal world of being. Both men reflected the acute alienation which affected many sensitive souls at the turn of the century. Rural life was passing, as urban industrial life was literally laying waste to that which they believed to be more real. Hall thought he saw a way out. He used the concept of evolution as the key element in structuring his story of Mansoul, which for him gave respite from the artificiality of civilization and recaptured the youthful spirit of earlier savage cultures. Although a complete analysis of the ideas which Hall plugged into his evolutionary landscape is not possible here, it is crucial to consider some of them in order to catch the critical social thrust of his new dispensation.

IV

Although Hall tended to be open to many different trends and seemed to embellish the overall structure of his thinking with whatever was current, much of the basic structure of his thought appeared early in his career. Upon his return from his second student tour in Germany in the early 1880's, he gave lectures and wrote articles which reflected this developing structure. In these articles there appeared the recapitulation theory,[71] the conflict between science and religion, and Hall's attempt to resolve the issue by way of suggesting the role for a new psychology.[72] These articles also reflected his conception of the child in need of stern shaping of its will and character. In later works he would talk about "coercing and breaking"[73] the will of the child, but the concept of *Dressur,*[74] which he believed necessary for certain stages of child development, was already very evident in his highly significant essay, "The Education of the Will." As Hall said, "The only duty of small children is habitual and prompt obedience."[75] In sweeping Fichtian terms, Hall introduced the reader to "muscle-culture," the need to develop strong bodies, and "will-culture," the need to develop strong character. Hall argued that character must be shaped and molded so that those people who are destined to become obedient servants will, in fact, become obedient servants.

While many will become fixated at the lower evolutionary stage of savagery or even barbarism and will, therefore, need "obedience" training, there are also those few who will go beyond the civilized stage itself. These few are the rare moral geniuses who are destined for leadership, who can be trusted to be trained to follow their true nature:

> Thrice happy he who is so wisely trained that he comes to believe he believes

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> what his soul deeply does believe, to say what he feels and feel what he really does feel, and chiefly whose express volitions square with the profounder drift of his will as the resultant of all he has desired or wished, expected, attended to or striven for. When such an [sic] one comes to his moral majority by standing for the first time upon his own careful conviction, against the popular cry, or against his own material interests or predacious passions, and feels the constraint and joy of pure obligation which comes up from this deep source, a new original force is brought into the world of wills.[76]

This kind of character formation for the masses of people would be an "impractical if not dangerous ideal." Hall insisted it was fit only for the "rarest moral genius.' Most people are not fit for freedom. Hall argued,

> For most of us the best education is that which makes us the best and most obedient servants. This is the way of peace and the way of nature, for even if we seriously try to keep up a private conscience at all, apart from feeling, faction, party or class spirit, or even habit, which are our habitual guides, the difficulties are so great that most hasten, more or less consciously and voluntarily, to put themselves under authority again, reserving only the smallest margin of independence in material interests, choice of masters, etc., and yielding to the pleasing and easy illusion that inflates the minimum to seem the maximum of freedom, and uses the noblest ideal of history, viz., that of pure autonomous oughtness, as a pedestal for idols of selfishness, caprice and conceit.[77]

Hall's estimate "for most of us" is strangely similar to that of another charismatic leader who, in a little more than a decade after Hall died, took the public stage in Germany and announced: "Providence has ordained that I should be the greatest liberator of humanity. I am freeing man from the demands of a freedom and personal independence that only a few can sustain."[78] Hall, like Hitler somewhat later, saw the bulk of humanity as eager and willing to escape from freedom. Both men sensed the underlying yearning for security which had overcome western man. Both were highly sensitive to the alienating effects of industrial progress and the renting of western consciousness from an agrarian to an urban life. Finally, both seemed intuitively aware of the kinds of symbolic uses of the past which seemed to heal that wound. While Vilfredo Pareto analyzed this need for "security" by the "western mind" in what was becoming a fractured culture, others would write about the conditions of man as alienated from nature, God, and even man himself. Running throughout Hall's work from his "The Education of the Will" (1882) essay to his last work, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist* (1923), there is a constant reference and reaction to the loss of the agrarian virtues and the growth of artificial urban life. Indeed, the work which catapulted him to educational fame was *The Content of Children's Minds* (1893), which was based on an examination of urban youngsters' knowledge of rural life.

Hall firmly believed that the scientific study of the child would reveal the vital stream of Mansoul which could ultimately overcome the devastating effects of urban civilization. Here again, however, one finds that the ideological screen which Hall used to study the child, the adolescent, or the adult invariably colored his findings.

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Through his "scientific" studies of human development came his elitism, his racism, his sexist chauvinism, his penchant for primitivism, as well as his authoritarianism: all the integral elements of his personal value system. So we find him recommending that, "there are many who ought not to be educated, and who would be better in mind, body, and morals if they knew no school."[79] So, too, he argued, that to educate girls to be self-supporting is "wrong and vicious," for to scientifically follow nature, "Every girl should be educated primarily to become a wife and mother."[80] He further insisted that *Dressur* was necessary for elementary students because the preadolescent was passing through an abbreviated form of the savage stage. In like manner, he believed the adolescent was passing through the stage when civilization and reason began to dawn and therefore courses in "heroälogy" were appropriate to teach the noble lesson of service to the collective soul of the people. Long after the recapitulation theory had been discredited, Hall continued to cling to this evolutionary structure.

He fought a delaying action when confronting movements which ran counter to his belief system. Typical of his approach was his resistance to the women's rights movement. In a variety of public arenas he argued that women belonged in the home. However, when women began to gain some entrance to higher education he insisted that at Clark University they were treated fairly. Nevertheless, in a private letter to Col. Bullock, one finds him saying, "I am strongly opposed to giving women the slightest foothold in the college, even if we could do so under the founder's will. I feel that they would crowd out the best men a little later."[81] Hall went on to say that he was inclined to leave the doctoral degree open to women because so few had gone through in the last ten years. Besides, he added, "it would save us a good deal of pounding by feminists; and by depriving it we would needlessly shut off possible bequests from women who have borne a pretty large part in the endowment of universities."[82] Here Hall was practicing explicit institutional chauvinism. What would appear to many on the outside as a relatively open system was, in fact, highly discriminating in intent as well as practice.[83]

Hall knew women had a place and for him it was not in the advanced centers of learning. He romanticized women as something very special, close to nature, bearers of the race, and, indeed, the conduit through which "Mansoul" might some day become a "supermansoul." Hall's personal values were perhaps best revealed when he reacted to his son's announcement that he had found a girl whom he wished to marry. Hall said, "I hope she is physically strong and with good heredity. What's her complexion? Send me her photo."[84] Hall had raised physical and mental health to a near cult. His book on *Morale,* which was subtitled "The Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct," was addressed to the physical and moral athlete, calling for a new collective ideal firmly rooted in the collective *Volk.* As he described it:

> Thus my book is a plea for nothing less than a new criterion of all human worths and values. I would have the home, the state, the church, literature, science, industry, and every human institution, not excluding religion, and perhaps it most, rejudged and revaluated by the standard of what they contribute to individual, industrial and social morale. This would give us a new scale on which to measure real progress or regression.[85]

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Hall's scale for measuring progress toward a new order was clearly a totalitarian one.

While the social system could thus be improved, Hall also stressed heredity as of great importance and argued that a pound of heredity is "worth a hundredweight of education."[86] Thus it is necessary to pay attention to better breeding: "The nation that breeds best, be it Mongol, Slav, Teuton or Saxon, will rule the world in the future."[87] Eugenics, he insisted, was not merely medical certificates for fitness to marry or taxing bachelors for failing to breed their kind, or even steps to prevent the unfit from propagation, but rather it meant the constant encouragement of the "Abrahams" of the race to breed a better race.[88]

> If farmers who can breed good cattle, sheep and horses, can also learn how to breed good men and women, the problem is solved. Germ plasm is the most immortal thing in the physical world. Backward it connects us by direct and unbroken lines of continuity with our remotest ancestor, be it Adam, the anthropopithicus, the amoeba or whatever else the human life began in, and the most optimistic law in the world is that the best survive and the worst perish.[89]

His complete vision ultimately would include breeding for a superrace. Hall went on,

> If God, [one should be reminded here that "God" for Hall is a collective term for "Mansoul"] the great stirpiculturist of man, were to create or choose an ideal environment for improving the human stock where the pure air and water and right, simple living and high thinking with correct adjustment of all the influences that work for the right balance between those supreme human forces, individuation and genesis, is struck, and thus establish a nursery for the slow evolution of the superman who will in body and soul realize all the highest human ideals and make what we have already dreamed must sometime come to the world, a new paradise, what better cradle or nest in which to incubate the overman of the future could be found than here?[90]

The new Paradise which Hall had in mind was the superstate[91] which he portrayed in the "Fall of Atlantis." In Hall's ideal kingdom men practiced religion in all forms, from fetish and nature worship to Mansoul worship according to each person's development on the evolutionary scale. Everyone in this society dedicated his total self to the interest and service of the society under the enlightened guidance of those Hall called "heartformers" (psychologists). The entire society was organized into groups according to their working productive function in that society.[92] Each group was dedicated to the ideal of being the very best of what they were destined to be. Thus, service was emblazoned on everyone's consciousness. At the top of the social hierarchy could be found the supermen, in the form of scientific researchers, constantly seeking more and more knowledge of Mansoul. Hall's message was clear: through selective breeding, genetic psychology, and a well-planned educational system, the real nature of Mansoul could flower in the form of the superstate. However, something went wrong. Hall's idyllic state eventually ended in chaotic destruction. Individual freedom at the expense of the collective ideal had eaten away at the very foundation of Hall's totalitarian collective ideal. Here, Hall's second message was also clear: if America was to arrive at the promised land of "Mansoul" it would have to learn to tighten up and discipline itself to

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the collective ideal of *Morale*. This, then, was Hall's ultimate vision and promise for America.

Charles Burgess best captured the sense of what Hall strove for when he said:

> With morale as the new religion of coercion for virtue's sake, with the colossus of a Christ-like superman standing on Liberty's vacated pedestal, with sublimation of self to the State therefore permeating every hierarchical layer from the slave to the *uebermensch*, Hall would at last be able to say that his battle had ended. The dawn of the new day would be upon the world.[93]

Before World War I, Nietzsche's view of the *uebermensch* often served as Hall's model man. In many ways Hall's superman was virtually the same as Nietzsche's. However, after the disillusioning experience of the war, Hall came to believe that his superman was unlike Nietzsche's which he believed had succumbed to German militarism. Nietzsche's *uebermensch* became for Hall a superman of sheer power. In contrast he believed his superman was more moral and cultural. His was more a Christ-like colossus, a product of the evolutionary Mansoul. For Hall, the Germany he had loved so dearly had destroyed itself by its turn toward militarism. This militarism, he believed, could also infect other cultures and nations and would ultimately lead, if not checked, to the destruction of all culture.

While Hall's ideal state was not a militarized state, it was clearly a totalitarian state, for Hall had the mind of a totalitarian. He envisioned not only a total culture where all would be subservient to the ideal, but a total humanity where ultimately the best would come to see, as he, Christ, and Buddha had seen, that view from the mountaintop.

Hall had thus preached a new religion, a totalitarian, naturalistic faith for twentieth-century man, where the psychologist replaced the priest and where sickness replaced the age-old concept of sin. Hall, however, was more. He was also a prophet of the twentieth century's totalitarian man. Being tuned into the deeper undercurrents of western culture, he felt the pangs of man's alienation and intuitively sensed the symbolic structure for which such vulnerable people came to yearn. Thus he not only sensed the truly reactionary longings of an alienated man, but also intuitively grasped the kind of symbols which could satisfy those longings and, in doing so he seemed to touch the future. Hall was not long in his grave when western man began to hear those strange Hallian themes of back to nature, soil, fatherland, hearth and home, health, strength through joy, agrarian virtue, world order, new order, charismatic leadership, supermen and superrace, ancestral calling, thinking with one's blood, and ultimately the *Triumph of the Will*,[94] echoing off those cold gray walls of the sports colossus at Nuremberg. Hall had touched the symbolic structure which the National Socialists would use to weld Germany into an ironclad soul of "obedient servants."

Perhaps Hall was correct in arguing that it was not German cultural ideology that led Germany astray in World War I but rather the growth of German militarism that was to blame. Nevertheless, the unanswered question remains: what role did these complex ideological, cultural currents play in keeping the trains running on time to Auschwitz and the fires burning in the crematoriums? It might be, as Hall

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had argued, that these "cultural currents" of Mansoul were innocent "victims" rather than "perpetrators" of the catastrophe which ensued. The fault lies, he might have said, with a growing cancerous military mind. Then again it just might be the case, as another enlightened utopian visionary once claimed, that, "The abolition of religion as the *illusory* happiness of men, is a demand for their *real* happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition which requires illusions."[95] Perhaps if we were to look more carefully at those conditions which require illusions, we might find those cultural ideological conditions which helped propel Germany not only into National Socialism, but into militarism itself. It is possible that Hall was wrong in blaming solely the military. Perhaps some combination of cultural conditions along with militarism concocted that witch's brew. The current American trends toward longing for a reactionary past, charismatic leadership, health cults, back to the soil, nature, religious cults, as well as a search for mystical roots and the simple virtues of "manhood," "womanhood," and "motherhood," stand pale in isolation. However, it may well be that such an ideological pallor in conjunction with the growth of American militarism in our atomic age may be the spark that will light the path of Mansoul to an even greater if not final catastrophy.

However one interprets these American developments, it does seem that Lawrence Cremin was correct when he said of Hall: "he injected into the mainstream of American educational thought some of the most radical—and I happen to think virulent—doctrines of the twentieth century, and there is no understanding the present apart from his contribution."[96]

While many of Hall's doctrines can be viewed as "virulent" in the context of the twentieth century, it is equally and perhaps more importantly clear that the conditions which gave rise to such ideas need further, more intensive examination. It is, however, also clear that just when it seemed that America was about to lose its traditional religious moorings, G. Stanley Hall, as a priestly prophet of the twentieth century, did more than any other single individual to help construct that new faith, that new religion of psychology, in which so many have now come to believe.

NOTES

1. G. Stanley Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1923), p. 596.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Lorine Pruette, *G. Stanley Hall* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1926), p. 199.
4. Quoted in Dorothy Ross, *G. Stanley Hall the Psychologist as Prophet* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 254.
5. Hall, *Life and Confessions*, p. 178.
6. See Merle Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, rev. ed. (Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1960), p. 426. Also see E. L. Thorndike, *Biographical Memoir of Granville Stanley Hall (1846-1924)*, National Academy of Sciences, *Biographical Memoirs*, vol. 12 (1928).
7. See Ross, *G. Stanley Hall*, p. 336.
8. Quoted in Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, p. 396.
9. A response to Edwin G. Boring's inquiry "Whose Student Are You?" Clark University Archives, G. Stanley Hall Collection, Box 32 folder.

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10. Quoted in Pruette, *G. Stanley Hall,* p. 7.
11. This practice, while not unique to the field of early childhood, was particularly well-developed in this area and continues so to the present day.
12. G. Stanley Hall, statement of the difference between his views of religious psychology and those of Professor William James, 249a, May 9, 1907, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, p. 1.
13. *Ibid.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
16. *Ibid.*
17. G. Stanley Hall, "Eddyism and Emmanuelism," May 1909, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Box 28, Folder no. 1, p. 14.
18. G. Stanley Hall, review of William James's *The Principles of Psychology,* in *American Journal of Psychology* 2 (1891): 590.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Eddyism is the philosophy of Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of the Christian Science, a faith based on a pure idealism which asserts that there is only one reality, namely Mind, God, Good, and that matter and evil are unreal. This idealism is combined with a healing ministry which relies heavily on the power of thought. The Emmanuel movement is an attempt to employ moral treatment for nervous disorders. The movement was inaugurated by Rev. Elwood Worcester and Rev. Samuel McComb in Emmanuel Church, Boston, 1906. The overall aim has been to revive the Church's ministry of healing in cooperation with scientific medical practice.
21. Hall, "Eddyism and Emmanuelism," p. 29.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–37.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9
39. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
41. *Ibid.*
42. See Christine M. Shea, "The Ideology of Mental Health and the Emergence of the Therapeutic Liberal State: The American Mental Hygiene Movement, 1900–1930" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1980).
43. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
44. *Ibid.*
45. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.

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55. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
56. See Curti, *The Social Ideas of American Educators*, pp. 434–35. Consider the suggestion by Hall that lower-class children are not really unfortunate in being neglected. Lower-class children, he asserted, "thrive well under a certain degree of neglect." G. Stanley Hall, "What Is to Become of Your Baby?" *The Cosmopolitan* 48 (April 1910): 664.
57. See Pruette, *G. Stanley Hall*, p. 265.
58. G. Stanley Hall, letter to William A. White, February 18, 1913, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Box 26, Folder 9.
59. *Ibid.*
60. William A. White, letter to G. Stanley Hall, February 11, 1913, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Box 26, Folder 9.
61. G. Stanley Hall, "Why Kent Is Passing," *American Journal of Psychology* 23 (July 1913): 421.
62. It is not the case as Ross claimed that "Hall's picture of Jesus owed little to Freud" (*G. Stanley Hall*, p. 418), but rather it is significantly dependent on many Freudian insights.
63. G. Stanley Hall, letter to Sigmund Freud, September 24, 1923, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Box 24, Folder 9, pp. 2–3. See also John Chynoweth Burnham, ed., "Sigmund Freud and G. Stanley Hall: Exchange of Letters," *Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (1960): 314–15. Ross followed Burnham's estimate that the Jesus book could have been written without Freud's influence. A careful reading of both volumes leads one to question this point. This author believes Hall is essentially correct on this point.
64. Hall, *Life and Confessions*, p. 436.
65. Consider, for example, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Schopenhauer, and Wagner.
66. Hall, *Life and Confessions*, p. 461.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 462.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
69. G. Stanley Hall, "Note on Early Memories," *Pedagogical Seminary* 1 (December 1899): 504.
70. See, for example, G. Stanley Hall, "Bay Life in a Massachusetts Country Town Thirty Years Ago," *Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society*, vol. 7 (1892). Also see G. Stanley Hall, "Note on Early Memories," p. 504.
71. See G. Stanley Hall, "The Moral and Religious Training of Children," *Princeton Review* (New York, January-June 1882), p. 32.
72. See G. Stanley Hall, "The New Psychology," *Andover Review* 3, no. 14 (February 1885): 247.
73. See G. Stanley Hall, "The Ideal School Based on Child Study," *The Forum* 32 (February 1902): 35.
74. The concept of unflinching obedience training. See Hall, *Life and Confessions*, p. 514.
75. G. Stanley Hall, "The Education of the Will," *Princeton Review* (July-December 1882), p. 310.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 321–22.
78. Quoted in Herbert J. Muller, *Issues of Freedom* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 36.
79. Hall, "The Ideal School as Based on Child Study," p. 25.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
81. G. Stanley Hall, letter to George A. Bullock, November 20, 1909, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Box 20. I am indebted to Chris Shea for first calling my attention to this letter.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
83. The same process can be found for institutional racism of the period as well.
84. G. Stanley Hall, letter to Robert G. Hall, May 16, 1915, Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Box 2, Folder 9.
85. G. Stanley Hall, *Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1920), p. 20.
86. Hall, "What Is to Become of Your Baby?" p. 661.
87. G. Stanley Hall, untitled and undated ms., Clark University Archives, Hall Collection, Articles 1 Addresses, 1902-1917, Box 29, Folder 1, p. 24.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.
89. *Ibid.*, pp. 25–26.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.
91. Hall uses this term to describe his ideal state in his essay on the "Fall of Atlantis," in *Recreations of a Psychologist* (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1920), p. v.

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92. This was similar to the way Benito Mussolini organized Italy after coming to power.
93. Charles Burgess, "The Educational State in America," (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1962), p. 222.
94. These ideas were vividly portrayed in Leni Reifenstahl's film, *The Triumph of the Will.*
95. T. B. Bottomore, ed. and trans., *Karl Marx* (New York: McGraw Hill and Co., 1964), p. 45.
96. Charles E. Strickland and Charles Burgess, *Health, Growth, and Heredity: G. Stanley Hall on Natural Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1965), p. viii.

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

The Public School Movement vs. the Libertarian Tradition*

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Given the temper of the times it was surprising that following the American Revolution there appeared proposals for national systems of education. The libertarian tradition which fed the flames of the Revolution was staunchly opposed to a union of government and schooling. The greatest fear was that such a union would lead to despotism over the mind and be the enemy of freedom of thought and speech. Indeed, the advocates of governmental systems of education in the United States have been primarily interested in restraining and controlling freedom of thought and action and not in providing the intellectual tools for the expansion of individual freedom. To appreciate this argument, one must compare the eighteenth-century libertarian opposition to governmentally provided schooling with the several proposals for such schooling which emerged from the fears of popular political control after the Revolutionary War.

One of the major factors contributing to the despotic aspects of the post-Revolutionary education proposals was a belief by their proponents that they possessed knowledge of virtue and truth. It seemed to them natural that, if they knew how people should act and think, a system of schooling should be established to bring people into conformity with those values. The aftermath of the Revolutionary War appeared to be an opportune time to reconstruct both government and human character. To advocates of national systems of education, the reconstruction of government required control of human character and values. They believed firmly that a republican society could not exist unless people were trained to act according to certain moral and political values. The "correct" values for a republican society were, of course, those that they themselves held.

One of the lessons to be learned from the historical comparison—which we will here undertake—between the libertarian tradition and early educational proposals is the danger of the existence of any political mechanism by which people can use coercive power to impose their values on others. Most people believe they know what is right and would like to see the world conform to their vision of right

*The original version of this essay was presented at the Eighth Libertarian Scholars Conference, November 1981, in New York City.

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action. In most cases this is a result not of any conscious attempt to do evil but of a firm belief in doing good and helping others. The attempt to impose values is most frequently a product of a moral crusade and not of an attempt to corrupt. If the mechanisms exist by which ideological control can be exercised over a population, these moral crusaders will use those means to further their ends. The early libertarians understood this issue and resisted attempts to give the state the power of ideological control through a centralized educational system.

The early educational proposals, with their emphasis upon molding individual character for the good of the state, set the pattern for all later discussions of the role of schooling in a republican or democratic society. Schooling was to provide the tools not for freedom but for conformity to particular values and political dogma. The early educational proposals, as we shall see, sought obedience, submission, and political conformity to the state and the law. They demanded uniformity in the educational system and control and censorship of the content of learning.

There are several important conceptual distinctions that help to clarify the differences between the early proponents and opponents of national systems of education. The most important of these differences centered around the meaning of liberty. For advocates of national systems of education, like Benjamin Rush and Noah Webster, liberty meant primarily the freedom to live a Christian life. As we shall see in more detail later in the discussion, they equated virtue with leading a Christian life and argued that a Republican form of government could be maintained only if all people were virtuous. A republic provided the opportunity to be virtuous and required virtuous action.

In contrast, the libertarian tradition, as represented by Robert Molesworth, John Trenchard's and Thomas Gordon's *Cato's Letters,* Joseph Priestley, and William Godwin, advocated liberty as a means for living a life guided by the use of reason. As Bernard Bailyn has shown in his now classic *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,* it was this tradition, particularly as presented in *Cato's Letters,* which provided the intellectual underpinnings for the American Revolution.[1] It was this tradition which put primary emphasis upon freedom of thought and speech as essential for the free exercise of reason and which, consequently, rejected the idea of government-provided national systems of education.

Another important distinction to be made is in the meaning and use of the terms "patriot" and "patriotism." This distinction will be important in considering the stress upon nationalism and patriotism by the "schoolmaster of America," Noah Webster, and the plans of Benjamin Rush to educate "republican machines" who would be subordinate to the interests of the community. When Tom Paine wrote his famous lines in 1776, "These are the times that try men's souls: The summer Soldier and sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country," he did not use "patriot" to mean an individual who was obliged to be obedient to the will of the state. "Patriotism" meant a loyalty to the spreading of freedom from tyranny. Paine wrote for the soldiers at Valley Forge, "Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph."[2] This brand of patriotism,

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as we will see, is in sharp contrast to the controlling patriotic nationalism which Noah Webster sought to develop through a national system of government schools.

One American figure who stood between the politically constraining plans for national schooling and the libertarian tradition was Thomas Jefferson. On the one hand, his post-Revolutionary educational plans called for only minimal education of the great masses of citizens. His primary belief, in keeping with the libertarian tradition, was that political education should be a product of the exercise of individual reason in conjunction with a free press. On the other hand, he was concerned about education of a proper republican leadership and, to that end, prescribed censorship of the political texts to be used in that education.

Finally, before proceeding to examine these ideas more closely, we should note that neither the early libertarian tradition nor the advocates of national systems of education had very positive ideas about the education of the great masses of the people. Either they advocated education to teach people their place in society or they argued against schooling because it might lead people not to accept their place in society. When the working class movement for education developed in the 1820's and 1830's, it began as a movement stressing the importance of separating the education of the workers from the powers of government. This may, however, have been the only time in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when there existed a truly popular movement for the creation of educational institutions.

The Libertarian Tradition

The ideological struggle which provided the justification for the American Revolution took place in the vast number of pamphlets and newspapers issued from small presses in England and the colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The concern about the maintenance of a free press and free speech reflects the importance placed on the political education gained from this war of words. Bernard Bailyn has written with regard to his study of the pamphlets:

> It confirmed my belief that intellectual developments in the decade before Independence led to a radical idealization of the previous century and a half of American experience, and that it was this intimate relationship between Revolutionary thought and the circumstances of life in eighteenth-century America that endowed the Revolution with its peculiar force and made it so profoundly a transforming event.[3]

The writings of the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries which are considered to have had the most profound effect in raising revolutionary consciousness were Algernon Sidney's *Discourses Concerning Government* (1698), which has been called a "textbook of revolution"; John Trenchard's and Thomas Gordon's *Cato's Letters* (1721); and, particularly important in terms of the relationship of education to the state, Robert Molesworth's *An Account of Denmark as It Was in the Year, 1692.* Sidney died on the English scaffold in 1683 after presenting a statement to the sheriff which declared his opposition to all tyranny and stated, "I am persuaded to believe that God has left nations the liberty of setting up such governments as best please themselves."[4]

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Caroline Robbins argues, in her detailed history of what she calls the "Commonwealthman," that heirs of Sidney's revolutionary tradition were a circle of close friends of Robert Molesworth. It was the writings of this group that not only inflamed the passions for liberty in England but also found their way across the ocean to provide an argument for revolution. The most popular writings of the group, in both England and the colonies, were *Cato's Letters*. Robbins has written about this group, "They produced a not inconsiderable body of political tracts and treatises which deserve to form a part of the English liberal tradition. None of them attained the stature of a Locke or a Sidney, but their publications attracted many readers on both sides of the Atlantic for more than a hundred years."[5] Bailyn writes: "So popular and influential had *Cato's Letters* become in the colonies within a decade and a half of their appearance, so packed with ideological meaning, that . . . it gave rise to what might be called a 'Catonic' image, central to the political theory of the time."[6]

Molesworth's *Account of Denmark* provided one of the earliest descriptions of the dangers of making the education of youth a function of government. One of Molesworth's reasons for writing his study of Denmark was that the country had undergone a transformation in 1660 from an older constitution to a modern hereditary absolutism. A key element in this transformation was the gaining of the people's absolute obedience to the state. This he found was made possible by linking religion to the state and making education a function of religion. Religious orders preached and taught a doctrine, he claimed, of submission and obedience to both heavenly and earthly rulers.

Molesworth's argument reflected the concern on both sides of the Atlantic for separation of religion from the state. His concern encompassed the broad issue of ideological control. He believed that when religion linked arms with government, religious doctrines were used to justify tyranny. When education was a function of a state-established religion, then religious doctrines were used to justify the power of the state and to mold future citizens into a condition of obedience.

In his study of tyranny in Denmark, Molesworth wrote: "enslaving the Spirits of the People, as preparative to that of their Bodies; . . . those Foreign Princes think it their Interest that Subjects should obey without reserve, and all Priests, who depend upon the Prince, are for their own sakes obliged to promote what he esteems his Interest."[7] After establishing the interrelationship of interests, he went on to lament that " 'tis plain, the Education of Youth, on which is laid the very Foundation Stones of the Publick Liberty, has been of late years committed to the sole management of such as make it their business to undermine it."

It should be noted that Molesworth was not concerned solely with the relationship between government and the Catholic Church. In his preface, he makes it quite clear that he has found the same danger resulting, in other parts of Europe, from government support of Lutheranism. In part, Molesworth argued that the modern power of religions was their control over learning. He wrote that in former ages church people were ignorant and held in low esteem, "but since . . . through a Reformation of Manners, and Knowledge of the World, they have recovered

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credit, and . . . the restored Learning of Europe is principally lodg'd among them, they have gained a much greater influence."

The major service that religion performed for the state through the education of youth, according to Molesworth, was "to recommend frequently to them what they call the Queen of all virtues, Viz. Submission to Superiors, and an entire blind Obedience to Authority." But of even greater importance was that it made the people forget that government was a product of human actions and not divine intervention. By making government appear divine in origin, religiously controlled education could teach obedience to government as if it were obedience to divine authority. In Molesworth's words, religiously controlled governmental education taught "that the People ought to pay an Absolute Obedience to a limited Government; fall down and worship the Work of their own Hands, as if it dropt from Heaven; together with other as profitable Doctrines."

One of the obvious conclusions of Molesworth's study was that education, if it were to contribute to liberty and freedom, had to be secular and separate from religion. He called for the professor to replace the priest and for students to learn the content of their classical studies rather than just the grammar. Education had to be free of religious dogma which served the state and free to lead the learner down the path of reason.

Two of Molesworth's friends, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, provided the broadest defense for the freedom of ideas and learning. Their writings gave sustenance to the endless political discussions in public houses on both sides of the ocean. Their essays were collected as the *Independent Whig* and *Cato's Letters,* first appearing in London between 1720 and 1723, and they were many times reprinted during the next twenty-five years. The essays contained the same anti-clerical attitudes as Molesworth's and sought relief in secularism and rationalism. Freedom was both a right and a necessity for the progress of nations.

Trenchard and Gordon defended freedom of thought and speech as essential for the economic and social development of a nation. In linking social progress and freedom they were able to give their defense in concrete terms rather than just as an appeal to abstract justice. They were able to say that a country needs freedom because without freedom there can be no growth in human wisdom and invention and, consequently, no progress in economic development. Tyranny and slavery stopped social development and improvement in human well-being, while freedom and liberty led to progress and happiness.

One of the earliest of *Cato's Letters* defined freedom of thought and speech as a right which could be abridged only to protect the freedom of others. In the authors' words, "Without Freedom, there can be no such Thing as Wisdom; and no such Thing as public Liberty, without Freedom of Speech: Which is the Right of every Man, as far as by it he does not hurt and controul the Right of another." This limitation, they declared, "is the only Check which it ought to suffer, the only Bounds which it ought to know."[8]

Humans in their original state of nature contented themselves with "the Spontaneous Productions of Nature." But these spontaneous supplies proved insuffi-

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cient to support increasing numbers of human beings. The next step, then, was "to open the bosom of the Earth, and, by proper Application and Culture, to extort her hidden Stores." The differences in prosperity that existed between nations was considered largely a product of the differences in the advancement in the state of learning which allowed for greater productivity. Wisdom and art promote prosperity, which in turn provides full employment, economic well-being, and a general elevation of the spirit and culture of a people. Without the advancement of wisdom and learning would come unemployment and resulting human misery. "People, in most countries, are forced, for want of other Employment, to cut the Throats of one another, or of their neighbours; and to ramble after their Princes in all their mad conquests . . . and all to get, with great Labour, Hazard, and often with great Hunger and slaughter, a poor, precarious, and momentary subsistence."[9]

Such was the equation between freedom and the good life. Freedom of thought and speech promoted wisdom, which in turn provided the basis for prosperity and the elimination of the crime which grew from hunger and poverty. Within the framework of this argument, tyranny was to be avoided because it hindered the growth of wisdom, prosperity, and social happiness. "Ignorance of Arts and Sciences, and of every Thing that is good, together with Poverty, Misery, and Desolation, are found for the most part all together, and are all certainly produced by Tyranny."[10]

Cato's Letters expressed an uncompromising defense of all freedom of thought and action because of the necessity of being able to follow any line of reasoning. There could not be selective freedom of thought because knowledge was so complex that no person or groups of persons could determine before the investigation what areas of thought should be limited. "The least Cramp or Restrain upon Reasoning and Inquiry of any kind will soon a mighty Bar in the Way of Learning." The authors continued their defense of unrestrained freedom of thought in terms of the complexity of knowledge. "It is very true," they argued, "that all sorts of knowledge, at least all sorts of sublime and important knowledge, are so complicated and interwoven together, that it is impossible to search into any part of it, and to trace the same with Freedom to its first Principles, without borrowing and taking in the Help of most, if not all, of the other Parts."[11]

As examples of the limitation of freedom of thought, they wrote of a Bishop "burned before the Reformation, for discovering the World to be round; and, even in the last Century, the excellent Galileo was put into the dismal Prison of the Inquisition, for maintaining the Motion of the Earth round the Sun, as her Centre."[12] These situations resulted from government's arbitrary imposition of a religious orthodoxy which limited the search for truth by not allowing any conclusion which contradicted its dogma.

A short passage in *Cato's Letters* provides a forceful summary of the authors' arguments: "Ignorance accompanies Slavery, and is introduced by it. People who live in Freedom will think with Freedom; but when the Mind is enslaved by fear, and the Body by Chains, Inquiry and Study will be at an End." In this condition of fear, they claimed, "Men will not pursue dangerous knowledge, nor venture

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their Heads, to improve their Understandings. Besides, their Spirits, dejected with Servitude and Poverty, will want vigor . . . to . . . propagate Truth; which is ever High-Treason against Tyranny." Of course, tyranny could not afford freedom, because "neither the Titles nor the Deeds of Tyrants will bear Examination; and their Power is concerned to Stupify and destroy the very faculties of reason and thinking."[13]

The link that *Cato's Letters* made between freedom of thought and material prosperity flowed naturally into the real set of events which sparked the industrial revolution in England. An emphasis upon reason, secularism, and practical application of knowledge to increase productivity described the intellectual conditions which were later claimed as necessary for the expansion of industrialism and technology. Technological expansion was justified in terms of promises of prosperity. Within this context, it was quite natural for the libertarian tradition to continue and grow in the later part of the eighteenth century in the industrial centers of Birmingham and Manchester. It was also logical for libertarians to expand earlier concerns about the government's use of religion to hinder freedom of thought and speech to fear of any governmental restriction on these freedoms. Fear of government's use of religious orders to educate the youth of a nation led to fear of government's direct involvement in education.

Caroline Robbins calls these late-eighteenth-century heirs of the libertarian tradition "Honest Whigs," who from the 1760's to the end of the century found themselves in the strong currents of industrialism and the reactions to the American and French revolutions.[14] Their main forums were the Lunar Society founded in Birmingham in 1766 and the Literary and Philosophical Society founded in Manchester in 1781. The membership of these organizations included thinkers who in their day were among the most advanced in the areas of science, economics, and politics. Their discussions, demonstrations, and debates ranged across the frontiers of knowledge.

One of the more famous members was scientist and political writer Joseph Priestley, who was a good friend of Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson and later sought refuge in the United States. Another important member was William Godwin, who was famous both for his political writings and for his wife Mary Wollstonecraft and daughter Mary Shelley. Godwin's political ideas can be found throughout the writings of his daughter's husband, Percy Shelley. Other important figures were Matthew Boulton, James Watt, Erasmus Darwin, Samuel Galton, and Josiah Wedgwood. In addition, all of these persons could claim contact with leading members of the important intellectual centers of Glasgow and Edinburgh. David Hume, Joseph Black, and Adam Smith are only a few of the names of those intellectual pioneers who freely interacted with the membership of the Lunar Society and the Literary and Philosophical Society.

In relation to freedom of thought and speech, one of the clear and often stated concerns was governmental systems of education. English historian Brian Simon has written concerning Priestley and this group of intellectuals: "In common with Godwin, however, and indeed all other dissenters, Priestley was adamantly opposed

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to education becoming a function of the state. Should it do so, it would not achieve the object he desired, on the contrary, it would be used to promote uniformity of thought and belief." High regard for the importance of intellectual freedom permeated the thinking of this group, just as it had with the previous generation of libertarians. Priestley declared, "Let all friends of liberty and human nature join to free the minds of men from the shackles of narrow and impolitic laws. Let us be free ourselves and leave the blessings of freedom to our posterity."[15]

Priestley gave some very explicit examples of the results of state-controlled education—for instance, the attempt at Oxford to discourage the reading of Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding*. Priestley believed that if any group gained control of the educational system they could greatly increase their power over the rest of society. He argued that education should encourage free inquiry and inspire the love for truth. State-endowed teachers would be more committed to instilling a particular set of religious, moral, or political principles than they would be to training the mind for the free use of reason. Caroline Robbins summarizes Priestley's feelings regarding education provided by the state: "The chief glory of human nature, the operation of reason in a variety of ways and with diversified results would be lost. Every man should educate his children in his own manner to preserve the balance which existed among the several religious and political parties in Great Britain."[16] Molesworth and *Cato's Letters* had emphasized concern with state-established religious control of education. Now there was added a concern about control by particular political groups.

Priestley's friend, William Godwin, considered national systems of education one of the foremost dangers to freedom and liberty. Godwin stated that the two main objects of human power were government and education. Of these two, education was the more powerful, because "government must always depend upon the opinion of the governed. Let the most oppressed people under heaven once change their mode of thinking, and they are free." If individuals can control the opinion of the people through education, then they can control government. If education is made a function of government, then those who control government can use education to maintain and strengthen their control. In his study of government, *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice,* Godwin warned that "before we put so powerful a machine under the direction of so ambiguous an agent, it behooves us to consider well what it is that we do. Government will not fail to employ it, to strengthen its hands, and perpetuate its institutions."[17]

It seemed obvious to Godwin that a governmentally supported system of education would not allow teachings that were contradictory to the ideology justifying that particular government. Under such a system, education would be shaped to conform to the dictates of political power. Godwin argued that "the data upon which their conduct as statesmen is vindicated, will be the data upon which their instructions are founded." Godwin based his concern on a belief that political institutions tended to favor the rich over the poor and to promote self-interested values, such as a quest for national glory, patriotism, and international economic and cultural competition between nations. From this standpoint, nationalized education would

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be used to support chauvinistic patriotism and the political and economic power of the state.

For Godwin, constitutions and laws should exist only if accepted as beneficial by individual reason. Loyalty to the constitution and government, if instilled through nationalized education, would create an individual attachment based on belief rather than reason. If belief were substituted for reason then the door would be open for tyranny to reign. Godwin argued, "It is not true that our youth ought to be instructed to venerate the constitution, however excellent; they should be led to venerate truth; and the constitution only so far as it corresponds with their uninfluenced deductions of truth." Concerning law he argued that most people could understand that certain crimes were injurious to the public. Those laws which stood outside the realm of reason and had to be taught rather than understood were usually laws which gave advantages to some particular group in society. Godwin wrote, as an example, "It has been alleged, that 'mere reason may teach me not to strike my neighbour'; but will never forbid my sending a sack of wool from England, or printing the French constitution in Spain." He maintained that "all crimes, that can be supposed to be the fit objects of judicial administration are capable of being discerned without the teaching of law." People should not obey laws whose value and worth could not be determined by individual reason. Godwin declared: "Destroy us if you please; but do not endeavor, by a national education, to destroy in our understandings the discernment of justice and injustice."

While the concern of these libertarians at the end of the eighteenth century was more with political control than with the earlier concern about religious control, there are certain common elements. First was a belief in human reason and the necessity of allowing human reason to search for truth without hindrance of a particular orthodoxy. Fear of governmental appointment of religious groups to teach a dogma was replaced, at the end of the century, with a fear of governmental appointment of teachers to instill particular political doctrines. In either context, national systems of education were rejected because of their potential threat to freedom of thought.

Political Control through National Systems of Education

A number of plans for national systems of education were proposed in America during this period of time. The reader should be reminded, before exploring these proposals, that it was the libertarian tradition of liberty and freedom which had contributed to shaping the ideology of the American Revolution. Indeed, as we shall see, the national systems of education which were proposed must be considered as a reaction against that tradition.

Contrary to present folklore there was no great rush to establish government systems of education following the American Revolution. The actual number of proposals was very small and none was adopted in its entirety. While the numbers were small and their ideas contrary to the libertarian tradition which fed the most radical parts of the American Revolution, these plans are nevertheless important in terms of the ideas they represented and their cultural impact, particularly in the

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case of Noah Webster. Webster's plan was intimately linked to his attempt to create a national language and to the marketing of his extremely successful *American Spelling Book.* Benjamin Rush's proposal was important because of his leadership in medicine and his status as "father of American psychiatry." In many ways Rush's ideas were a prelude to what is now called the therapeutic state. Two additional proposals, by Samuel Harrison Smith and Samuel Knox, were the result of an essay contest conducted by the American Philosophical Society in the 1790's. Thomas Jefferson's proposal is important as a contrast both to these other plans for nationalized education and to the libertarian tradition.

Rush's proposal most directly challenges the libertarian tradition. His 1786 plan for the establishment of public schools in Pennsylvania declares: "I dissent from one of those paradoxical opinions with which modern times abound: that it is improper to fill the minds of youth with religious prejudices of any kind and that they should be left to choose their own principles." He stated flatly, "it is necessary to impose upon them the doctrines and discipline of a particular church. Man is naturally an ungovernable animal, and observations on particular societies and countries will teach us that when we add the restraints of ecclesiastical to those of domestic and civil government, we produce in him the highest degrees of order and virtue."[18]

Rush's rejection of the English libertarian tradition is interesting because his training in medicine and chemistry brought him into direct contact with their ideas and placed him in the leading ranks of the scientific and industrial revolution. Rush was born in Pennsylvania in 1746 and served as an apprentice to a Philadelphia doctor between 1760 and 1766. Between 1766 and 1769 he studied at what was considered the most advanced school of medicine, the University of Edinburgh, and traveled and studied in London and Paris. With letters of introduction from Benjamin Franklin he was able to make contact with some of the leading intellectuals and scientists in Edinburgh and London. Upon returning to the colonies he established his medical practice in Philadelphia and began teaching chemistry at the College of Philadelphia. During the Revolution he served as physician general to the Revolutionary Army.[19]

One of the unique features of the writings of this "father of American psychiatry" is his reduction of political and social problems into medical or mental problems which might be cured by the physician. At the heart of his conceptual framework was the belief that all human beings had a moral faculty which led them to avoid evil instinctively. Evil acts were often the result of disease or some other physical factor which weakened the moral faculty. He prophesied that it might eventually "be as much the business of a physician as it is now of a divine to reclaim mankind from vice."[20] As an example of this tie between political problems and mental problems, he once wrote in reference to Alexander Hamilton's financial program, "The funding system, and speculation in bank script, and new lands have been fruitful sources of madness in our country."[21]

During and after the Revolution, Rush expressed concern about the spread of democratic ideas and the rise of what he called "mobocracy." He believed that

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popular control of government might lead to its control by the irrational emotions of the masses of people. In the one essay on the Revolution, he described the Tories as suffering from a hypochondria caused by exile and confinement. Among the Revolutionaries, there appeared after the war "a species of insanity, which I shall take the liberty of distinguishing by the name of Anarchia."[22]

Rush proposed that a governmentally provided system of education would strengthen the moral faculty and keep the American citizen from slipping into mobocracy and the disease of Anarchia. In one of his more famous passages on the goals of state education, he wrote: "I consider it . . . possible to convert men into republican machines. This must be done if we expect them to perform their parts properly in the great machine of the government of the state."[23]

Both the justification and goals of Rush's proposed educational system centered upon subordination to the authority of government. In fact, one of the major goals of his educational system was to train the individual to be obedient and submissive to the will of the state and to give up ownership of self to ownership by the state. He wrote in his educational proposal, "Let our pupil be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. Let him be taught to love his family, but let him be taught at the same time that he must forsake and even forget them when the welfare of his country requires it."[24]

Rush believed that a state educational system would provide for the necessary inculcation of republican duties. These duties meant primarily a willingness of the individual to sacrifice for the good of the state. This sacrifice extended to property. Rush wrote, "He must be taught to amass wealth, but it must be only to increase his power of contributing to the wants and demands of the state."[25]

For the proper education of youth, Rush proposed that "the authority of our masters be as absolute as possible . . . . By this mode of education, we prepare our youth for the subordination of laws and thereby qualify them for becoming good citizens of the republic." Rush demanded very strong control over youth and argued that the most useful citizens were formed from those youths who "have never known or felt their own wills till they were one and twenty years of age."[26]

Rush was one of the first writers to argue for the superiority of government over the family in providing education. By the end of the nineteenth century one of the constant refrains was that the family was collapsing or failing in its duties and the school had to pick up the pieces. Rush made a similar argument in 1786 when he wrote, "society owes a great deal of its order and happiness to the deficiencies of parental government being supplied by those habits of obedience and subordination which are contracted at schools."[27]

The goal of producing submissive republican machines was reflected in the authoritarian political structure which Rush proposed for the educational system of Pennsylvania. He envisioned a single university located in the state capital at the top of a pyramid of schools. In this structure an individual would enter a free school in the local township and from there proceed to a county academy and then to one of four regional colleges. From the colleges the best students would go to the university.

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All schools in this system were to be uniform in their teachings and conform to a single state philosophy. "The same systems of grammar, oratory, and philosophy will be taught in every part of the state, and the literary features of Pennsylvania will thus designate one great and equally enlightened family." To aid in creating this coherent system, teachers were to be produced by the system itself. "The University will in time furnish masters for the colleges," wrote Rush, "and the colleges will furnish masters for the academies and free schools."[28]

Here was a vision of republican education which promised obedience to a uniform curriculum and philosophy while at the same time reproducing the ideal character structure for the system by internal training of teachers. Rush justified the use of general taxation to support the system with another argument which, along with concern about the failure of the family, was to later become a constant refrain. Public education, he argued, would eventually provide an economic return to the taxpayer in the form of an improved economy and a reduction in the crime rate.

Whereas it might be difficult to measure the impact of Rush's ideas regarding education, it is not difficult to give specific figures regarding Noah Webster's impact on American culture and thinking about education. Webster, "the Schoolmaster of America," was one of the most extraordinary intellectuals of his time. A prolific writer of political and social essays, he left as legacy a standardized American Dictionary of the English Language, an American version of the Bible, and his famous "Blue-Backed Speller." Through the wide usage of the Speller and his development of the Dictionary, Webster cast a lasting mold for the American language.

It would also seem that Noah Webster made a political contribution to the development of the American common school system. Between 1815 to 1819 he served in the Massachusetts Legislature and worked actively for a state school fund. In a speech which captures the flavor of what he believed could be the result of a government system of common schools, he told the legislature, "I should rejoice to see a system adopted that should lay a foundation for a permanent fund for public schools, and to have more pains taken to discipline our youth in early life in sound maxims of moral, political, and religious duties. I believe more than is commonly believed may be done in this way towards correcting the vices and disorders of society." One historian claims that Webster's work in the state legislature began the movement for common schools which culminated in the work of Horace Mann in the 1830's.[29]

Born in Connecticut in 1758, he began his early career as a country schoolmaster. While teaching in 1779 he conceived the idea of developing a new system of American education. In 1783 he completed the Spelling Book which was the first of three volumes in a series entitled *A Grammatical Institute of the English Language*. In 1784 he completed a grammar book as the second volume of the Institute, and a reader as volume three. In 1785 he packed his bags and rode through the country as an itinerant lecturer selling his instructional system.[30]

Both his salesmanship and the content of his textbooks proved a success. One

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and a half million copies of the Speller had been sold by 1801, twenty million by 1829, and seventy-five million by 1875. The Speller became a model which was imitated by other spelling book authors. The extreme popularity of the Speller is demonstrated by the production of a Civil War edition in the South in 1863 which was adapted "to the youth of the Southern Confederacy."[31]

Besides the educational goal of teaching reading and writing, Webster also believed that his texts would produce good and patriotic Americans. Both the development of an American language and the content of the readers and spellers were designed to create a unified national spirit. As his biographer Harry Warfel describes: "This unified series of textbooks effectually shaped the destiny of American education for a century. Imitators sprang up by the dozen, and each echoed Websterian nationalism. The word 'American' became indispensable in all textbook titles; all vied in patriotic eloquence."[32]

Like Benjamin Rush, Noah Webster did not believe that republicans were developed by allowing the free exercise of reason. He believed that moral and political values had to be imposed on the child. Webster wrote that "good republicans . . . are formed by a singular machinery in the body politic, which takes the child as soon as he can speak, checks his natural independence and passions, makes him subordinate to superior age, to the laws of the state, to town and parochial institutions."[33]

Nothing better exemplifies the idea of imposing political values and the undemocratic nature of Webster's educational system than the "Federal Catechism" which appeared in the early versions of his spelling book. The idea of a political catechism was rather unique and somewhat startling in the context of developing republican institutions. The idea of children memorizing and parroting specific answers to specific political questions would seem to be a gross example of using an educational system for the purposes of inculcating standardized political values. It represents the complete opposite of the position advocated by William Godwin that individual reason rather than dogma should determine political actions.

The following passage from the "Federal Catechism" reflects the undemocratic nature of the values Webster felt should be drilled into American children.

> Q. What are the defects of democracy?
> A. In democracy, where the people all meet for the purpose of making laws, there are commonly tumults and disorders. A small city may sometimes be governed in this manner; but if the citizens are numerous, their assemblies make a crowd or mob, where debates cannot be carried on with coolness and candor, nor can arguments be heard: Therefore a pure democracy is generally a very bad government. It is often the most tyrannical government on earth; for a multitude is often rash, and will not hear reason.[34]

The idea of imposing dogma through education was also evident in the connection between the maintenance of a Christian culture and republicanism. In this context freedom and liberty meant Christian liberty or the freedom to act virtuously. Any action that was not Christian or virtuous was considered a threat to the Republic.

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Those who proposed governmentally provided schooling saw as one of its functions the training of youth in moral virtues.

When Webster spoke of "principles of virtue," he specifically meant Christian virtues. Within his framework a republican culture was equated with a Christian culture. This is very evident in the "Moral Catechism," which was also part of his *American Spelling Book.* Like the "Federal Catechism" this was a process of learning which involved memorization of dogma and not the exercise of reason. The first part of the "Moral Catechism" is a perfect example of the equating of virtue and Christ-like actions.

> Question: What is moral virtue?
> Answer: It is an honest upright conduct in all our dealings with men.
> Q. Can we always determine what is honest and just?
> A. Perhaps not in every instance, but in general it is not difficult.
> Q. What rules have we to direct us?
> A. God's word contained in the Bible has furnished all necessary rules to direct our conduct.
> Q. In what part of the Bible are these rules to be found?
> A. In almost every part; but the most important duties between men are summed up in the beginning of Matthew, in Christ's Sermon on the Mount.[35]

One of the central goals of Webster's attempts to create a national language and an educational system was the promotion of nationalism and patriotism. Now an important distinction must be made between patriotism which is a result of reason and self-interest and patriotism which is a result of emotion. The libertarian thinkers, like Godwin, believed that political actions should be based on reason and self-interest, because if actions were a product of dogmatic teachings and emotion people might be led to act not in their own interests but in the interests of a tyrannical government. In contrast, both Webster and Rush believed that schooling should teach submission and obedience to the will of government.

Webster carried this idea one step further and called for the establishment of an emotional bond between the citizen and the government. Webster wrote that, "every class of people should know and love the laws." Love or attachment to the law, he believed, "may be formed by early impressions upon the mind." This goal was to be achieved through the creation of a national language and the patriotic content of his textbooks. His comment concerning his method of selecting items for his readers illustrates the patriotic goals of his texts:

> In the choice of pieces, I have not been inattentive to the political interest of America. Several of those masterly addresses of Congress, written at the commencement of the late revolution, contain such noble, just and independent sentiments of liberty and patriotism, that I cannot help wishing to transfuse them into the breasts of the rising generation.[36]

His readers contained items like Washington's Farewell Orders to the Army, patriotic poems, and for the first time in a school book a history of the Revolutionary War. On the cover page of his 1787 reader appeared the words, "Begin with the infant in the cradle; let the first word he lisps be Washington."[37]

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Webster makes one of the strongest links between the establishment of government and an educational system. He believed that a republican government could not survive without a national system of education which would shape youth into a particular political mold. In both his textbooks and his ideas, his educational model included dogmatic teachings about political and moral values, and building of emotional patriotism. In essence, his stress on the critical importance of a national educational system was based on his desire that all people should be trained to conform to his vision of the virtuous republican. People should be allowed the freedom to act only if their actions conformed to a prescribed pattern.

The two educational proposals which won the essay contest held by the American Philosophical Society in the 1790's paralleled the thinking of Rush and Webster. Of the essays submitted to the competition, only these two survive, but one can argue that they reflected what the members of the Society thought were the best educational ideas of the time. The American Philosophical Society had formed from Benjamin Franklin's Junto in 1769. Franklin was the Society's first president in 1769, followed by David Rittenhouse until 1796. Upon the death of Rittenhouse, Jefferson became head of the group. The general purpose of the group was to provide a forum for the spread of "all philosophical experiments that let light into the nature of things, tend to increase the power of man over matter, and multiply the conveniences or pleasures of life."[38] In these terms, its functions paralleled those of the Lunar Society and the Literary and Philosophical Society.

The two winning essays of the American Philosophical Society's competition are models of absolute and controlling systems of education. Both essays advocated centralization, uniformity, censorship, and control of the diffusion of knowledge. One of the essays, by Samuel Harrison Smith, called for the establishment of a board of literature and science which would have the duty of forming a system of national education including primary schools, colleges, and a national university. The board would also have the power to judge all literary and scientific productions, "and in case they shall pronounce any such work worthy of general perusal . . . it shall be printed at the public expense and the author rewarded."[39] As a result, of course, the board would have extreme power over the production and distribution of new knowledge. In order that the material be reproduced at public expense, the board would be given the power to force public financial support of certain creative works. Furthermore, Smith suggested, "It shall be the especial duty of the board to determine what authors shall be read or studied in the several institutions and at any time to substitute one author for another." The board would also control the content of a national system of libraries. In reference to libraries, Smith wrote, "it shall be in the power of the board to establish them wherever it shall see fit and to direct all original productions of merit to be introduced into them."[40] In Smith's plan the board would thus have tremendous control over ideological development by virtue of its control of the content and structure of both the educational system and the library system.

The other prize-winning essay, written by Samuel Knox, contained the same elements of uniformity and control. Knox also proposed a national board of education

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which would supervise primary schools, academies, and colleges. Under his system, each state government would have its own printer who would produce for the schools within the state "such school books and other literary publications as should be recommended or directed by the board of education." In this manner, Knox wrote hopefully, there would be throughout the "United States the same uniform system of the most approved school books."[41] Knox believed that one of the proper functions of a national system of education was to gain allegiance and submission of the future citizen to the laws and Constitution of the United States. Part of his argument expressed the fear of political liberty and suffrage without virtuous character. "It is certainly of the highest importance in a country like this that even the poorest or most uninstructed of its citizens be early impressed with a knowledge of the benefits of that happy constitution under which they live and of the enormity of their being corrupted in their right of suffrage." And to aid in this goal, he proposed the use "of a well-digested, concise moral catechism."[42] A nationally used moral catechism in a uniform system of public schools would most certainly have exerted a great deal of ideological control.

Both Smith and Knox argued for the importance of various types of censorship. Their national systems of education were not examples of freedom of speech and the press. Knox hoped that a uniform national system of textbooks would remove some of the material which he believed was injurious to the "delicacy and purity of sentiment which education ought rather to cherish than violate." Like Smith, Knox argued that throughout "all the primary schools, country academies, and even state colleges the same uniform system of books should be taught," and he suggested that the actual printing be done by only a few in order to achieve total uniformity of appearance of all textbooks.[43]

Smith hoped the board of education would exert censorship over all presses in the country. He fully recognized the enormous power he was giving the board when he wrote that because the board, in guarding the interests of virtue, "will only reward talents when exerted in its cause, we may expect that authors, as they regard the approbation of this board, will be careful to promote and not attack morals."[44] Smith believed and hoped that this would have a direct, nationwide effect on all publishing. "Hence it may be inferred that fewer vicious productions will issue from the press than at present disgrace it."[45]

It is important at this point to ask why the American Philosophical Society, which resembled in organization and membership the English organizations discussed earlier in this essay, would award prizes to essays which advocated such complete and total governmental control of the educational system. Certainly, the English libertarians would have rejected these plans. One answer might lie in their differing perspectives about government. English libertarians had a long history of suspicion of government and could not conceive of giving the monarchy and the Church of England such total control over the production and diffusion of knowledge. In part, this was because they did not believe that the Church or monarchy possessed any special knowledge of truth or understanding of social progress.

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Quite in contrast, those people in the United States who proposed national systems of education saw their plans as a means of using government to impose their beliefs about virtue and truth upon the rest of the population. This is the crux of the difference and one of the important lessons to be learned from the past. When people believe they possess the truth, they often feel little compunction about searching for some way of getting all people to conform to their brand of truth.

The best example of this is Thomas Jefferson's proposal to censor and control the political texts at the University of Virginia. Jefferson is certainly America's best-known advocate and defender of freedom of speech and the press. In the libertarian tradition, he argued that, "It is error alone which needs the support of government. Truth can stand by itself."[46] But when it came to the issue of teaching political theory, he could not resist the temptation of imposing what he thought were correct political values on future generations. In this case truth was not to stand alone but was to receive government support.

Jefferson did not advocate the censorship of all texts, but only those dealing with the "one branch in which we are the best judges, in which heresies may be taught, of so interesting a character to our own State and to the United States, as to make it a duty in us to lay down the principles which are to be taught." Jefferson's fear lay not in the teaching of some extreme form of totalitarianism but in the teaching of one political movement in the United States, namely his political enemy, federalism. Concerning federalism, he wrote: "It is our duty to guard against such principles being disseminated among our youth, and the diffusion of that position, by a previous prescription of the texts to be followed in their discourses."[47]

The other aspects of Jefferson's proposals for education did not reflect this obvious attempt to impose political and moral values. Unlike the other educational plans for the United States that have been considered, there is no heavy emphasis upon imposing virtue and morality and producing republican machines. He proposed simply that all children should receive three years of free education in reading, writing, and arithmetic. The purpose of the schooling was not to form the republican, but to provide the tools by which the individual, through the exercise of reason, could become a republican. The key to training the new citizen was not the school but a free press. Jefferson stated, in one of his most famous passages:

> The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.[48]

Jefferson's concern that the educational system should produce future republican leadership was a reflection of the transitional nature of the post-Revolutionary period and the need which Jefferson and others saw for preserving the traditions of the English Constitution. They were particularly concerned with replacing the English system of checks and balances on power between the monarchy, the nobility, and the commons, for they saw this system as the heart of the English Constitution.

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Part of the answer, for Jefferson, would be the creation of a natural aristocracy that he believed would arise through a system of education.[49]

His proposal called for selecting the best students from the primary school and sending them at public expense to grammar schools where a similar selection process would choose students for a free college education. In Jefferson's words, "By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from the rubbish annually."[50] It was the political education of this future republican leadership that Jefferson wanted to control and censor.

The example of Jefferson demonstrates the danger of providing for any government involvement in the production and diffusion of knowledge. Most people believe that their views and opinions are correct and proper. If an institutional mechanism exists which allows for the imposition of values, then people will be tempted to use it for spreading their versions of the truth. If that mechanism is a governmentally supported system of education, then there is great danger that those who control the political system will want to impose their values on the rest of society through governmental control of learning and knowledge.

It was not Jefferson's ideas—of limited schooling and a free press—but those of Webster and other early proponents of national schooling systems that became the backbone of American political education. The goal of public schooling became that of creating a democratic citizen through the teaching of ideology and the shaping of individual character. Youths were to be made to conform to the values of those who controlled the schools. While the first part of the nineteenth century might evidence some popular control of the schools, by the end of the century all pretenses of popular control vanished in the arguments for expert and elite control.

The popularization of government schooling was not, however, a result of the arguments for training republican and democratic citizens. It was a result of the great myth that public schooling was and is the friend of the poor. It is this myth that has been most widely used to win the affections of the people for public schooling and to create dependence of the poor. The myth of public schooling as friend of the poor has been used to obscure the ideologically controlling aspect of schooling.

NOTES

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2. Thomas Paine, "The Crisis," in *The Essential Thomas Paine* (New York: New American Library, 1969), p. 75.
3. Bailyn, *Ideological Origins,* pp. vi–vii.
4. Quoted in Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 44.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
6. Bailyn, *Ideological Origins,* p. 44.
7. Robert Molesworth, *An Account of Denmark as It Was in the Year 1692* (Copenhagen: Rosenkilde and Bagger, 1976). The pages of the preface are unnumbered. All of the following quotations from Molesworth are taken from the preface.
8. *Cato's Letters,* unabridged reproduction of 6th ed., ed. Leonard Levy General (1755; New York: Da Capo Press, 1971), 1:96.

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9. *Ibid.*, 2:306–309.
10. *Ibid.*, 2:312.
11. *Ibid.*, 3:33.
12. *Ibid.*, 3:34.
13. *Ibid.*, 3:32.
14. See Robbins, *Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, pp. 320–77.
15. Quoted in Brian Simon, *Studies in the History of Education, 1780#1870* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1960), pp. 34–35.
16. Robbins, *Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, p. 350.
17. The present author has provided a more detailed discussion of Godwin's educational ideas elsewhere. That study and the quotes from Godwin used in this paper can be found in Joel Spring, *Primer of Libertarian Education* (New York: Free Life Editions, 1975), pp. 13–33.
18. Benjamin Rush, "Thoughts upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic," in Frederick Rudolph, ed., *Essays on Education in the Early Republic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Library, 1965), p. 5.
19. See David Hawke, *Benjamin Rush: Revolutionary Gadfly* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), pp. 5–262.
20. Quoted *ibid.*, pp. 108–109.
21. Quoted in Norman Dain, *Concepts of Insanity in the United States, 1789#1865* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), p. 8.
22. Quoted in Hawke, *Benjamin Rush*, p. 279.
23. Rush, "Thoughts upon the Mode of Education," p. 17.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Benjamin Rush, "Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools," in Rudolph, *Essays on Education*, pp. 4–6.
29. Harry Warfel, *Noah Webster: Schoolmaster to America* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 335–36.
30. See *ibid.*, pp. 119–50.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–75.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
33. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 21.
34. "Noah Webster's Federal Catechism" (1798), in Sol Cohen, ed., *Education in the United States: A Documentary History* (New York: Random House, 1974), pp. 769–70.
35. "Noah Webster's Moral Catechism," *ibid.*, p. 771.
36. Warfel, *Noah Webster*, p. 86.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
38. Allen Oscar Hansen, *Liberalism and American Education in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 105–10.
39. Samuel Harrison Smith, "Remarks on Education," in Rudolph, *Essays on Education*, p. 213.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
41. Samuel Knox, "An Essay on the Best System of Liberal Education," *ibid.*, p. 323.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 332.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 324–25.
44. Smith, "Remarks on Education," *ibid.*, p. 215.
45. *Ibid.*
46. Thomas Jefferson, "Notes on the State of Virginia," in Gordon Lee, ed., *Crusade Against Ignorance: Thomas Jefferson on Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1961), p. 64.
47. Jefferson, "To Joseph Cabell," *ibid.*, p. 133.
48. Jefferson, "To Edward Carrington," *ibid.*, p. 102.
49. See Bailyn, *Ideological Origins*, pp. 175–98.
50. Jefferson, "Notes on the State of Virginia," p. 94.

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

Ayn Rand and the Is-Ought Problem

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The Essential Subjectivity of Objectivism

Although ethical systems may be divided into those which claim to be objective and those which freely acknowledge their own subjectivity, a special place must be reserved for an ethical system such as that of Ayn Rand[1] which takes its name from this central claim to objectivity—Objectivism.

In this essay, the claims of Objectivism to present an objective epistemology[2] will not be considered, but only the claim of Rand's ethical system to represent an objective value system. Rand says specifically:

> No philosopher has given a rational, objectively demonstrable, scientific answer to the question of *why* man needs a code of values. So long as that question remained unanswered, no rational, scientific, *objective* code of ethics could be discovered or defined.[3]

There can be no doubt that she intends to construct an ethical system in which the standards of morality operate independently of their subjective acceptance by individual human wills:

> Today, as in the past, most philosophers agree that the ultimate standard of ethics is *whim* (they call it "arbitrary postulate" or "subjective choice" or "emotional commitment")—and the battle is only over the question of *whose* whim: one's own or society's or the dictator's or God's. Whatever else they may disagree about, today's moralists agree that ethics is a *subjective* issue and that the three things barred from its field are: reason—mind—reality.[4]

Two main obstacles block the successful creation of an objective ethical system: epistemological moral relativism and the is-ought gap (often called Hume's Law[5]). The first obstacle, although the more familiar, is by far the weaker and more easily dispatched. Moral relativism, based upon epistemological arguments and objections, appears to block the path to the discovery of an objective system of morality by two major arguments: (1) that the variety of the innumerable ethical systems of the people of the earth, and the fact that many of these systems command actions that others of them forbid, demonstrates that there is no correct ethical system, but only subjective preferences in the ethical realm; and (2) that the inability to prove the correctness of an ethical system in an experimental manner or even in an *a priori,* geometrical demonstration proves its mere subjectivity.

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In regard to the first challenge from the relativistic perspective, Rand retorts by placing her ethical system in a category radically different category from virtually all other such systems. In reference to her own system, she states:

> What is morality, or ethics? It is a code of values to guide man's choices and actions—the choices and actions that determine the purpose and course of his life. Ethics, as a science, deals with discovering and defining such a code.[6]

All others she characterizes in the following manner:

> In the sorry record of the history of mankind's ethics—with a few rare, and unsuccessful, exceptions—moralists have regarded ethics as the province of whims, that is: of the irrational. Some of them did so explicitly, by intention—others implicitly, by default. A "whim" is a desire experienced by a person who does not know and does not care to discover its cause.[7]

With the second contention of the relativists, that moral systems do not admit of scientific proof, Rand would unequivocally disagree. That section of Ayn Rand's address on Objectivist ethics[8] wherein she speaks of the discovery or definition of a "rational, scientific, *objective* code of ethics" has already been quoted here. In the same address[9] she upbraids Aristotle for denying that ethics is an exact science[10] and for his doctrine of the wise and noble man (spoudaious[11]) whom one is to observe and to imitate in order to be moral. Rand rejects this intuitionism in a clear belief that a proper moral system is capable of rational demonstration.

It should be noted that Rand does not have to claim this scientific demonstrability for her ethical system in order to overcome the second attack of the relativists. The fact that a particular system has not been demonstrated *a priori* or even *a posteriori* does not prove the relativists' assertions, for the absence of such a proof is not, and cannot be, the same as a refutation. In point of fact, most ethical argumentation is developed in the mode of *a fortiori* reasoning. Rand, however, has other reasons for desiring the complete demonstrability of her system—the awesome difficulty of facing Hume's is-ought dichotomy.

The skepticism of Hume annoys and revolts the rationalistic Rand, for his denials of the provability of causality, consciousness, and the continuity of nature are all "accompanied by vehement opposition to the mysticism of the Witch Doctor and by protestations of loyalty to reason and science."[12] Hume uses reason to make an assault upon reason's own reliability and especially upon its epistemological subset—the tenets of the scientific method and probability. Since Hume does not use faith against reason, but reason against itself, she senses in his formulations the deadliest of opponents.

Rand's characterization of Hume's skepticism as "the manifesto of a philosophical movement that can be designated only as *Attila-ism,*"[13] despite its vituperative quality, is probably not unfair, for the ethical system that derives from the Humean skepticism cannot but be recognized as one where power is the overall determinant. The Humean ethical system could well be called a refined and sophisticated Hobbesianism—but whereas Hobbes dwells principally upon the purely

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materialistic aspects of power, Hume acknowledges the role that human ideas and subjectively held values play in motivating human action (i.e., in creating and resisting political and social power).

Rand is, however, unfair in her analysis of Hume when she asserts: "Hume's conclusions would be the conclusions of a consciousness limited to the perceptual level of awareness, passively reacting to the experience of immediate concretes, with no capacity to form abstractions, to *integrate* perceptions into concepts, waiting in vain for the appearance of an object labeled 'causality.'"[14] It is not the case, of course, that Hume's consciousness does not draw the same conception of causality from witnessed events that virtually all humans do, but rather, that upon analysis, he cannot justify these conceptual products of his consciousness deductively. Intellectually, Hume would maintain that the concept of causality must rest upon faith, for all empirical evidence of its existence becomes evidence only by a prior assumption of the notion of causality.

The question of Humean skepticism in general need not be of concern to us here, but the Randian response to Hume's is-ought problem may very likely be colored by her analysis and reaction to his skepticism.

Rand begins by recognizing the clear relation of value to the individual will, for she says, "the concept 'value' is not a primary; it presupposes an answer to the question: of value to *whom* and for *what?*"[15] In this distinction, she is clearly repudiating any approach like that of G. E. Moore, who, in *Principia Ethica,* attempted to circumvent the naturalistic fallacy[16] by making the good a property adhering in certain actions. Rand then quotes approvingly from a speech by her John Galt, the hero of *Atlas Shrugged,* in which he draws a direct link between "life" and "value," noting that only living entities can have values and that the great fundamental alternatives in the cosmos are existence and nonexistence.

Rand develops this idea at length,[17] holding up the "organism's life [as] its *standard of value,*" and calling life "the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action." By emphasizing the interaction of the valuation of life and the role of values in preserving life (and imparting meaning to it), Rand appears to have successfully avoided falling into the naturalistic fallacy, for she does not make "life-sustaining" a total synonym for "good." If she were to make them synonymous, Moore's objection that the term "good" could be dropped and the purely descriptive term ("life-sustaining," in this case) could be retained, would apply. Galt seems to speak this way—"it is only to a living entity that things can be good or evil"—but Rand draws the appropriate distinction:

> And an animal has no choice in the standard of value directing its actions: its senses provide it with an *automatic* code of values, an automatic knowledge of what is good for it or evil, what benefits or endangers its life. An animal has no power to extend its knowledge or to evade it.[18]

Rand has called the things that harm or help the lower organisms "good" or "evil" by a kind of metaphorical extension, but for the human organism, who

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makes rational choices on the basis of life-oriented values, she means these terms literally. In this way, she has avoided both the naturalistic fallacy and subjectivism. For the human being, a thing can be chosen because it belongs to this class of life-sustaining things or activities (and hence is good on that lower, metaphorical level), but in the act of choosing (valuing) the thing or activity in a conscious choice, because it is life-sustaining, the thing or activity becomes "good" in the higher sense, which cannot be reduced to the purely descriptive phrase of "life-sustaining." The morally good, as opposed to the naturally good, in Rand equals not "life-sustaining," but "life-sustaining freely chosen on account of that standard."

Subjectivism is thus avoided because, although it is the individual will which chooses, it can choose incorrectly, for the standard of the life-sustaining is embodied in concrete reality: "Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality."[19]

It is at this stage in her argumentation, at the very point of seeming triumph over subjectivity, that Rand loses the battle. She takes aim at the Humean disjuncture of the prescriptive from the descriptive and fatally wounds the pretentions to objectivity of her own systematic ethics: "The fact that a living entity *is,* determines what it *ought* to do. So much for the issue of the relation between *'is'* and *'ought.'*"[20] In these two sentences, Rand reveals a serious misconception of the nature of the Humean is-ought gap and introduces a dangerous potential for self-contradiction into her own ethical system.

In his work *A Treatise of Human Nature,* the Scottish philosopher David Hume challenged the basis of all objective systems of morality:

> I can not forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for sometime in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is,* and *is not,* I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought* or an *ought not.* This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new revelation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.[21]

Clearly, Rand thinks that Hume denied a connection between facts and systems of morality. This error is not uncommon, and forms the basis for A. C. MacIntyre's revisionist reinterpretation of Hume's famous paragraph.[22] Claiming that Hume could not have meant to establish a total divorcement of facts from values because Hume uses facts in his own ethical system, MacIntyre interprets Hume to be assaulting only theologically-based morality. In fact, there is nothing in the Humean formulation of the problem which hinders the simple integration of facts and values. The sole difficulty arises over the derivability of values from facts.

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The following syllogism does not violate Hume's Law:

> One ought not to murder human beings.
> Socrates is a human being.
> Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates.

On the other hand, the syllogism below does violate Hume's Law:

> Human beings have a right to life.
> Socrates is a human being.
> Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates.

The second syllogism is defective, for it requires for its conclusion the premise that one ought to respect the rights of others. Add that assumption, and one has a valid syllogism which integrates facts and values.

It should be noted that, although many philosophers speak as if the is-ought problem were a problem in logic, the question does not belong to the domain of the science of logic at all. The problem can, of course, be expressed in logical terms, for the impossibility of deriving an "ought" from an "is" can be rendered as the inability to reach prescriptive premises from descriptive conclusions. Despite the use of the terminology of logic in setting up the problem, however, there exists no necessity from the point of view of the science of logic alone why one should expect to be able to derive an "ought" from an "is." No paradox or antinomy results from this inability, and prescriptive conclusions can be produced by the expedient of utilizing a prescriptive premise.

The difficulty produced by the is-ought gap involves the discipline of ethics, rather than that of logic, for, if one must always have a prescriptive premise in one's assumptions, a nasty perplexion arises: One must either assume an infinite regression of prescriptions, or one must assume a most basic prescription (or set of prescriptions). The first assumption—an infinite regress of prescriptions—is incomprehensible. Aristotle called an infinite regress in explanation illogical, and, as a standard form of philosophical argumentation, the demonstration that a particular position necessitates an infinite regression constitutes a refutation of that position. From the second assumption, if one (or more) moral maxim(s) is taken to be the most basic possible, then another difficulty arises: Either this maxim can be disobeyed or it cannot. If it cannot be disobeyed, then the term "ought" seems inappropriate, for we use that word in connection with free choices only. As John Galt said, and as Rand reiterates: "Man has to be man—by choice; he has to hold his life as a value—by choice; he has to learn to sustain it—by choice; he has to discover the values it requires and practice his virtues—by choice. A code of values accepted by choice is a code of morality."[23]

If, on the other hand, there is a choice either to obey or to disobey this most basic moral maxim, then there is a demand automatically set up for either a more basic moral maxim still, or for a reason why one would benefit from obedience to the maxim. Obviously, the demand for a more basic moral maxim is simply

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the setting up of an infinite regression, which Rand as well as Aristotle recognizes as impossible:

> Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals or means: a series of means going off into an infinite progression towards a nonexistent end is a metaphysical and epistemological impossibility. It is only an ultimate, an *end in itself,* that makes the existence of values possible.[24]

The other alternative, the supplying of a benefit—either directly positive or the absence of a negative sanction—indicates a teleologization of the moral maxim, and for this reason is unacceptable, for it makes the maxim depend upon the individual, subjective human will. If, for example, we say that "one ought to do x, in order that y," we have made the obligation to do x dependent on some personal desire to have y occur. "One ought to do x, in order that y" can be translated into "if one wants y, one ought to do x," which is conditional, depending upon the subjective desire for y. The "ought" in the teleological conditional, "if one wants y, one ought to do x", does not present a problem in regard to the is-ought gap, for it is not a genuine deontological "ought," and may be rendered in a non-prescriptive form. Thus, the following syllogisms are valid and equivalent, despite the is-ought dichotomy (which applies to the deontological "ought" only):

If you want y, you ought to do x.	If you want y, the most efficient way to achieve it is to do x.
You want y.	You want y.
Therefore, you ought to do x.	Therefore, the most efficient way to get what you want is to do x.

Given either of these equivalent syllogisms, if you act contrary to the conclusion, we do not express moral outrage, but merely surprise. One either assumes that you did not, in fact, want y, or that you did not know or believe the factual content of the first premise. If one becomes convinced that neither of these applies, and you still refuse to act in line with the reasoning of the syllogism, one assumes that you are illogical, crazy, or so forth. Max Black's claim that there is no distinction between the deontological and the (teleological) hypothetical moral imperatives in regard to the is-ought problem, therefore, proves totally incorrect.[25]

Returning to the Randian system of ethics, we see that the claimed bridging of the is-ought gap has not succeeded. Rand says: "Knowledge, for any conscious organism, is the means of survival; to a living consciousness, every 'is' implies an 'ought.'" Yet she goes on to elaborate the obvious fact that a man may choose contrary to the standards she has endorsed: "Man is free to choose not to be conscious, but not free to escape the penalty of unconsciousness: destruction."[26]

This ability of man to choose his own destruction is of some importance, and Rand mentions it more than once. She uses this negative choice-potential to differentiate the human from the lower vegetative life-forms: "there is no alternative in a plant's function: it acts automatically to further its life, it cannot act for its

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own destruction."[27] The negative volitional option is utilized to separate human from animal as well.[28] Freely chosen evil is recognized as essential for this differentiation,[29] and indeed, it is seen as that which constitutes the uniqueness of man: "Man is the only living species that has the power to act as his own destroyer—and that is the way he has acted through most of his history."[30] Galt is summoned to cap it off: "the alternative his nature offers him is: rational being or suicidal animal."[31]

These reiterations seemingly contradict another basic thesis of Randian ethics, however, for she has insisted: "Ethics is an *objective, metaphysical necessity of man's survival.*"[32] Now, this standard—the rational criterion required for man to survive *qua* man[33]—is perfectly objective, and unalterable by human whim: "No choice is open to an organism in this issue: that which is required for its survival is determined by its *nature,* by the kind of entity it *is.*"[34] Since Rand has admitted (often) that the entity can choose death over life, however, it is at this critical juncture that the subjectivity enters and dominates Rand's entire ethical edifice. The whole Randian moral system rests upon the most basic moral command that one ought to do that which preserves one's life (*qua* man). It makes no difference, then, that the standard is not variable in response to the individual, subjective will, for the commitment to the command ("one ought to behave so as to survive *qua* man") demands a more basic deontological moral imperative—setting up the prospect of an infinite regression of moral commands—for a rational creature has the option to choose nonsurvival as well as survival: "Metaphysically, the choice 'to be conscious or not' is the choice of life or death."[35]

Apparently, there is no reason not to select death over life. The fact that activity y is required for my continued existence does not make a deontological "ought" derivable from that fact. If, on the other hand, "one ought to do y in order to survive" can be translated into "if one wishes to survive, one ought to do y," then the entire structure of Objectivist ethics becomes subjective, for the conditional "if one wishes to survive" colors all that depends upon it.

It does not seem at all clear that Ayn Rand has an answer to this objection, but hints of a defense seem to suggest themselves in certain key texts. Rand seems to be making an explicit argument that the choice of death over life is irrational and illogical. Having noted that only a living organism has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed activity,[36] she states:

> Epistemologically, the concept of "value" is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of "life." To speak of "value" as apart from "life" is worse than a contradiction in terms. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible."[37]

Despite Rand's frequently expressed loathing for the German philosopher Kant—"the man who . . . closed the door of philosophy to reason, was Immanuel Kant"[38]—she seems to have borrowed an ethical notion from Kant's moral theory. She attempts to utilize one of the underlying principles of Kantian ethics, that immoral actions are self-contradictory. One finds Rand employing another Galtian

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speech to hint at this idea: "Happiness is a state of non-contradictory joy—a joy without penalty or guilt, a joy that does not clash with any of your values and does not work for your own destruction."[39]

The roots of this Randian approach seem to lie in her espousal of a substantive, rather than an instrumental, definition of rationality. She calls her opponents irrationalists, and she has Galt in the aforecited speech, in a single sentence, speak of "rational man," "rational goals," "rational values," and "rational actions."[40]

Rand speaks worshipfully of the "laws of logic,"[41] and in her thumbnail history of philosophy, she calls Aristotle's philosophy "the intellect's Declaration of Independence" from the reign of mysticism and unreason:

> Artistotle's . . . incomparable achievement lay in the fact that he defined the *basic* principles of a rational view of existence and of man's consciousness: that there is only *one* reality, the one which man perceives—that it exists as an *objective* absolute (which means: independently of the consciousness, the wishes or the feelings of any perceiver)—that the task of man's consciousness is to *perceive,* not to create, reality—that abstractions are man's method of integrating his sensory material—that man's mind is his only tool of knowledge—that A is A.[42]

She even goes so far as indirectly to praise St. Thomas Aquinas as the vehicle for the reintroduction of Aristotle's thought to pre-Renaissance Europe.[43]

One need not reproduce the endless arguments between the proponents of theories of substantive rationality and those of instrumental rationality in order to see that the Randian use of the doctrine does not solve her difficulties with the "is" and the "ought." Hume, it is true, believed that reason was purely instrumental—desires could neither be rational nor be irrational, but were essentially non-rational. Actions could be called rational or irrational only in regard to their appropriateness to the achievement of desires. In a famous dictum, Hume assured his readership: "Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger."[44] There is no need to prove the correctness of the Humean teaching of the instrumentality of reason in order to show that the Randian notion of substantive rationality does not provide a bridge between "is" and "ought," however.

Rand says (through Galt) that "rationality is a matter of choice."[45] This presents an immense problem for the Randian philosophy, for one is forced to ask: If rationality is a matter of choice, is the choice to maintain rationality or to abandon it a rational choice or a non-rational choice? This involves a great deal more than semantics, for if it is the case that either choice is non-rational (or even pre-rational), then the Randian system of morality depends, at root, on a happenstantial, unfree choice. The Randian might attempt to claim that there was a bifurcation, with the choice of rationality amounting to the rational choice, and with the choice of irrationality amounting to an irrational choice. This raises a double difficulty.

First, it is unclear how the selection of one of two alternatives can possibly

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alter the nature of the prior choice that produced the selection, but this point may be debatable. Secondly, the elimination of the possibility of a rationally chosen commitment to irrationality means that there can be no such thing as freely chosen evil. Rand seems to reject this possibility, however, for she does appear to require the existence of freely chosen evil:

> Man's basic vice, the source of all his evils, is the act of unfocusing his mind, the suspension of his consciousness, which is not blindness, but the refusal to see, not ignorance, but the refusal to know.[46]

For the choice to unfocus the consciousness to be evil—to be a refusal to see rather than blindness and a refusal to know rather than ignorance—it is necessary that it be a freely adopted choice by the reason, for if the individual did not freely and consciously choose it, it cannot be said that the individual acted as he ought not to have acted. Rand, it is true, speaks at times of a fact that "man must act for his own *rational* self-interest,"[47] but that "must" seems clearly to be in the context of action within the framework of the acceptance of Objectivist ethics. Clearly, if there is a choice as to whether to act rationally or not, there can be no reason why a man "must" (in any absolute sense of necessitation) act in his own rational self-interest, at least as "rational" is defined by those who adhere to belief in substantive reason.

Rand's subtle attempt to use the Kantian gambit of the contradictions of evil actions is apparent in the following sentence: "The irrational is the impossible; it is that which contradicts the facts of reality; facts cannot be altered by a wish, but they *can* destroy the wisher."[48] The problem with both the Kantian and the Randian positions on this issue is that it is not the case that immoral actions constitute an impossibility or a logical contradiction in the way that a square circle does: A square circle can be neither constructed, nor described, nor conceived, for it consists of no more than the juxtaposition of two contradictory words which can be put together only in time, but cannot be otherwise conjoined. Evil choices and evil actions cannot be seen as contradictory or impossible for the simple reason that they can be done. Since one can choose to will values which will lead to his demise, Rand is left with the problem of why one ought not so to will if one feels inclined in that direction.

The following syllogism is defective, but it represents the most basic moral reasoning of the Randian system:

> The adoption of value system x is necessary for the survival of any human being.
> You are a human being.
> Therefore, you should adopt value system x.

The missing premise—a prescriptive premise—is that one ought to do what is necessary in order to survive. But any inclusion of that prescriptive premise just triggers the infinite regression of the is-ought dichotomy. Treatment of the problem as a hypothetical imperative would prove equally unsatisfactory:

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If you wish to survive, you ought to adopt value system x.
You wish to survive.
Therefore, you ought to adopt value system x.

This syllogism is perfectly valid, but it will not serve for Rand's purposes, for its introductory conditional makes the entire ethical system subjectively dependent on the individual human will: If you do not choose to survive, there appear to be no grounds upon which the Randians can condemn your judgment morally. Objectivist ethics are, therefore, thoroughly subjective.

The Natural Law Defenders of Rand

Having discussed Ayn Rand's ethical system as presented in her own words, it may prove advisable to look at some of the attempts which have been made to provide a natural law interpretation and defense of the Randian moral system.

This reply will focus on two separate aspects of the natural law argument for Randian ethics: (A) an analysis of some difficulties in the life-as-ultimate-value position, and (B) a consideration of whether the Randian (or any other) natural law approach solves the Humean is-ought problem.

A. In presenting their elaboration of the Randian position of life as the ultimate value, Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen,[49] by their replication and intensification of the original Randian arguments, make clear (unintentionally) a major flaw in the Randian conceptualization of ethics.

When considering why life is a value implicit in all other values, Den Uyl and Rasmussen present the following argument for their (and Rand's) position:

> Man's life must be the standard for judging moral value because this is the end toward which all goal-directed action (in this case purposive action) is directed, and we have already shown why goal-directed behavior depends on life. Indeed, one cannot make a choice without implicitly choosing life as the end. Let us consider the following argument:
>
> 1.) X is an object of choice.
> 2.) Y is a necessary condition for the existence of X as a value. . . .Y makes X as a value possible.
> 3.) If P chooses (values) X, P must choose (value) the necessary condition for P's valuation of X.
> 4.) P chooses (values) X.
> Thus 5.) P chooses (values) Y.
> 6.) Y is man's life.
> Thus 7.) P chooses (values) man's life in choosing (valuing) X.[50]

We can see clearly that 'Y' is presented as an undifferentiated whole, with no consideration as to time, but time differentiation is one of the most essential elements in the valuation of life. To begin with, it is obvious that the desire for life in the abstract is an absurdity—all "life" as we know it is time-differentiated, both as to beginning and as to end. Even if it is not an absurdity to wish for endless life, two problems immediately present themselves: (1) life is still time-differentiated, as it proceeds from a fixed beginning, and (2) if unending life is the goal, we are

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certain to fall so infinitely short of the mark as to render the distinction between instant death and death after the interval of centuries meaningless.

If, however, the natural law defenders of Rand admit that the ultimate value—life—is time-differentiated, great problems arise for their analysis. If we take time t as the first moment when an individual makes a conscious, knowledgeable, and willed choice between or among alternatives, and if we further assume life to be a time-differentiated entity, some interesting results will follow: at time t there is no meaningful sense in which life-at-time-t can be the object of a meaningful act of choice (valuing)—for it is a given, and one which it is equally meaningless to will to be or to will not to be, since both options alike lie outside our power.

To begin with, our life is not and cannot be of our willing initially. From the point of view of our own human wills, we come to consciousness already in life, as A. E. Housman put it, "Born a stranger and afraid/In a world I never made." If we look at all the time that has preceded the initial moment of decision (time t), we may, for the sake of demonstration, take our first moment of life (whether at birth, at conception, or at some point in between) to have been at time t−10,000. At time t, it is as meaningless to make a valuation (i.e., a valuative volition) concerning life-at-time-t as it would be to wish that one had not existed from time t−10,000 to time t or, alternatively, that one had existed at any point prior to time t−10,000.

Such volitions as these are contrafactual, and may be said to be truly illogical. They simply cannot be achieved because they were not in the time which has passed, and thus, now, can never be. Interestingly, because they are fully and truly illogical (that is, because they can never be), we do not attach any moral significance to such volitions, except (perhaps) to suggest that anyone who gives them too much consideration is wasting his time.

A decision, a volition, at time t can only be meaningful in relation to life-at-time-t+1 or life-at-time-t+1, t+2 or life-at-time-t+1, t+2, ..., t+n. We can only will concerning life in the future (however proximate that future), for the presence of life at the moment of willing is a given condition for the act of willing, and must therefore be accepted (no act of volition being necessary or possible in regard to it)—it *cannot* in any case be altered, for it is simultaneous with the act of willing—i.e., it is as much outside the effective operation of our wills as is our being or non-being at any point in time prior to that act of willing.

When we look at volitions concerning life at a future point, however, no such problems arise. If at time t, one decides to end one's life, or to carry on some form of activity that is likely to result in an early expiration, such as playing Russian roulette, one is making a decision about life-at-time-t+1 or about life-at-time-t+x—in any case, about some future point in time—at which point the holding of life (and the valuing of it) are not necessary for those valuations which have been made at time t.

There is no contradiction whatsoever in a wish to live an hour, a day, a week, a year, or any set number of years, but no longer than that specified time. The illogical wishes for life (and those wishes, therefore, incapable of fulfillment) are those involving a desire to have lived in a time prior to one's birth. If, of course,

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one wishes for both life and that which is normally antithetical to life, one runs a high risk of having one of one's wishes contradicted by events. If, to take an example, one gets a craving for a luncheon of Angel of Death mushrooms, but, at the same time, one has an equally strong hankering for continued life, then one would do well to give up either the culinary vellications or the desire for longevity. Should one clearly desire a meal of the deadly mushrooms more than the prolongation of life, however, there would be nothing illogical in eating the fatal fungus.

Given the application of time differentiation to life, there remains no substance to the Rasmussen–Den Uyl claim for the paradoxicality involved in valuing death: "Given that life is a necessary condition for valuation, there is no other way we can value something without also (implicitly at least) valuing that which makes valuation possible. Paradoxically perhaps, we could value not living any longer, but in making such a value we must nevertheless value life."[51] More significantly, however, the ground seems to move away from their subsequent argument that death cannot be an ultimate value:

> Death, a living thing not-being, does not require any actions for its maintenance. Death is not a positive way of being. Rather, it is a negation—the absence of being a living thing. It has no required actions; it has no needs. Death cannot be the reason or cause of goal-directed behavior. . . . Therefore, we cannot "suppose" death or anything else (other than life) as the ultimate value, for the very activity of "holding something as a value," let alone as an ultimate one, depends on life being the ultimate value in the sense of "ultimate" discussed earlier.[52]

It is undeniably true that, given time-undifferentiated life and death, life requires actions to sustain it, and death requires none. Nevertheless, if we refer to time-differentiated life and death, they begin to take on a far greater similarity in regard to the necessity of action to achieve or sustain them: Death, it is true, never requires any purposive action and willful choice to sustain it, but to achieve it at a given time may require such actions. Under some conditions, it may require the greatest degrees of ingenuity and courage to achieve it. Life, on the other hand, requires actions to sustain it (sometimes), but can never be "achieved"—i.e., one must always have life, one can never acquire it as an object of actions, but only the extension of it.

Since Rand would reject any notion of an immortal soul in man as the propaganda of the Witch Doctor, and since (anyway) such an assumption attached by a revisor of Rand would seriously distort the role of physical survival in Rand's ultimate valuation of life, another problem arises *vis-à-vis* life as the ultimate value—it cannot, in any case, be sustained beyond the paltry few years of our life spans.

Death has the quality, at least, of being everlasting. Rand and her defenders have done little to treat the problem of the effect which the inevitability of the loss of life has upon the role of life-as-the-ultimate-value. Since one must (will, if you prefer) die at time $t+x$, Rand and her defenders must elaborate why that loss of life at time $t+x$ is to be preferred (automatically) to the loss of life at time $t+(x-1)$

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or at time t+(x−1,000) or at any other time. This problem flows out of the lack of time differentiation in the Randian valuation of life, and it will not be pursued further here.

B. Far more important than these specific criticisms of the Randian use of life as the ultimate value is the question of Rand's purported solution to Hume's is-ought dichotomy. As already demonstrated in this essay, Rand's proposed solution to this difficulty is entirely inadequate, but we must now take up the issue of whether the interpretation of Rand as an ethical philosopher of the natural law tradition will alleviate her snag on Hume's Law.

Alas, it appears that such is not the case, for as yet, no solution to the Humean quandary has come out of the natural law tradition either.[53] Why, it may well be asked, should Ayn Rand be held to account for a failure to overcome that meta-ethical problem—Hume's is-ought gap—which no other philosopher has as yet subdued? Simply, in answer, it must be pointed out that unlike most of the great ethicians, and especially the giants of the natural law tradition, such as Aristotle, Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Cicero, Suarez, etc., Rand has lived after the publication of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature,* and she herself proclaims both her intent to solve and her success in solving that particularly knotty problem.

Natural law philosophy will not, in its present state, answer the difficulty of the is-ought problem. If we were to construct a paradigm syllogism of a generalized natural law ethical argument, it would resemble the following, which was Osterfeld's version of that paradigm:

1. The behavior or movement of any living entity having a nature ought to be in accord with its nature.
2. Man has a nature.
3. Hence, man ought to act in accordance with it.[54]

Osterfeld went on to undermine this paradigmatic syllogism's significance for ethics by an astute observation:

> One may. . .feel that anyone who could reject the conclusion that one "ought to act in accordance with his nature" is "a bit weird," but the fact remains the moral norm can be binding only on those who accept the higher axiological rule, but it is quite without moral significance for anyone who doesn't.[55]

Rasmussen, in attempting to deal with the Osterfeld objections, follows the weaker (but more highly emphasized) line in Osterfeld's reasoning. Rasmussen summarizes Osterfeld's central argument thus:

> The reason why the first premise could not be substantiated was because it claimed to be an ultimate value, a *summum bonum,* and while such an ultimate value could not be disproven, neither could it be proven. . . .One could not prove the obligatory nature of an ultimate value, for that would require that the value be substantiated by reference to some other value, and hence what was claimed to be an ultimate value would not be so, and if such a justificatory

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> process were followed, why should one accept the value used to provide the final justification? Wherever the justification process ends, what does one say to the person who does not choose to accept the ultimate value?[56]

Rasmussen responds to the epistemological argument in Osterfeld, but the core of the is-ought problem is not epistemological. Ignoring the difficulties involved, let us assume that the ultimate value of a particular ethical system could be proven, what could be made of conscious, deliberate defiance of it?

We come upon a man committing some act grossly violative of his nature: let us say that he was engaged in a theft. We apprehend him, and while we have him in custody we question him about the nature of the act we caught him performing. We find he is an extremely knowledgeable fellow, familiar with all the arguments of the natural law school. In fact, he has read Rasmussen's article and was convinced that the proposition that a man ought to act in accord with his nature is correct, logically. "Well," we ask him, "if you know that to steal is to act against your nature, and you know that you ought to act according to your nature, how could you bring yourself to commit your felonious act?" "I chose not to act in accord with correct ethical principles," our philosophical burglar might answer.

My story, I trust, illustrates the problem. To deny an ultimate value and to defy an ultimate value are not at all the same activity, and it is the latter which provides the stronger support of the is-ought dichotomy. One can deny a fact, but one cannot defy one. You can deny the law of gravity is operative in the world, but your denial will have no effect on what will happen when you step off a precipice. The law of gravity operates no matter which course of action you pursue—if you accept the existence of the operation of the law and hold yourself back from the edge of the cliff, or if you reject the truth of the law of gravity and step over the ledge, or if you accept the truth of the law, but wish to fall (let us say as a means of suicide), in all three cases the operation of the law of gravity is unaffected.

Moral law does not work in this way, however. One can admit the intellectual correctness of a proposition of moral law (even of its ultimate value), and yet deliberately defy it. This being the case, we must question what moral law means: If one could not, by any means whatsoever, defy moral law, great difficulty would arise over the appropriateness of the use of "ought"—for we do not normally use that word to command actions which in any event cannot be avoided. If, on the other hand, one can and does defy the imperative of a moral law, how is one still seen as bound by it? Punishment or other ill consequences do not suffice to make moral law objective, for if the person committing the violation of the maxim(s) prefers the object of his illicit action, even when coupled with punitive or other unfortunate consequences, that seems to mean that there is no apparent reason why he should not act contrary to that moral law.

Any reason offered for why one should not act contrary to moral law must either be a fact or a value. If a fact, it will need to be made relevant by the acceptance (envaluation; not epistemological acceptance) of that fact by the individual's

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will, which condition, in turn, renders it subjective. If a value, it, in its turn, will require an answer why it may not be defied, and so *ad infinitum.*

With regard to the specific arguments employed in defense of the Rothbardian argument for a natural law ethics,[57] Rasmussen presents essentially Randian rationales for the place of life as the ultimate value and standard of value for human beings:

> Living beings necessitate and make possible the existence of end-oriented behavior, and they are the only type of beings which do so. . . .The most fundamental difference possible is the difference between existence and non-existence. If such a difference did not exist, . . .if an action could not result in the existence or non-existence of the entity that acted to achieve a goal, then there would be no difference in the results of achieving or failing to achieve a goal. If there were no difference in result with respect to an entity existing or not existing, then what other differences could there be?[58]

Immediately following this essentially Randian exposition, Rasmussen presents an extremely revealing position: "Thus, it is the difference between a living being existing and not existing that creates all the other alternatives a living being faces, and it is because life is something that must be maintained that there are goals in the first place."[59] The claim that life *must* be maintained contradicts directly not only our own experience of human behavior, but Rand's and Rasmussen's own stated principles as well. In listing those conditions "necessary for the possibility of ends (values)," Rasmussen lists as the second requirement: "End-oriented behavior requires by its very nature the existence of an entity faced with an alternative, i.e., an entity whose actions could achieve or fail to achieve a goal."[60]

Rasmussen's "must" contradicts not only our knowledge of human behavior, but also his own stated requirement for the possibility of values. If it were truly the case that life *must* be maintained, then there would be no grounds for values on Rasmussen's own testimony, for no alternative would confront men on this most basic question of values.

Besides the man who freely chooses death, Rasmussen is conscious of the problem of the man who escapes the dire consequences of the moral maxim(s) of the Randian natural law:

> A human can, of course, act in a manner inconsistent with the standards set by his nature and not be literally dead, but such "non-death" cannot be considered life or, at least, successful human life. To ignore the principles that human nature requires and to attempt to live without regard to them in any manner one might choose is to opt for an existence as a metaphysical misfit, living by sheer luck and/or the moral behavior of someone else.[61]

Rasmussen threatens the moral malefactor with the possibility of becoming "a metaphysical misfit"—reminding one of the W. C. Field's admonition "Don't be a moon-calf! Don't be a jabbernowl! You don't want to be those things, do you?" At the risk of belaboring a point: Why oughtn't one to be " a metaphysical misfit, living by sheer luck and/or the moral behavior of someone else"?

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Rasmussen clearly has not grasped the severity of the is-ought dichotomy when he says: "It is wrong to believe that a moral principle is obligatory only if immediate and devastating consequences rain down upon you when you violate them."[62] Even if every evil act had immediate and terrible consequences, that would not make moral principles obligatory in the objective, deontological manner for which Rasmussen hopes. The terrible consequences would still be merely facts, requiring the teleologism (Kantian hypothetical imperative) "If you don't want x (the terrible consequence), don't do y (the immoral action)"—which makes the proposition subjectively dependent on your individual will, for if you are willing to put up with x, there then appears no reason why you should not do y.

In the end, Rasmussen carries his argument further than serves his purposes. He states: "Insofar as one chooses, regardless of the choice (even if it is the choice not to choose), one must choose (value) man's life qua man. It makes no sense to value some Y without also valuing that which makes the valuing of Y possible."[63] We may note in passing the hedged phraseology "makes no sense." Why not the stronger "is illogical"? But were "is illogical" the words used, we would be left with the perplexing question: If such a valuation were truly illogical, how indeed could it be made?

In order to lay the problem of is-ought finally to rest, Rasmussen resorts to the stratagem of making the ultimate value ineluctable:

> Thus, it is a category mistake—a type of contradiction—to hold something as a value, i.e., to make some choice, and at the same time ask why one should live in accord with his nature. "Man's life qua man" is the end at which all human action implicitly aims; and insofar as one chooses, one values this ultimate end. The very asking of the question "Why should I live in accord with my nature?" is a choice, a valuation, that demands that one already accept this ultimate value. Thus, Osterfeld would be obliged to act in accord with his nature by virtue of his own act of choice, his valuing Y, which in his case was the wanting of an answer to his question. Thus, not only does the mere acceptance of end-oriented behavior require the acceptance of an ultimate end; the mere acting for some end requires the acceptance of an ultimate end, which in the case of chosen ends is man's life qua man—man's natural end.[64]

The stratagem fails precisely because if it were to succeed, it would render the ultimate moral value morally valueless. If every human choice—including the choice not to choose and the choice of death—is dependent upon, and implicitly aims at "man's life qua man," then this value cannot be the criterion for the judgment of value and moral worth between potential acts. If all acts implicitly aim at life, then that by itself cannot be the means of differentiating one alternative act from another, since both implicitly aim at the ultimate value. Should it be argued that some acts are life-related or life-sustaining to a greater degree than others, it would be necessary to counter with the point that there is no necessity, simply because life is the *sine qua non* of every choice and also the implicit aim of every choice, for the acceptance of some standard whereby those choices which are the *most* life-related or the *most* life-sustaining are to be preferred over those choices which

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are less so. If we cannot but act in accord with our nature, then our nature cannot be the standard of our moral choices. "One ought to act in accordance with one's nature" is a meaningless injunction unless one can act otherwise.

C. Since this critique has attempted to leave the premises and factual assumptions of Rand and her defenders unchallenged, it is necessary to point out that some of these premises are highly dubious. We shall deal with only one, but a moderately central one.

Rand, in numerous places, and Rasmussen in the passage last cited, imply that, without the possibility of non-being, there would be no alternatives worthy of the name "moral choices." Rasmussen said in the above quotation: "If there were no difference in result with respect to an entity existing or not existing, then what differences could there be?"

Now, unless this argument already presupposes the Randian assumption of life as the ultimate value, it is incomprehensible. Let us, for argument's sake, assume men to be immortal, but not impervious to pain. Can Rasmussen's statement (that there would be no difference of any import without the life-death alternative) be understood as meaningful if we picture, on the one hand, a man surrounded with all the sources of hedonistic and intellectual pleasures, and, on the other hand, this same immortal man writhing on the torture rack of some insatiably vengeful dictator, finding his physical immortality a source of excruciating torment in that it carries within it the threat that the punishments might be unending?

If one already accepts the Randian ethic, one might be able to dismiss these two scenes as inconsequential alternatives *by definition*, but that cannot be used as an argument in support of Randianism.

Finally, if the counterfactuality of the example should disturb the reader, pray let him consider that Ayn Rand herself contrasted the goal-orientation and value-deriving nature of living, conscious beings with an immortal robot. From the above counter-example, however, we may see that it was the robothood of Rand's hypothetical creature, rather than its immortality, which made values impossible and alien to it. Without the faculty of will, which *may* (contingently) be assumed to reside only in mortal, living things, value is impossible, but an immortal being possessing a will would be, it seems, perfectly capable of valuation.

In conclusion, then, Ayn Rand's system of Objectivist ethics does not provide the basis for a solution to the Humean dilemma of the is-ought gap; nor have attempts by a new generation of natural law ethicians to rework her system succeeded in subduing that central ethical difficulty. Since no ethical system has been demonstrated to have solved the is-ought problem, it may be thought a minor flaw in Rand. It is her specific claim to have overcome this difficulty that magnifies its importance in regard to her system.

NOTES

1. Rand's philosophy is more than simply a philosophy of ethics, for it takes up questions of metaphysics, theology, and epistemology, as well. Nevertheless, it does not seem a distortion of her thought to characterize it as primarily ethical.

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2. See Ayn Rand, *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* (New York: New American Library, 1979).
3. Ayn Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness* (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 3. (Emphasis in all quotations conforms to original sources).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
5. R. M. Hare, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 55 (1954–1955), p. 303.
6. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. 2.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
8. A paper originally delivered by Rand at the University of Wisconsin Symposium on "Ethics in Our Time" in Madison, Wisc., February 9, 1961; reprinted in *The Virtue of Selfishness*, pp. 1–34.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
10. Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.3.1094b13–26.
11. *Ibid.*, 3.4 *passim*, 4.8.1128a33, 9.4.1166a2–4, 9.9.1170a14–16, 10.5.1176a16–23.
12. Ayn Rand, *For the New Intellectual—The Philosophy of Ayn Rand* (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 29.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. 5.
16. See G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959).
17. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, pp. 5–8.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
21. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. 3, chap. 1, sec. 1.
22. A. C. MacIntyre, "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'," *Philosophical Review* 48 (1959); reprinted in W. D. Hudson, *The Is-Ought Question* (New York: St. Martins, 1969), pp. 35–50.
23. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. 16.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
25. Max Black, "The Gap between 'Is' and 'Should'," *Philosophical Review* 73 (1964), reprinted in Hudson, *The Is-Ought Question*, p. 107.
26. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. 15.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
38. Rand, *For the New Intellectual*, p. 31.
39. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. 25.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
42. Rand, *For the New Intellectual*, p. 20.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
44. Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, bk. 2, chap. 2, sec. 3.
45. Rand, *The Virtue of Selfishness*, p. 16.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
47. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
49. Most of the positions for the natural law defense of Rand's ethical philosophy are taken from two articles: Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen, "Nozick on the Randian Argument," *The Personalist* (April 1978): 184–205; and Douglas Rasmussen, "A Goundwork for Rights: Man's

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Natural End," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 4, no. 1 (Winter 1980): 65–76. These two articles appear to give correct interpretations of Rand's philosophical writings, or—in a few cases—to put her thoughts in a more defensible form than found in the original.

50. Den Uyl and Rasmussen, "Nozick on the Randian Argument," p. 191.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. I am, by conviction, an adherent of the Thomistic natural law school of thought in ethics, but I believe that some special modifications must be performed to overcome the is-ought gap, even in that tradition. One of the central difficulties seems to have been that scholars in that tradition have failed, in general, to recognize in what way and to what degree the problem of the is-ought gap applies to them.
54. David Osterfeld, "Reflections on the Substantive and Epistemological Aspects of the Rothbardian Natural Rights Ethic" (Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Libertarian Scholars Conference, Princeton University, October 1977), p. 11.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
56. Rasmussen, "A Groundwork of Rights," pp. 65–66.
57. See Murray N. Rothbard, *The Ethics of Liberty* (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1982).
58. Rasmussen, "Groundwork for Rights," p. 71.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–72.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
62. *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
64. *Ibid.*

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

The Natural Rights Debate: A Comment on a Reply

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I

In his "A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End," Douglas Rasmussen takes issue with a paper I presented at the Fifth Annual Libertarian Scholar's Conference in which I was concerned with the difficulty of *demonstrating the validity* of natural rights doctrines in general and the libertarian natural rights doctrines in particular.[1] I argued that the traditional presentations of natural rights doctrines have followed one of three courses:

1. They have *asserted* that a particular goal or condition was of ultimate value and then proceeded to deduce from this goal an axiological system to govern behavior; or
2. Similarly, they have made the *assumption* that a certain norm was true and then proceeded to deduce an axiological system from this self-evident truth; or
3. They have started from an (alleged) *empirical fact* and proceeded to derive normative statements from this fact.

Aristotle is a prime example of a philosopher who falls into the first category. "The good life," he says in his *Politics*, "is the chief end, both for the community as a whole and for each of us individually." But what is the "good life"?[2]

In *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle defines the "good life" as happiness.[3] But, as Aristotle acknowledges, "to call happiness the highest good is a little trite." "As far as its name is concerned, most people would probably agree. . . . But when it comes to defining what happiness is, they disagree." [4] There are, he continues, three kinds of lifestyles that commonly pass for good or happiness: (a) the pursuit of pleasure in its "most vulgar" sense, (b) the political life, and (c) the contemplative life. The first two are dismissed as superficial. Aristotle then attempts to prove that a life of contemplation is a life of true or complete happiness. His reasoning on this point is well-known. Since, Aristotle says, "the goodness and proper performance of man would seem to reside in whatever is his proper function," a "clearer account" of true happiness can be obtained by "ascertaining the proper function of man." And "what can this function be?" he asks.

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> Simply living? He shares that even with plants, but we are looking now for something peculiar to man. Accordingly, the life of nutrition and growth must be excluded. Next in line there is the life of sense perception. But this, too, man has in common with the horse, ox, and every animal. There remains then the active life of the rational element.[5]

Since the rational element is unique to man it is man's nature to be reasonable and the development of reason is thus man's proper end: "The proper function of man . . . consists in an activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle."[6] In brief, the development of man's reason, the life of contemplation, is man's "natural end"; it is the life man ought to pursue.

Aristotle's argument contains several difficulties. In so far as the "good life" or "happiness" is determined by the goals individuals *actually do pursue* or the lifestyles individuals *actually do adopt,* then the ethical prescription that the individual ought to pursue the good life becomes tautological, for the good life is whatever lifestyle the individual pursues. To overcome this tautology, to provide any guidance for real behavior, Aristotle recognizes that "the good life" must be infused with *substance.* He then maintains that only a *particular kind of life,* that of contemplation, is in conformity with happiness or the good life.[7] Thus, to escape his empty tautology Aristotle ends up positing a "natural end" for man which is quite *independent* of the ends men actually prefer. But as Felix Oppenheim has observed, "'Man as such' does not have purposes independent of those he happens to choose."[8] To term as happy or good a lifestyle which some, perhaps many, would consider one of agony is to engage in nothing more than verbal gymnastics. Finally Aristotle's argument becomes impaled by the "is-ought dichotomy": the fact that X *is* in no way demonstrates that X *ought* to be. Even if it can be shown that contemplation is, indeed, "man's natural end," Aristotle still has not *demonstrated* why this end is *intrinsically desirable* and *ought* to be pursued. It is quite conceivable that an individual could reject the pursuit of this "natural end" for that of some "unnatural end" which he regards as preferable, and Aristotle has provided no reason why such ends ought not to be pursued.

Thus, Aristotle's belief that man's chief end is the development of "the rational element" is, ironically, a mere assertion, unaccompanied by any convincing, rational demonstration.

An example of a philosopher falling into the second category—the positing of norms for behavior—is Thomas Aquinas. The first principle of morality, according to Aquinas, is the injunction that one should do good and avoid evil. "All other precepts of natural law are based on this."[9]

Since good is, by definition, what one should do, until it is infused with some content, this too is tautological. As one writer has commented:

> It does not even enjoin anyone to do this or forbid him to do that, it provides no guidance whatsoever of what ought to be done in any specific situation. If the gas chambers are good, then the Nazis "did good." It is not even possible to conceive of an action which would violate the "command" that good ought to be done, for the very reason that it is self-evident, logically necessary—and vacuous.[10]

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Later Aquinas informs the reader that the moral precept "one must not kill" is "derived as a conclusion from the principle that one should do harm to no man," which, in turn, is derived from the principle do good and avoid evil. But once again the "is-ought problem" rears its head. Aquinas tacitly *assumes* that to harm another is to commit evil. This may be true, but Aquinas has not demonstrated it. The *fact* that A harms B does not, *in itself,* demonstrate that A has committed evil. In fact, as Oppenheim has pointed out, "harming or even killing certain kinds of people—enemies, Jews, slaves, deformed infants, old persons—has been considered good and right in many ethical systems."[11]

Finally, Herbert Spencer may be considered an example of one who attempts to derive normative propositions from (presumed) statements of fact (the third category). "Let men learn that a legislature is *not* 'our God upon earth.'" Only those human laws are valid, Spencer says, that are consistent with the "laws of nature." And what laws are consistent with "the laws of nature"? The basic fundamental moral law of nature is The Law of Equal Freedom: every man has freedom to do all that he wills provided he infringes not on the equal freedom of other men. This Law, Spencer thinks, provides the rationale for extreme *laissez faire.*

Insofar as an individual respects the rights of others "his position is a passive one; and whilst passive he cannot become an aggressor." But since individuals are willing to violate the rights of others, a coercive institution—a government—is necessary to protect rights and punish aggression. Now, "government being simply an agent employed in common by a number of individuals it can have no more rights" than those possessed by these individuals. Since individuals are morally obliged to respect the Law of Equal Liberty, the sole legitimate function of government is to protect and enforce this Law. As soon as it exceeds this function it no longer protects but aggresses against natural rights. Consequently, since any legislation intended to subsidize the poor, educate children, regulate working conditions, provide for sanitation, etc., imposes positive, as opposed to negative or passive, obligations on individuals, it exceeds the bounds of the Law of Equal Liberty and is therefore immoral.[12]

But what justification does Spencer provide for viewing the Law of Equal Liberty as the basic moral norm? "My ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes," says Spencer in his *Data of Ethics,* "has been that of finding for the principles of right and wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific basis."[13] And, he goes on to say, he has discovered the scientific basis of morals in the theory of evolution. In fact, proclaims Spencer, the culmination of the evolutionary process—which he terms a "beneficient necessity"—is human and social perfection. Peace and prosperity will replace war and poverty; kindness and altruism will take the place of cruelty and selfishness; and competition will be replaced by cooperation.[14] In such a condition, there would be no reason for the state, and it would wither away. "It is a mistake to assume that government must necessarily last forever. The institution marks a certain stage of civilization and it is natural to a particular phase of human development. It is not essential, but incidental. . . . Thus, as civilization advances, does government decay."[15]

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In order for this condition to be reached all obstacles that might impede the operation of the mechanism of evolution—the survival of the fittest—must be removed. The weak must be permitted to be weeded out. Although this may sound cruel, in fact, it is quite beneficial. "Pervading all nature," Spencer says in his *Social Statics,*

> we may see at work a stern discipline, which is a little cruel that it may be very kind. . . . The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle . . . are the decrees of a large, far seeing benevolence.[16]

The basic difficulty with Spencer's metaethical position is that if the evolution toward perfection is necessary and inevitable, as he sometimes argues, it is meaningless to maintain that it is immoral to place obstacles in the path of this process. If it is truly inevitable, no obstacles can stop it. Only if man *is* capable of impeding this process does moral choice present itself. But if man can choose, this means that he can decide on one of two options: to be cruel now for the sake of greater happiness for the future survivors, or to be kind now at the cost of decreased future enjoyment. Spencer *believes* that the latter is the better of the two but is unable to demonstrate why this is so. Thus his attempt to move from an observed fact (evolution) to a normative conclusion (evolution is good) ultimately fails.

The foregoing by no means covers the natural rights waterfront. No mention has been made of "traditionalists" like John Locke or Thomas Hobbes, or of "moderns" such as Reinhold Neibuhr or H. L. A. Hart. But it does, I believe, illustrate the approaches that natural rights theorists have taken, and those not discussed can be placed in one of these categories.

The problem is that all three approaches fail for the same basic reason: their inability to demonstrate the validity of their first principles, i.e., the value they hold as ultimate or the norm they hold as most basic. For example, the assertion that "life is good" does not demonstrate that it is so, just as the fact that life exists does not prove that it ought to exist. They have been unable to demonstrate the validity of their first principles because, I submit, they are, by their nature, *undemonstrable.* That is to say, the moment we attempt to advance reasons why value (norm) X is ultimate (most basic) we no longer view X as an ultimate end (basic norm) but as a means to a still higher end (more basic norm), such as Y. Thus, one may demonstrate that X is of value *because* it is a prerequisite to attainment of Y. And one may then demonstrate that Y is valuable because it is necessary for attainment of Z. But if Z is truly a first principle one cannot say that "Z is valuable because . . . ." One can only assert that "Z is valuable." Thus truly first principles can only be asserted or affirmed, not objectively demonstrated. This impossibility of moving *logically* from an is to an ought poses a serious problem, for if B rejects or denies a particular value or norm asserted by A to be fundamental, the result is a moral impasse. It is this logical dead-end that has plagued traditional presentations of natural rights theory.

Please note, however: in stating that an ultimate end or fundamental norm is

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not demonstrable, I am not saying that such values or norms do not exist. My personal *belief*—which I thought I had made clear in my original paper—is that they do exist. The distinction I am making, therefore, is between what I *believe* to be the case and what I can, at least in principle, *demonstrate* to be the case.

II

If the argument in Part I is correct, the central problem of natural rights theory has been that *even if the theory is correct,* demonstrating its correctness would be a *logical impossibility,* for such a proof would be contingent upon moving from an is to an ought. I certainly do not view recognition of this problem as a call to abandon the natural rights ship, for while Humean skepticism has successfully challenged *one* method of presenting and defending natural rights, perhaps others can be found. The eminent political philosopher, Arnold Brecht, and others, as well, have noted that while there are no logical links between the is and the ought there might be *empirical* links between the two.[17] In investigating this as a possible method of *defending* natural rights, I have concluded that there *are* empirical links. Furthermore, being empirically grounded and thus more capable of objective demonstration, this method has offered the possibility of overcoming the moral impasse—moral assertion versus moral counterassertion—that has hindered progress in debate on ethical issues in the past. My original argument addressed this issue and, to facilitate my response to Rasmussen's criticisms, I would like to take the liberty of presenting the relevant portions of my original paper.[18]

Although one cannot *logically* derive an ought from an is, it is still hasty to conclude, as does Felix Oppenheim, that any natural law doctrine is, *ipso facto,* invalid. The validity of a set of axiological rules can be demonstrated as valid if (1) the rules are correctly deduced from higher values *and* if (2) those higher values are themselves not in question. The values are not in question when they are *either* (a) *proven* as intrinsically valuable, *or* (b) *accepted* as valuable by *all* concerned. Since it is impossible to demonstrate intrinsic value, method (a) is automatically eliminated. But since method (b) remains, it is at least theoretically possible to construct a set of axiological rules that is binding on everyone by empirically demonstrating universal agreement on a particular value or set of values. In short, while there are no logically necessary links between is and ought, there may be factual links.[19]

It is generally thought, however, that, since natural law prescribes moral rules derived from some ultimate end or absolute value, the attempt to prove that any axiological deduction is morally binding is dependent upon the ability to empirically demonstrate universal agreement on the *intrinsic* or absolute value of some particular end. But I think that this overstates what is required. For if it can be empirically demonstrated that everyone adheres to one of several *distinct* ends, E_1, E_2, . . ., E_n, and if it can also be shown that means *m* is a *necessary condition* for the attainment of any of these ends, it is therefore possible to demonstrate the validity of an axiological rule on the following basis:

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1. Ultimate ends E_1, E_2, . . ., E_n can be attained *only* through means *m*.
2. Everyone desires or values ultimate ends E_1, E_2, . . ., E_n.
3. Hence, everyone ought to adopt means *m*.

While the syllogism itself is formally correct it is important to note that the deduction is based not on the empirical demonstration of a universally held absolute value, but on the empirico-logical demonstration that the attainment of any of the ultimate ends or values that people do hold is predicated upon the observance of a particular means. That means therefore becomes a *universal instrumental value*. If the foregoing is correct then, it might be possible to formulate a natural rights ethic so that the minor premise becomes a factual statement that can be empirically tested instead of a proclaimed norm.

However, verification of any minor premise constructed along these lines might, at first glance, be regarded as impossible since it would seem that the only way to determine what values everyone in the world does hold would be to send out an army of interviewers to ask everyone what values they, in fact, do hold. All the answers would have to be sorted out and every distinct end would then have to be examined to ascertain whether means *m* was actually a necessary condition for its attainment. But even if it were discovered that *m* was a necessary condition for the attainment of all of the ends recorded in the study, this would still not be sufficient to conclude that "everyone ought to adopt *m*," for some may have deliberately lied, misunderstood the questions, or subsequently changed their values. Hence, empirical verification would seem to require the impossible task of perpetually interviewing everyone in the entire world, thereby precluding the possibility of deducing a universally binding axiological rule from an empirically demonstrated, universally held value. While this strikes me as a cogent refutation of all other moral doctrines, I do not think it holds for the natural law–natural rights ethic of the type advanced by Murray Rothbard.

The substantive aspect of Rothbard's natural rights libertarianism is based on the dual Lockean postulates of self-ownership and property ownership. Since Rothbard argues that these two premises are prerequisite not only to man's fulfillment of his nature, but to life itself, the Rothbardian natural rights ethic can be formulated as follows:

1. Self-ownership and property ownership are necessary means to sustain life.
2. Everyone values life more highly than death.
3. Hence, everyone ought to adopt the principles of self-ownership and property ownership.

Since the major premise is a factual statement asserting an indispensable or necessary causal connection between a particular goal, *viz.*, life, and a particular set of means, *viz.*, self-ownership and property ownership, the causal connection can be objectively examined and the truth of the claim ascertained. The thrust of Rothbard's analysis lies in establishing the *logical* relationship between life and property rights, and in depicting the inevitable consequences of the violation of those rights. Briefly,

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Rothbard has pointed out that if one denies the premise of man's self-ownership then one must conclude that either "(1) a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B; or (2) everyone has a right to his equal quotal share of everyone else." The first proposition is correctly dismissed since it violates the rules of formal logic. Since both group A and group B belong to the same class, "human beings," they must possess the same essential characteristics of that class. Thus A cannot own both himself and B for that would negate B's right of ownership. This means that one must either grant every individual's right of self-ownership or adopt the second proposition that everyone has a right to an equal quotal share of everyone else. But the second proposition, as Rothbard notes, means that no one in the world could "take any action whatever without prior approval or indeed command by everyone else in society. It should be clear," he continues, "that in that sort of 'communist' world, no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish."[20] And not only does Rothbard cogently establish this logical relationship, but there is considerable empirical support for it as well. The only concerted effort within a large society to abandon the principle of private ownership was in the "War Communism" period in the Soviet Union immediately following the Bolshevik Revolution. This effort was short-lived and was abandoned in early-1921 after the entire society had been brought to the verge of collapse and an estimated six million had died of starvation.[21] The major premise appears, therefore, to have been satisfactorily established.

How, however, can the minor premise that "everyone values life" be demonstrated without recourse to the impossible task of perpetual interviewing referred to above? Values are accurately revealed only through what economists term "demonstrated preference." An individual's values are made known to himself and others through his actual choices.[22] And since anyone can end his life at any time he chooses, this means that we have incontrovertible empirical verification that everyone in the world today does actually value life more highly than death.

It is important here to point out what is *not* being claimed. It is not being claimed that life is a universally held absolute or intrinsic value. It is clear, I think, that at least some, and probably many, do not regard it so. Nor is it even being claimed that life is a necessary condition for the attainment of all possible ends. It is being claimed, rather, that life is seen either as an end-in-itself, i.e., an intrinsic value, or as a necessary condition for the attainment of any end that people in the world *actually do hold.* This is so since, as the doctrine of demonstrated preference tells us, the moment continued life is seen as impeding or preventing the attainment of any individually held end, the individual will forego his life for the attainment of that value. A despondent individual may, for example, decide to end his misery-on-earth by taking his own life. In such a case, not only would life no longer have any value for that individual, it would actually impede the attainment of a higher value: the termination of his living hell. We can see this similarly with Ludwig von Mises' Buddhist (for whom adherence to his religious practices was more important than life itself), with Max Weber's syndicalist (for whom adherence to his politico-economic doctrines was of greater importance than life), and with the

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Shakers (a religious group whose prohibition of sexual intercourse on religious grounds resulted in their extinction in the early part of the twentieth century). But the important point here is that in taking his life the individual also takes himself out of the picture. Hence, everyone in the world empirically demonstrates by the simple fact of his continued existence that he values life more highly than death.

It is also important to note that it is irrelevant whether life is considered to be of intrinsic or merely instrumental value. This can be demonstrated by the following two deductions. For those who value life as an end-in-itself, the formulation would be:

1. Self-ownership and property ownership are necessary means to sustain life.
2. Some desire life as an end-in-itself.
3. Hence, they ought to adopt the principles of self-ownership and property ownership.

But for the others who desire life for the attainment of some other, higher ends, the formulation would be:

1. Some want to attain ultimate ends E_1, E_2, . . ., E_n.
2. These ends can be attained only when life is secure.
3. Life can be secured only by respecting the principles of self-ownership and property ownership.
4. Hence, they ought to respect the principles of self-ownership and property ownership.

Thus, it is clearly irrelevant whether one holds life as an intrinsic or a necessary instrumental value. And the minor premise that "everyone wants to live" would seem to have been empirically verified.

If both the major and minor premises have been verified, then the conclusion that "everyone ought to adopt the principles of self-ownership and property ownership" must, *ipso facto,* follow as well.

Whether or not I succeeded may be questionable, but my goal was to defend natural rights. I therefore found Rasmussen's comment that "we shall ignore Osterfeld's interesting attempt to slip natural law in the back door by a different name" quite baffling. Aside from implying an intellectual sleight of hand on my part, this sentence makes sense only on the premise that in *attempting* to refute the natural rights ethics I was forced to rely on the very concept I was refuting. But if this is what the sentence means it is indicative of a complete misunderstanding of my paper. To reiterate, my goal was, and is, not to refute but to defend natural rights. Far from "slipping natural rights in the back door," I thought I was going in the front door accompanied by a brass band.

III

Rasmussen is quite critical of my position. "It is only dogma," he says "that first principles qua first principles cannot be defended."[23] Rasmussen bases his rebuttal on Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction, or PNC, as he terms it. According

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to this principle, X can be shown to be a first principle if it can be demonstrated that X is "necessary for the very possibility of the subject matter under question . . . . The PNC is defended by showing it to be necessary not only for the very possibility of its being denied, but even for the denier's thought, speech and action." Rasmussen then acknowledges that "if it is not clear that Y exists, then the argument for the truth of X will be weak, because Y's existence is the argument's premise."[24] "Is there" then, he asks,

> some initial condition, some premise or starting point that everyone concerned with ethics must accept, that requires the truth of some ultimate value, let us say X? In particular is there some initial condition that someone like Osterfeld accepts that requires that he also accept the ultimate value of a living thing acting in accord with its nature; and, even more importantly, would this initial condition require the acceptance of a human being acting and living in accord with his nature as the ultimate *moral* value?

His answer is that

> there certainly does seem to be an initial condition that Osterfeld and indeed all concerned with ethics would seem to accept—the existence of end-oriented behavior, that is, action done for the sake of something. Regardless of what the "something" may be, . . . the matter of concern is the same: some agent acting for some end.[25]

Now, "the very existence of ends—that for the sake of which an action is done—does require the existence of something whose very being not only makes the existence of ends possible but indeed necessitates the existence of ends." That something is life: "it is the difference between a living being existing and not existing that creates all the other alternatives a living being faces, and it is because life is something that must be maintained that there are goals in the first place." And again: "life is the ultimate or final goal of all goal-directed behavior." And finally: "life is a value in itself."[26]

Rasmussen sums up his argument in the following way:

1. Y is an object of choice.
2. X is necessary for the existence of Y as a value. X makes Y's existence as a value possible.
3. If P chooses (values) Y, P must choose (value) what is necessary for P's valuation of Y.
4. P chooses (values) Y.
5. Thus, P chooses (values) X.
6. X is man's life qua man, man's natural end.
7. Thus, P chooses (values) man's life qua man in choosing (valuing) Y.[27]

Thus, "Osterfeld would be obliged to act in accord with his nature by virtue of his own act of choice, his valuing Y, which in his case was the wanting of an answer to his question."[28]

IV

While Rasmussen's argument is interesting, it in no way affects the validity of my

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position. He latches on to a syllogism presented early in the discussion to illustrate the *strictly logical* difficulty encountered in the traditional presentation of natural rights theory:

1. The behavior or movement of any living entity having a nature ought to be in accordance with its nature.
2. Man has a nature.
3. Hence, man ought to act in accordance with his nature.

Rasmussen is correct in pointing out that I maintained that, while formally valid, the argument could not be sustained because the first premise could not be shown to be true from a *strictly logical point of view.* It was, apparently, this syllogism with which Rasmussen takes issue, and he endeavors to demonstrate, if I understand his position correctly, that from a *strictly logical point of view,* first principles *can* be demonstrated.

In response, I will argue two points. First, Professor Rasmussen mistakes a particular point in the development of my argument for a statement of my actual position. As a result, the position that he imputes to me—that man does not have to act in accord with his nature—is *not* the position I take. Secondly, *his* defense of one's obligation to act in accord with one's nature is *not,* Rasmussen's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, based on *logical* connections between the is and the ought, but on *factual* connections and, as such, his argument closely resembles the argument I developed in my original paper—i.e., he ends up adopting the very position he set out to refute.

In regard to the first point, I again want to point out the distinction between what I *believe* and what I can *demonstrate.* While I believe that one ought to act in accord with one's nature, the problem that concerned me was how to demonstrate this belief to someone who might claim to reject it. My argument proceeded by demonstrating the consequences of action contrary to one's nature, which ultimately were death. Thus, I argued, if one wants to live, then one must choose the appropriate means: in choosing life, one is also choosing to live in accord with one's nature. This is the thrust of my argument, and in regard to the second point, unless I am misreading Rasmussen's criticism of me, this is all his PNC really boils down to: ends and means must be compatible; in choosing life one is also choosing to live in accord with one's nature.

However, our positions are by no means identical. My criticism of the traditional formulation of natural rights ethics was that the validity of the initial premise could not be *logically demonstrated.* Rasmussen's critique of me proves this very point.

When Rasmussen states that man is obliged to act in accord with his nature because "life is the ultimate or final goal of all goal-directed behavior," his meaning is not clear. Is this a normative proposition that *life is valuable* and, thus, everyone ought to act to preserve his life, or is it a statement of fact, that *everyone's final goal is the preservation of his life?*

If the statement is meant normatively, what evidence does Professor Rasmussen

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offer to demonstrate that life is valuable? So far as I can find, he offers none; he assumes it. But surely, the fact that *life does exist* does not demonstrate that it *ought to exist;* nor does the observation that people *want* to live prove that life is valuable or that they ought to live. While Rasmussen *believes* that life is valuable and that life ought to be preserved—and I heartily concur in this belief—he does not advance any arguments to substantiate this belief. Thus, if taken normatively his proposition fails because it assumes the very thing it was intended to demonstrate: that life *is* valuable.

Now it is true that Rasmussen does point out the consequences—ultimately, death, or at least death sooner than it would otherwise occur—of acting in violation of one's nature. But surely it does not follow *logically* from this, as Rasmussen apparently believes it does, that man ought to act in accordance with his nature. One could have pointed out to the Irish hunger strikers that not eating is "contrary to man's nature" and would rather quickly result in death. But it is difficult to believe that this would either have come as much of a revelation to the strikers or have been regarded by them as a convincing argument for a change in their behavior since, in the absence of an alteration of British policy toward Ireland, death is precisely the goal they wanted to achieve. Thus, Rasmussen's normative proposition that one is obliged to act in accord with his nature would be binding on those who accept the belief that life is more valuable than death but is hardly binding on those who reject that belief.

It is interesting and quite significant that, despite his numerous unqualified statements that man *is* obliged to act in accord with his nature and that life *is* the ultimate end, his own schematization of his PNC belies his demonstration of moral absolutism. "Why should I live in accordance with my nature? Why is it obligatory for one to do so?"[29] asks Rasmussen. Because, he answers in the third sentence of his PNC, "*if* P chooses (values) Y, P must choose (value) what is necessary [i.e., X] for P's valuation of Y." Two things are worthy of note. First, "if" is the key word, for it clearly indicates the contingent or provisional, as opposed to the absolute, nature of values in the realm of *value demonstration.* By Rasmussen's own admission, X can be shown to be valuable to P if, but *only if,* P chooses Y. Thus, one can say that an individual ought to live in accordance with his nature (X) if he values or chooses life (Y). If, however, he rejects life for some "higher" goal—as in the case of the Irish hunger strikers—then the moral injunction to live according to one's nature would, even by Rasmussen's own PNC, no longer hold. And second, since this was precisely the position I took in my original paper (see the syllogisms presented here in Part II), Rasmussen ends up actually adopting, albeit inadvertently, the very position he set out to refute. There is, however, one important difference in our positions. It is clear that the validity of the third sentence of the PNC is an empirical, not a logical matter. While I tried to demonstrate empirically that everyone who continues to live, and so long as he continues to live, does prefer life to death, Rasmussen merely assumes that this is so.

If, on the other hand, the proposition that "life is the ultimate end" is taken as a statement of fact, it is clearly false. People do commit suicide, sacrifice

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themselves for others or, with the Irish hunger strikers, for a cause. In such cases the end sought is not life, but quite its opposite, death. Moreover, many people willfully shorten their lives by ingesting harmful foods and drugs such as coffee, heroin, tobacco, etc.

Thus, if taken normatively, Rasmussen's statement that "life is the ultimate value or end" is an assertion whose validity cannot be demonstrated; if taken as a statement of fact it is clearly wrong. We have come full circle. In trying to refute my position, Rasmussen has only succeeded in highlighting the dilemma of the traditional formulations of natural rights theory as discussed in Part I.

V

While there are several other minor points that could be mentioned, this reply is already too long. By way of conclusion let me simply reiterate that it is not the natural rights ethic, itself, that I am critical of, but the traditional defense of that ethic. While I *believe* that the libertarian ethic is correct I have tried to shift the defense of that ethic from the *assertion* that certain things are *universally valuable* to the *demonstration* that certain things are *universally valued.* I thought that this approach could be useful in breaking the moral impasse of assertion versus counterassertion and in clarifying the logical ramifications of competing moral systems. The question would then become whether the choices individuals do make are in fact consistent with the ethical systems they purport to hold. Thus, if, as Professor Rothbard has argued, private property is a requirement for life, and if an individual does prefer to sustain his life, then he must adopt an ethical system that recognizes private property, i.e., he cannot logically be a socialist. My hope was that this approach would permit the debate between competing ethical systems at least to reach first base. Whether this effort was successful only the reader can decide.

NOTES

1. My paper was "Reflections on the Substantive and Epistemological Aspects of the Rothbardian Natural Rights Ethic" (presented at the Fifth Libertarian Scholars Conference, Princeton University, October 1978). Douglas Rasmussen's response was "A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 4 (Winter 1980): 65–75.
2. Aristotle, *The Politics*, ed., Ernest Barker (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 111.
3. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), p. 5.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 6, 16.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 288.
8. Felix Oppenheim, *Moral Principles in Political Philosophy* (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 117.
9. St. Thomas Aquinas, *Treatise on Law* (Chicago: Regency, 1967), p. 61.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
11. Oppenheim, *Moral Principles*, p. 77.
12. Herbert Spencer, *The Right to Ignore the State* (Cupertino, Calif.: Cayman Press, 1972), pp. 5–6.
13. Quoted in Oppenheim, *Moral Principles*, p. 94.

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14. See John T. Hallowell, *Main Currents in Modern Political Thought* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 307–309.
15. Spencer, *Right to Ignore the State*, p. 14.
16. Quoted in Oppenheim, *Moral Principles*, p. 96. For a fuller exposition, see Hugh Elliot, *Herbert Spencer* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 181–215.
17. See Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 367ff. Also see Arnold Brecht, "Political Theory: Approaches," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 312–13.
18. The rest of Part II is taken from my "Reflections," pp. 13–19.
19. Felix Oppenheim writes: "Value-cognitivism claims that there exist intrinsic value-judgments which are cognitively true or false, regardless of the speaker's or listener's intrinsic value-commitments. Only if value-cognitivism holds true can some particular natural law theory be correct" ("The Natural Law Thesis: Affirmation or Denial?" *American Political Science Review* [March 1957], pp. 42–43). Also see Brecht, *Political Theory*, pp. 387–88; and Arnold Brecht, "A New Science of Politics," *Social Research* (Summer 1953), pp. 230–35.
20. Murray N. Rothbard, *Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature, and Other Essays* (Washington, D.C.: Libertarian Review Press, 1974), p. 59.
21. On the "War Communism" period, see Lancelot Lawton, *An Economic History of Soviet Russia* (London, 1932); and by the same author, *The Russian Revolution* (London, 1927); and Michael Farbman, *Bolshevism in Retreat* (London, 1923). It must be admitted that other factors such as the Civil War, the Allied Blockade, and the terms of the Brest-Litvosk Treaty also played their part in the economic collapse. Also, more research is needed on the relationship of the market and private property—i.e., which is more fundamental to the maintenance of social life, and whether they can even be separated.
22. See Murray N. Rothbard, *Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics*, Occasional Paper Series, no. 3 (New York: Center for Libertarian Studies, 1977); Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), pp. 11–29; and Lionel Robbins, *On the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London: Macmillan, 1962), pp. 83–94.
23. Rasmussen, "A Groundwork for Rights," p. 66.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 67–68.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–73.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

In Defense of Natural End Ethics: A Rejoinder to O'Neil and Osterfeld

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Patrick M. O'Neil and David Osterfeld have offered some criticisms of our natural end interpretation and defense of Rand's ethics.[1] This essay is a rejoinder to these criticisms. It consists of two parts: (I) a reply to O'Neil and (II) a reply to Osterfeld. In the case of the latter, we will confine ourselves to commenting only on those statements which constitute criticisms of our position. We will not discuss Osterfeld's own views regarding the foundation of ethics.

I

Life and Time Differentiation

We are told by O'Neil that "great problems arise for [our] analysis"[2] of life as the ultimate value because we ignore the fact that life is "time-differentiated"—that is, that life proceeds through a series of moments from beginning to end. If we make our first conscious volitional choice at time t, we must already be alive at t. We cannot make meaningful choices (valuing) about any point prior to t, because the past is outside our control. Any acts of valuing must therefore be about the future, i.e., t+1 or later. Since all choices are about the future, and since death will occur at some future time (say t+x), then we must show "why that loss of life at time t+x is to be preferred (automatically) to loss of life at t+(x−1)."[3] Presumably there is no point between t and t+x which is a necessarily less perferable point for choosing death. Thus life is not *necessarily* the ultimate value for the points between t and t+x, since we cannot show why t+x must be preferred to any prior point in time.

It is important to realize that O'Neil phrases his argument as if we had maintained that mere survival or elongation of life were the ultimate value. This misunderstanding is inexcusable, since we have been more than careful in arguing that life as the ultimate value does not mean mere biological survival. Fortunately for us, however, O'Neil's argument fails even without this misunderstanding.

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A major portion of O'Neil's argument is based on the fallacious assumption that a choice at t is necessarily about the future. In fact, on the contrary, the correct way to describe any choice we make is that it involves bringing the present into the future. What and where we are at *present* is as important to an accurate description of choice-making as is the future. Thus, it is incorrect to say all choices are about the future. Moreover, since the present is to some extent a function of the past, our past is a necessary component of our choices as well. O'Neil is, of course, correct to note that we cannot choose about our past; but it does not follow from this that all our choices are therefore about the future. David Norton in his *Personal Destinies* more adequately describes valuing and choice-making than does O'Neil.[4] Rather than viewing life as a linear succession of discrete moments, Norton points out that our present is the repository of our past and future. All three are equally necessary in understanding human choice and valuation. Indeed, it could be said that under Norton's scheme of things the eudaemonic individual lives a time-*integrated* life, whereas the dysdaemonic individual lives a time-differentiated life as envisioned by O'Neil.

A similar point can be made in the language of economics. Any choice I make now has its associated opportunity costs. These are not costs one is necessarily bearing in the future, but are rather my *present* costs. In fact, there may be more "present" than "future" in my choices, since what I am now doing reflects the present value to me of any future returns. All these points suggest that even the pursuit of suicide involves carrying one's present into the future. If the choice of suicide was just about the future, then we could value suicide without valuing the means to achieve it. In other words, if we could value only the future there would be nothing to link our present to the act of suicide itself. Suicide would then cease to be a value and instead become a wish.

We would furthermore object to the assertion that death can be "achieved."[5] It is clear what it means to achieve certain positive existential states such as pulling triggers, plunging knives, popping pills, etc. It is not at all clear what it means to "achieve" a negative such as death. To achieve means to achieve something. Since death is not something, it cannot be achieved. Two side comments need to be made here. First, this argument holds even if we posit the possibility of an immortal soul. Believers too use the concept of death as a negative. That is why death is always contrasted to eternal life. Secondly, O'Neil asserts that life cannot be achieved (we just have it). This assertion is one of the more blatant expressions of O'Neil's failure to see that we speak of life as more than mere physical survival. By rejecting O'Neil's interpretation of life as mere physical survival, we see that his claim that life cannot be achieved is thereby rendered false and irrelevant.

The concluding pillar of O'Neil's argument is that Rand's theory cannot explain why dying at $t+x$ (the point of natural or unchosen death) is preferable to dying at $t+(x-1)$ or $t+(x-n)$. The answer to this question is quite simple. Since $t+x$ is not something over which we have control, it cannot be an object of value for the same reasons that O'Neil said t could not be of value (we have no choice about it). With this in mind, O'Neil is partially correct. There is no reason that

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t+x can be preferred over t+(x−n), since t+x cannot be preferred at all. Preferences are only possible prior to t+x. Thus one must prefer having preferences prior to t+x, and it is only life that makes those preferences possible. Even the despondent person contemplating suicide must prefer the fact that he can prefer to die now rather than wait for t+x as, say, an animal must do. Again, t+x is not a positive. Thus those who prefer to elongate their lives are not saying that they prefer death at t+x to that at t+(x−n), but rather that they prefer that alternative which keeps them alive so long as they have an alternative to prefer. This is quite different from saying that one prefers the positive state that occurs at t+x to any prior condition. O'Neil, in short, is a victim of reifying a negative into something positive and then constructing a pseudo-problem from that mistake.

The Is-Ought Problem

If we have not totally misunderstood O'Neil, the central point of his criticism is that we have failed to understand the nature of the is-ought dichotomy. According to O'Neil, the is-ought dichotomy is not a result of there being some unbridgeable gulf between facts and values. (He notes MacIntyre's revisionist claim that even Hume did not seek such a separation.) Rather, the is-ought dichotomy results from a difficulty intrinsic to the discipline of ethics—namely, how one justifies a prescriptive premise. O'Neil states, "one must either assume an infinite regression of prescriptions, or one must assume a most basic prescription (or set of prescriptions)."[6] If one adopts the first disjunct, then justification of ethical claims is impossible; and if one adopts the second disjunct, then another difficulty arises: "Either this maxim can be disobeyed or it cannot. If it cannot be disobeyed, then the term 'ought' seems inappropriate, for we use that word in connection with free choices only . . . . If, on the other hand, there is a choice either to obey or to disobey this most basic moral maxim, then there is a demand automatically set up for either a more basic moral maxim still, or for a reason why one would benefit from obedience to the maxim."[7] Yet, if there is an appeal to still another maxim, then one is no longer dealing with *the basic* moral maxim, and one once again faces an infinite regress of prescriptions.

Moreover, if the "supplying benefit" alternative is accepted—viz., if the reason why one should live according to the requirements of one's nature is that one will achieve fulfillment and well-being—then this makes the basic moral maxim conditional. One is obliged to follow this basic moral maxim *only if* one wants to be fulfilled; otherwise, there is nothing obligatory about it. Obedience to the basic moral maxim is dependent, in O'Neil's words, upon "the individual, subjective human will."[8] A person can choose not to act for (desire) fulfillment or well-being; a person can "defy an ultimate value" and is thus in no way bound by it. O'Neil concludes that there is an essential subjectivity to natural end ethics (Randian or otherwise) and no way for this approach to ethics to solve the is-ought difficulty—no way to answer the question: "Why should I?"

The first thing that needs to be said about O'Neil's argument is that it assumes human freedom to be a freedom with respect to what is the natural function or

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end of a human being. Yet this is certainly not the case in the ethical tradition in which we operate. In the Aristotelian tradition the ends are given in the sense of being at least potentially present. This is just another way of saying that our human nature has an identity that is not itself open to choice. If we reverse the priority, as O'Neil seems to want, and make freedom primitive and all our ends derivative from that freedom, then our choices would determine our nature. But if our choices could radically determine our nature, then we could choose without first being a chooser, which is absurd.

It is, of course, possible to deny that human nature is teleological in the classical sense in which we take the term "teleological" (i.e., that human beings are constituted by a process of growth toward an end).[9] But O'Neil does not take on this most important issue. He assumes that the is-ought problem can be discussed in its own right—that is, in abstraction from how best to characterize human nature. Indeed, his discussion of time differentiation seems to presuppose the validity of the Humean paradigm, viz., that human existence is nothing more than a linear succession of discrete moments having no necessary connection to each other. Given that conception of human nature, it is probably true that there is an is-ought problem; but under our conception the problem is less threatening.

In any case, there is an ambiguity in O'Neil's claim that people can act contrary to their natural end. A person can, of course, choose not to act in accord with those principles that tend to promote fulfillment and well-being. But this does not show that one has no natural end. To say that one can ignore or act contrary to an end says nothing about whether that end still remains an end—unless, that is, one is Spinoza, who denies that people act for ends at all. But then Spinoza was consistent enough to deny that people make free choices as well. Thus it is unclear whether O'Neil means to say that we have no ends or whether if we have them it would be possible to choose contrary to them.

Still, the basic matter of contention here is whether in valuing any Y one must also value the ultimate value of man's life. This issue again has to do with human nature and the is-ought problem. O'Neil finds an ineluctable natural end to be morally valueless, for it is pointless to say one should live in accordance with one's nature if it is impossible to do otherwise. Yet, this objection fails to distinguish between what is potential and what is actual. The natural end for man is ineluctable in the sense that there is an inherent potentiality for a certain end, and nothing else. Although human nature cannot be something other than what it is, it does not follow from this that our potentialities will necessarily be actualized. The actualization of this potential is a highly contingent matter, subject to circumstances and human choice. However, the contingency of actualizing our potential does not compromise the necessary applicability of our natural end as a standard for evaluating our choices. Of course, "necessity" here is used differently from the way O'Neil must conceive of it. For O'Neil "necessity" means something like "cannot fail to be." Since there is no teleology in O'Neil's conception of man, any event which does not conform to what is said to be "necessary" automatically destroys the necessity of a standard, rule, or normative law. In our conception,

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on the other hand, "necessity" means something like "always applicable" or "ever present." Since we are teleological creatures, the mode by which an end is achieved is distinct from the end itself, so that misdirection in the former does not invalidate the latter as either a standard or as a value. It is characteristic of thinkers like Hume, Spinoza, *et al.*, of the modern era to deny latent potentialities or developmental potentialities of classical teleology. O'Neil has not shown this modern prejudice to be correct and the classical conception mistaken; he has merely *presupposed* the validity of the modern view and constructed his criticisms accordingly.

The second thing that needs to be said about O'Neil's argument is that he is much too casual about the fact-value issue. He regards the is-ought problem as primarily ethical in character and not at all metaphysical. This is, however, a mistake as we have already indicated above. When it comes to justifying a basic moral maxim, the very thing that allows a natural end ethicist to avoid the dilemma O'Neil presents is the contention that certain facts of nature are inherently value laden. Thus, what justifies one's following an ultimate prescriptive premise is that, as a result of one's nature, one is concerned with the benefits that living in accord with it tends to bring—namely, fulfillment and well-being. This is not something dependent on the "individual subjective will." For example, people who choose (value) being a "metaphysical misfit" are able to value such a state *only* because that state (qua value and qua object of choice) is made possible by their natural end (e.g., that fulfillment requires chosen courses of action). One's humanity is what makes one's choice to be a "misfit" possible. In effect, the "misfit" is saying, "I'm glad I'm the kind of being who can choose to be a misfit and not the kind of being to whom choices are not available." Our human life *is* a phenomenon that makes possible and inherently requires the pursuit of values. In general, then, the metaphysical claim that there can be value laden facts is given insufficient attention by O'Neil, and this lack of attention affects his interpretation of both Rand's and our arguments. Again, O'Neil presupposes the validity of a paradigm we are calling into question.

Necessity, Possibility, and Contradiction

Although O'Neil pays insufficient attention to Rand's claim that life makes value possible and is the sort of phenomenon that is inherently value laden, he does make some metaphysical judgments on this issue. For example, O'Neil claims that the view that life must be maintained directly contradicts the claim that life can cease to exist. Yet, this "must" refers to the fact that living things, by their very nature, have to act to sustain and maintain their lives. Such an assertion does not imply that these acts necessarily succeed; so there is no conflict.

O'Neil asks us to imagine an immortal man experiencing all sorts of pleasures and pains, and he claims that this picture provides a counter-example[10] to the claim that values exist only because living things do. However, our ability to visualize a state of affairs is not an argument for its possibility.[11] Can O'Neil provide a coherent conception of this putative state of affairs? What function do pleasure and pain serve for this immortal man? Just why would he differentiate between

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pleasure and pain? What would be the point of this creature seeking pleasure and avoiding pain? O'Neil, perhaps, would insist that the difference between pleasure and pain is a given, but what are we to make of an alleged pleasure-pain mechanism that is unrelated to the maintenance of life? Everything we know about pleasure and pain indicates that they exist for the maintenance of life. Beyond O'Neil's powers of imagination, what evidence does he have that suggests that it might be otherwise? We should note in this connection that the procedure of *inspectio mentis* is not an appropriate way to determine what is or is not possible for some feature of nature. Furthermore, the notion of natural necessity is not captured by the view that one "unpacks" a definition.[12] O'Neil's argument seems to betray an acceptance of a "Humean" or "logical empiricist" view of concepts and necessity. Needless to say, this is neither a view that a natural end ethicist must accept nor one that represents the predominant position regarding such matters.[13]

There remains only one other matter pertaining to necessity, possibility, and contradiction to be considered. Regarding the claim that it makes no sense to value Y without valuing that which makes the valuing of Y possible, O'Neil asks why the word "illogical" instead of the words "makes no sense" was not used. He speculates that this choice of words indicates a reluctance to call such an activity contradictory and claims to know the reason for the alleged reluctance—namely, if an activity were truly illogical, that is, something which involved a contradiction, then such a course of action would not be followed, and there would be no reason to discuss an activity that could not exist. O'Neil asks: "If such valuation were truly illogical, how indeed could it be made?"[14] This is, however, not a perplexing question. People can and do follow courses of action that involve contradictions, "make no sense." The crucial point, of course, is that they do not realize it. O'Neil forgets that contradictions are impossible if and only if two conditions are met—namely, sameness of time and respect. A person can at one time explicitly hold a particular belief, and then later, having never revoked that belief but now not consciously considering it, explicitly hold its contradictory. Alternatively, a person can at a given time have two beliefs which, although not explicitly contradictory, have contradictory implications which the person has not yet recognized or discovered. In these ways a person may be said to hold contradictory beliefs and could act in accordance with them. Thus, it is simply false to suppose that people cannot and do not act according to contradictory beliefs and plans. They will, of course, ultimately not succeed, and this is indeed why there is a point to showing people why their course of action involves a contradiction. There is, then, no reluctance on our part to say that there is something illogical or contradictory about valuing Y without also valuing that which makes the valuing of Y possible, and O'Neil has failed to show that there is any difficulty in saying this either.

Rationality and Choice

O'Neil claims that "an immense problem for the Randian philosophy"[15] arises from Rand's claim that rationality is a matter of choice. O'Neil argues that either the choice to be rational is itself rational or it is not. If the choice is nonrational

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then that choice is "unfree." It is not at all clear why O'Neil concludes that a nonrational (or pre-rational) choice to maintain or abandon rationality must be considered an "unfree choice." Perhaps he believes that Rand holds that only things which qualify as free choices are rational choices. It is hard for us to believe that O'Neil would attribute such a thesis to Rand, especially in light of the fact that he talks of Rand's acceptance of the idea of freely chosen evil shortly after he makes the foregoing assertion. Perhaps O'Neil believes that, since the choice is not a conscious one, it must be unfree—that it must be unfree because the will to be either rational or irrational would stem from some hidden urge within us. But it would seem that just the opposite could equally make sense here. Since O'Neil is willing to call the primary choice of being rational or not a "choice," that choice would not be unfree but rather radically free in a sense similar to Descartes' claim that freedom of the will is more fundamental than reason or doubt. It is not likely that Rand would hold this latter, alternative position either; but it does not matter. All that is necessary to refute O'Neil is to show that what is "prior" to the choice to be rational need not be "unfree" as he claims.

In any case, O'Neil is not particularly concerned with the freedom or lack thereof in the primal choice. Instead he immediately mentions a possible Randian reply and responds to it. Rand's response, O'Neil supposes, could be that the choice of rationality is what constitutes a rational choice and the choice of irrationality is what constitutes an irrational choice. This solution is said to pose a "double difficulty." In the first place, "it is unclear how the selection of one of two alternatives can possibly alter the nature of the prior choice that produced the selection."[16] We must confess that we find this statement of the problem opaque. It seemed to us that the choice of rationality constituted a rational choice. Thus the choice of one alternative over another would not "alter" the "prior choice" but rather give that choice significance (with respect to some standard). Perhaps we have misunderstood the criticism, but even if we have, O'Neil does not seem particularly anxious to press the point.

It is the second part of the "double difficulty" that appears to interest O'Neil. Here we are told that "the elimination of the possibility of a rationally chosen commitment to irrationality means that there can be no such thing as freely chosen evil."[17] Now much of this criticism leads into O'Neil's major point that Randian ethics can have no theory of moral obligation. Since we have treated this point elsewhere, we shall not repeat ourselves here. Another direction in which this criticism moves is the claim that Rand is like Kant in conceiving of all immoral acts as self-contradictory. We have also already said something about O'Neil's conception of logic and metaphysics in the preceding sections of this essay. Here it is enough to note that when Rand uses "contradiction" in an ethical context she means something like "is in opposition to those principles expressing the demands of our nature." She does not mean that the predicate term contradicts what is necessarily implied by the subject term in the analytic way that Kant uses "contradiction."

The chief defect in O'Neil's second criticism, however, is that it is either inco-

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herent or a non sequitur. O'Neil is saying either that one can rationally commit oneself to irrationality (which is incoherent) or that a commitment to irrationality necessarily implies the absence of freely chosen evil (which is a non sequitur). It thus seems to us that the "immense problem" fades away upon analysis. This is not to say that there are no problems in accurately and unambigously positing a thesis of "free will" and rationality. But whatever the problems may be with such a position, they are certainly not peculiar to Rand, nor are they any more troublesome here than with various philosophic alternatives.

II

The central criticism that Osterfeld advances regarding natural end ethics is simply that the natural end of man has not been shown to be something that ought to be pursued. Whether commenting on Aristotle and Aquinas or our own interpretation of Rand's ethics, Osterfeld believes there is an "inability to demonstrate the validity of. . .the value they hold as ultimate or the norm they hold most basic."[18] Though there is much that could be said regarding Osterfeld's characterization of Aristotle's as well as Aquinas' ethics,[19] we shall confine our comments to Osterfeld's criticism of the claim that the morally obligatory character of a normative first principle can be defended.

The major thing to be noted regarding Osterfeld's criticism of the position taken in "A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End" is that he misinterprets the nature of the argument that is presented. He states that the argument attempts to show that "from a *strictly logical point of view,* first principles *can* be demonstrated."[20] This is false. In no sense was it claimed that the morally obligatory character of the statement that "one should act in accord with one's nature" was a conclusion from some other normative principle or set of principles. Moreover, it was the central point of that essay to show that there was an instructive parallel between Aristotle's argument that the denier of the Principle of Non-Contradiction must accept this principle in order to deny it and Rand's argument that the person who asks why he should live in accord with the requirements of his nature must value such a way of life in order to value (viz., desire, want) an answer to his question. A normative first principle, like a logical and metaphysical one, cannot be demonstrated, but it can be defended. The defense or argument on its behalf was called a "negative demonstration," and the essay went to great pains to explain the difference between such a way of arguing and a demonstration. A "negative demonstration" uses the statements and actions of the person who claims to deny or doubt a first principle. A "negative demonstration" attempts not to prove or demonstrate the truth of a first principle but rather to show how such a principle is already accepted by the person who claims to deny or doubt it. Osterfeld apparently did not grasp the difference between a defense and a demonstration. Nor does it seem that this difference was not made clear, for as Professor Fred Miller has noted regarding this very argument:

> There is a close, instructive parallel between the Aristotelian and Randian arguments. Aristotle's argument proceeds "You cannot think or speak unless

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> the law of noncontradiction is true." . . . The argument for life as an ultimate value has a similar structure: "You cannot value unless it is true that one ought to promote life." Again, one cannot prove the principle *in vacuo* or persuade a vegetable or entity devoid of values of the principle. But the argument can be directed to an interlocutor who holds any value (in Rand's sense of value: that which one acts to gain or keep).[21]

Possibly Osterfeld interprets the argument presented in "A Groundwork for Rights" as an attempt to demonstrate or deduce the truth of a normative first principle because he holds that anything less than this amounts to showing that there is only a "factual" connection between the is and ought and not a "logical" one. In other words, if one appeals to the facts regarding human nature, there is no basis for saying that living in accordance with one's nature is valu*able* or desir*able* —that is, one can show what men do but not what they ought to do. But, why must one accept this Humean view of facts? A case for viewing human nature in a teleological fashion was clearly presented. We hasten to note that the argument used did not involve the crude non sequitur that living in accord with one's nature is the ultimate value because values can be attained only if one is alive to attain them. Rather, it was argued that the very nature and character of life was such that what it constituted was a value. That is to say, part of the world's furniture included things that were inherently value laden.

Osterfeld claims that no evidence was presented "to demonstrate that life is valuable." Though no deductive argument was presented, it was claimed that "teleology is found in the universe because the very nature of living things involves the development toward the form of the mature organism, and this means that living *being* is the ontological basis for end-oriented behavior."[22] In Aristotelian terms this meant that the actualization of a living entity's nature was the good or that-for-the-sake-of-which something was done.[23] The basis for this biocentric theory of value was the irreducibility of the laws of biology to those of physics and chemistry. To the extent the laws in terms of which organic phenomena are explained can*not* be reduced to laws which make no mention of the end or goal of the living process but only how the material constituents interact, then there is a case to made for teleology—that is, facts that inherently involve values. Though this view of teleology's foundation is by no means beyond dispute, Osterfeld in his essay never addresses this issue. Yet, the claim that values exist only because living things do is the crucial meta-ethical insight of Rand's ethics, and the very thing we have used in developing the notion of natural ends or functions. In this regard, Osterfeld is like O'Neil in that he fails to consider the metaphysical dimension of the is-ought controversy.

Osterfeld is also like O'Neil in that many of his objections to our position assume that mere survival or elongation of life was claimed as the ultimate end or value. This is not true. "To be a living thing and not be a particular sort of living thing is impossible, and thus, we cannot speak of life as an ultimate end or value without also understanding that it is always life as the sort of living thing the particular living thing is . . . . [L]ife as the sort of thing a human being is—man's life qua man—becomes the ultimate moral value."[24] Furthermore, Osterfeld is like O'Neil

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in that he assumes that if the obligatory character of a normative maxim is conditional on something, e.g., one's being a valuer, then it somehow loses its moral force. Yet bewitchment by the Kantian demand for categorical imperatives can be avoided, and this does not mean that morality need only be viewed as hypothetical. A human being is a valuer—even if one decides to forego valuing anything else, one must at least act for, value, the state of no longer valuing. To make morality dependent on what a human being *is* is not to make it any less obligatory, and, most importantly, it allows for an explanation for why morality is obligatory for man—namely, because man is by nature a being who is concerned with that which morality tends to promote, viz., self-actualization.

There is, of course, much more to be said in defense of natural end ethics. Nevertheless, the comments made here should suffice by way of meeting the objections advanced by both O'Neil and Osterfeld.

NOTES

1. Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Nozick on the Randian Argument," *The Personalist* 59 (April 1978): 184–205; and Douglas B. Rasmussen, "A Groundwork for Rights: Man's Natural End," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 4 (Winter 1980): 65–76.
2. Patrick M. O'Neil, "Ayn Rand and the Is-Ought Problem," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 7 (Spring 1983): 91.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
4. David Norton, *Personal Destinies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
5. O'Neil, "Ayn Rand and the Is-Ought Problem," p. 92.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
9. See Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Essentialism, Values, and Rights: The Objectivist Case for the Free Society," in Tibor R. Machan, ed., *The Libertarian Reader* (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), pp. 37–52.
10. O'Neil claims that a counterfactual example was introduced by Rand herself, and so one should not be disturbed by his appeal to imaginary beings. Yet, it should be noted that Rand does not use the term "imagine" to mean merely the ability to picture, as O'Neil does, but rather as equivalent with "coherently conceive." In this regard, it is instructive to note that Rand does not claim to imagine an immortal, indestructible being which has values, but instead asks the reader to "*try* to imagine" (Ayn Rand, "Objectivist Ethics," *The Virtue of Selfishness* [New York: Signet Books, 1964], p. 16, emphasis added).
11. See Douglas B. Rasmussen, "The Open-Question Argument and the Issue of Conceivability," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 56 (1982): 162–72.
12. See Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Logical Possibility: An Aristotelian Essentialist Critique," *The Thomist* (October 1983), pp. 513–40.
13. See Panayot Butchvarov, *The Concept of Knowledge* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), chap. 2, for a devastating critique of the claim that necessary truth can be accounted for by linguistic or purely formal considerations. For a defense of the claim that necessary truth can have ontological or factual import, see notes 11 and 12 *supra*, as well as Douglas B. Rasmussen, "Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism," *The New Scholasticism* (Summer 1984), pp. 316–35.
14. O'Neil, "Ayn Rand and the Is-Ought Problem," p. 96.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
18. David Osterfeld, "The Natural Rights Debate: A Comment on a Reply," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 7 (Spring 1983): 104.

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19. See Douglas J. Den Uyl and Tibor R. Machan, "Recent Work on the Concept of Happiness," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 20 (April 1983): 115–33, for a discussion of the complexities and richness found in Aristotle's view of happiness. See John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), for a discussion of all that is involved in the moral injunction that one should do good and avoid evil.
20. Osterfeld, "The Natural Rights Debate," p. 110.
21. Fred Miller, "The Natural Right to Private Property," in Machan, *The Libertarian Reader*. Miller is specifically referring to the parallel that is presented in Rasmussen, "A Groundwork for Rights."
22. Rasmussen, "A Groundwork for Rights," p. 72.
23. See Henry B. Veatch, *For an Ontology of Morals* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1971), chap. 6, for a discussion of how goodness, when understood as the actual as compared with the potential, constitutes what is desirable as well as what is desired.
24. Rasmussen, "A Groundwork for Rights," p. 73.

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

Land-Use Planning: Implications of the Economic Calculation Debate*

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The recent widely cited National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) adds to the growing number of individuals and organizations holding the view that land resources are too important to be left to the "whims of market forces."[1] In this view, there should be a shift from private ownership of land to social or political control of land use. Bjork, for example, suggests that planning policies should be instituted at the federal level to estimate the derived demand for agricultural land for twenty-five to fifty years into the future and then steps taken to ensure its availability.[2] Similar conclusions were reached in the National Agricultural Lands Study and in recent CAST (Council on Agricultural Science and Technology) studies.[3]

The proposed solution, however, ignores or discounts the importance of several key problems. What is the best way to provide for future requirements of agricultural land? What are the likely effects of substituting central direction for the price system in land markets? Even more basic, is there a realistic alternative to the price system in allocating land resources? The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the relevance of the economic calculation debate, that raged from 1920 to 1940, to these and other questions related to efficient use of land resources.

The economic calculation debate was over the feasibility of central planning. Specifically, Ludwig von Mises argued in 1920 that socialism was incompatible with rational economic planning.[4] The argument was that without market prices there is no possibility of allocating resources on the basis of consumer preferences.[5] The Mises argument was elaborated more completely by F. A. Hayek, but its significance was not realized by mainstream economists during the debate and was lost in the aftermath of the Keynesian revolution of the 1930's. The relevance of

*The original version of this paper was presented at a conference on "Agricultural Land Preservation: Economics or Politics," Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman, Montana, December 2–6, 1981. The author appreciates the comments of L. E. Danielson, M. A. Johnson, R. A. E. Mueller, and R. L. Stroup in revising the paper.

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this debate to issues involving economic planning of land use and other resources has only recently been rediscovered.[6]

The limitations of central planning identified by Mises and Hayek have not been resolved and apply generally when resources are allocated through non-market methods. In this study, the implications of the economic calculation debate are related to centralized land-use planning, including the preservation of agricultural land.[7] The objectives of this paper are twofold: (1) to briefly review the economic calculation debate, and (2) to relate the implications of this debate to land-use planning and the protection of agricultural land.

Economic Calculation Debate[8]

The economic calculation debate began in 1920 with the publication of Ludwig von Mises's "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth."[9] Mises stressed that producers and consumers cannot make rational economic decisions without market prices. Without such knowledge, Mises argued, there is no possibility of calculating costs or revenues and no way of knowing if products most highly valued by consumers have been produced. He concluded that rational calculation, in the sense of adjusting production to the satisfaction of human wants, is impossible in a centrally directed economy from which prices are necessarily absent. The market, in contrast, allocates resources on the basis of expected profitability. When, for example, there is an increase in the expected price of corn relative to soybeans, farmers shift more land into corn production. In arguing that economic resource use is possible only if prices are applied to intermediate products and factors of production as well as final products, Mises contended that no other conceivable process can take account of all the relevant facts as fully as do market prices.

Although the thesis was hotly disputed for twenty years after 1920, there is still no consensus concerning the significance of the debate. In convincing his socialist critics of the importance of market prices, Mises inspired attempts by those critics to duplicate the efficiency of markets through "market socialism"; that is, to develop methods by which a central planner could determine economically rational product and factor prices in the absence of private property. The best known is a simulated market proposal by Oskar Lange.

> To recall the bare essentials: households have freedom of choice of occupation and consumer's goods. Managers of publicly-owned enterprises and industry authorities also have discretion over their productive inputs and outputs, but must observe two rules: to produce any output with a least-cost input mix and to produce an output at which marginal cost equals price. The Central Planning Board (CPB) coordinates these activities by endeavoring to fix prices that will equate supply and demand for each good and service.[10]

This market socialism approach demonstrates that, given crucial data, central planning is possible.[11] If, for example, data on land resources, production alternatives, and consumer preferences are accurately known, then the central planner can determine the efficient use of land in agricultural and other uses. As

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demonstrated in the present discussion, however, there is no known way through which the planner can obtain these data. Thus, Hayek argued, this approach merely assumes the economic problem away. While market socialism is not logically contradictory, it is practically impossible because of information problems.

Even though Hayek's arguments were never refuted, it is still widely accepted by economists that the critics of market socialism have not proved their case. Musgrave, for example, in a recent study assessing the outcome of the economic calculation debate concludes: "planning emerged as feasible. . . . An efficient solution could be secured a la Lange by letting the planners simulate a competitive market."[12] Arrow reaches a similar conclusion: "Indeed, with the development of mathematical programming and high speed computers the centralized alternative no longer appears preposterous. After all, it would appear that one could mimic the workings of a decentralized system by an appropriately chosen centralized algorithm."[13] Improvements in programming and computer technology in fact will not solve the information problems identified by Mises and Hayek.

Market Socialism versus Robbinsian Maximization

Why do economists often fail to take account of the information problems inherent in market socialism? There is a marked similarity between the approaches of market socialism and of conventional neoclassical theory. Consider the Robbinsian maximization view of economics that has dominated the profession since the early 1930's.[14] In this approach, the individual is seen as confronted with an economic problem, *viz.* the allocation of *given* means among *given* ends to secure the greatest amount of satisfaction. When the economic problem is conceived in this way, the decision maker's role is reduced to that of mere calculation.[15] That is, if data are given to the decision maker, there is no uncertainty, and without uncertainty there is no scope for choice.[16] Moreover, to assume that economic data are *given* is to assume away the economic problem, regardless of the type of economic system.[17]

The decision maker, of course, is seldom if ever *given* the data. In fact, determining the possible means and ends is a key function of the entrepreneur; and, as Kirzner suggests, making the right decision calls for far more than correct mathematical calculation.[18] A farmer's success in determining the most profitable pattern of production and land use, for example, is likely to hinge much more on the ability to recognize current opportunities and to anticipate future conditions than on expertise in mathematical programming and decision theory.

Successful decision makers must not only economize in situations where the data are already known but also be alert to new opportunities that other entrepreneurs have not yet noticed. In competitive equilibrium, however, the decisions of all market participants dovetail completely so that there are no profit opportunities and, consequently, no need for entrepreneurship. Thus, the conventional equilibrium-based approach tends to obviate the role of entrepreneurship by ignoring or assuming away information problems.[19]

In a similar manner, market socialism also tends to assume away information

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problems and to reduce the economic problem to calculation. If it is assumed that data on preferences, available resources, and production opportunities are given, the Central Planning Board need only solve the constrained optimization problem, publish the shadow prices, and "order factory managers to maximize their profits."[20] Proponents of marginal-cost pricing often fail to take into account or minimize the importance of information problems inherent in this approach. Baumol, for example, identifies two problems in the application of marginal-cost pricing—the equilibrium that results maximizes private rather than social benefits, and marginal-cost pricing results in firm losses where average costs are decreasing. He does not, however, mention the more basic problem of information.

Hayek stresses that procedures to simulate market activity are not operational because the necessary data cannot be obtained.[21] Since information in the real world is vast, detailed, constantly changing, and specialized to the decision maker, the information that motivates individual choice cannot be neatly summarized in objective demand and cost functions for use by central planners.

What is the basic economic problem facing society? If the relevant information were given, the problem of economic resource use would be reduced to one of logic or mathematics and the solution could then be stated in terms of the usual optimality conditions for consumers, firms, and resource owners. As Hayek emphasized, however, this is not the economic problem which society faces:

> The reason for this is that the "data" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society "given" to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given. . . . The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources. . . . It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know.[22]

Thus, the economic problem facing society is not solved by showing how a unique solution could be determined if all the facts were known by a central planner. Any useful approach to the problem must show how to produce a solution that utilizes the partial knowledge of all interacting individuals in the market. Both the conventional maximization approach and market socialism fail to consider the implications of the subjective and decentralized nature of the data that motivate choice by individual decision makers.

Market socialism is also similar to the approach of conventional welfare economics in the use (or misuse) of the optimality conditions of competitive equilibrium as a norm. Welfare theory demonstrates that *given* a competitive equilibrium, the well-known optimality conditions hold and there is efficiency among consumers, firms, and resource owners. The optimality conditions of the competitive equilibrium, however, are of little use in assessing the efficiency of market activity in the real world. Competitive equilibrium in any market implies perfect competition, which requires price-taking behavior and a "perfect market," with perfect communication, instantaneous equilibrium, and costless transactions.[23] Since *all*

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real-world markets fall short of these requirements, they will inevitably appear to be inefficient when measured against this benchmark.[24]

In summary, conventional welfare theory *assumes* a competitive equilibrium and then uses the resulting optimality conditions as a norm in assessing the efficiency of real-world markets. Since no real-world market measures up to this standard, market failure is inevitable. When agricultural land markets are measured against the norm of perfect competition, for example, monopoly, externality, and information problems are revealed. Market socialism, however, accepts the same norm and shows how the central planner with data *given* can simulate optimality conditions. Since no real-world socialist economy can measure up to this standard (perfectly competitive equilibrium), "socialist failure" is also inevitable. The success of market socialism was (and is) judged largely on the basis of theory in which data are merely assumed available rather than on actual results of central planning, whereas real-world markets in the "market failure" approach are evaluated against the benchmark of perfect competition. In reality, as emphasized by Mises and Hayek, real-world markets should be compared with the results of central direction as it operates under real-world conditions.

Implications for Land-Use Planning

The implications of the economic calculation debate apply in land-use planning, just as they do in allocation of any other resource by non-market means. Perhaps because of the failure to fully appreciate the data problems inherent in all non-market resource allocation procedures, information problems have received relatively little attention in the land-use-planning literature. In order to appreciate the problems that arise if price signals are ignored in land markets, consider how the market makes use of widely dispersed information and knowledge in shifts of land from agricultural to non-agricultural uses. Individual preferences for housing, golf courses, and other uses are transmitted through the price system and reflected in higher prices of land available for these uses. Yet, individual landowners need not know about construction costs or the relative demands of land for housing, recreational activities, or agriculture. Thus, by coordinating and transmitting widely dispersed information, prices act to harmonize the separate actions of different people, and it is significant how little individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action.[25]

Use of Knowledge in Land-Use Decisions

In allocating land resources through central direction, information problems arise similar to those in economic planning generally. The theoretical basis of land-use planning is deficient in that no way has been found to solve the information problems inherent in all central economic planning.[26] In view of the lack of an adequate intellectual foundation for land-use planning, the widespread dissatisfaction with comprehensive land-use plans is not surprising.[27]

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Similar problems are also endemic in the "scientific" approach to public land management. The aim of the early conservation movement in the United States was to introduce "scientific management" into government.[28] If government is to function efficiently in managing natural resources, according to this view, politics must be confined to specifying general policy directions, leaving the actual administration to skilled professionals. In view of the inherent information problems (and the public choice considerations to be discussed here), the current dissatisfaction with the results of "scientific management" of rangelands, forests, and other publicly owned lands is not surprising.[29]

What data are required to determine efficient land use? The same data indicated by Lange as required for central planning generally—data on preferences, resources, and production opportunities. These data are, of course, not given; and the land-use planner who attempts to obtain the relevant statistical data faces problems similar to those identified by Hayek:

> The statistics which a central authority would have to use would have to be arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by lumping together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, and other particulars in a way which may be very significant for the specific decision. It follows from this that central planning based on statistical information by its nature cannot take direct account of these circumstances of time and place.[30]

A crucial implication of the economic calculation debate is that prices are necessary for rational land-use planning. Yet, this fact is ignored in most land-use-planning literature where land classification is presented as an alternative to market prices in allocating land to various uses. A proposed state land-classification scheme for North Carolina, for example, instructs local governments to divide land into one of five different classes: developed, transition, community, rural, and conservation.[31] Land classification is assumed to be a scientific or technical skill; but as a resource allocation technique, it is subject to the same problems identified by Hayek a generation ago. Planning is to be achieved not by leaving the ultimate decision to the people who are familiar with the circumstances of time and place but by attempting to communicate the pertinent knowledge to a central agency that makes the decision. Land classification contains no mechanism to utilize the dispersed bits of incomplete knowledge that all separate individuals possess about the demand and supply of land. The problem, as Sowell stresses, is one concerning the articulation of information:

> It is not merely the enormous amount of data that exceeds the capacity of the human mind. Conceivably, this data might be stored in a computer with sufficient capacity. The real problem is that the knowledge needed is a knowledge of *subjective patterns of trade-off that are nowhere articulated,* not even to the individual himself. I might *think* that, if faced with the stark prospect of bankruptcy, I would rather sell my automobile than my furniture, or sacrifice the refrigerator rather than the stove, but unless and until such a moment comes, I will never *know* even my own tradeoffs, much less anybody else's.[32]

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Since land typically has more than one use, land classification is inherently arbitrary. There is no objective procedure by which the planner can classify each parcel of land into a particular land-use category when land use depends on subjective valuations of land. Moreover, the land-classification approach fails to take into account the fact that technical information—such as soil type, which is readily obtainable—is likely to be of trivial importance when compared with the information required to carry out the ordinary processes of economic activity—knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.

A major focus of recent land-use-planning efforts in rural areas has been the protection of agricultural land, but no explicit criteria or standards have been presented for determining how much or which land should be preserved. Vague and ambiguous language suggests that "naturally productive" agricultural land should be retained in agriculture "where alternative lands are available."[33] This directive, however, glosses over the important unanswered (and perhaps unanswerable) questions: (1) What are naturally productive lands? and (2) When are alternative lands not available? Productivity is a matter of degree, not an either-or situation; and alternatives are always available at some price and at some location. Moreover, it is often the case that naturally productive agricultural land is even more productive in other uses. Apart from the price signals of the market process, no objective procedure has been discovered to determine the most economic amount of land to retain in agriculture—either now or in the future.

Problems Due to Time

Economic problems are always rooted in change, and in a dynamic economy any land use pattern will quickly become obsolete. How can one know apart from market signals whether more or less land should be in agriculture? The "public interest" is a popular criterion used in land-use planning, but the public interest is no more identifiable in land use than it is in other areas.[34] How, for example, would a landowner demonstrate that the conversion of agricultural land is in the public interest? All political decisions confer benefits on some people and impose losses on others, and there is no objective way to measure the benefits and costs.[35]

This raises the question of whose interests should prevail in land-use decisions. A similar question was also raised in the economic calculation debate. Most of the proponents of market socialism assumed that the goal of a socialist economy was to provide for maximum satisfaction of private consumer demand.[36] However, the information that motivates choice by land market participants is decentralized and no third party can capture the constantly changing trade-offs. Thus, "when user monitoring, conveyed through prices and sales, is replaced by third-party articulation, in words or numbers, vast amounts of knowledge are lost in the process."[37]

A recent CAST report holds that there is no strong economic incentive for individuals to support farmland preservation policies because so much of the benefit is realized by future generations.[38] However, expected future benefits are reflected in current land prices. Consequently, the landowner is induced to use land (and other resources) in ways that reflect future as well as current demands. If, for

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example, there is an increase in the expected future demand for agricultural land, the current price of such land will rise to reflect the expected change. Thus, in rationing land resources both at a given point in time and over time, the price system takes into account expectations of future demands of land in various uses. Since future benefits, costs, and discount rates are all uncertain, however, conservation and other land-use decisions are necessarily rooted in uncertainty. Thus, subjective entrepreneurial considerations are inevitably involved in analyzing the profitability of alternative patterns of land use.

In analyzing the issues related to preserving agricultural land, a recent study stresses major uncertainties about such factors as the future conversion of farmland to non-farm uses, possible long-run climate changes, future trends in agricultural productivity, and future water and energy supplies and costs. The study then concludes that "preserving farmland for the future is like buying an insurance policy for future contingencies."[39] There is an implication that central direction is required to preserve agricultural land in the presence of uncertainty. However, the presence of uncertainty does *not* imply that land-use decisions should be made by central direction and, in reality, all entrepreneurial decisions are rooted in uncertainty. The study cited fails to take into account how the market operates as a discovery process in selecting from among uncertain profitable alternatives and, hence, in promoting economic resource use. Indeed, the crucial role of entrepreneurship is to identify superior resource combinations and uses, taking into account expectations about the future.

Public-Choice Considerations

Two kinds of problems arise in non-market methods of allocating agricultural land (and other resources). In addition to information problems, public-choice theory suggests that, due to the *separation of authority and responsibility,* decision makers in the public sector often do not bear the full cost (or benefit) of the action taken.[40] Under public control, the entire community bears the costs and benefits associated with decisions made by central planners. The greater the area of land held in agriculture under administrative land-use controls, for example, the greater the cost imposed on potential users of land for other purposes—such as housing—as well as on current owners of agricultural land. Private entrepreneurs, by contrast, in choosing to own land and make land-use decisions, bear the costs and reap the benefits of their own entrepreneurial activity. For example, if the private entrepreneur mistakenly bids too much for agricultural land, he bears the cost. In the words of Mises the private decision maker is "subject to the incorruptible judgement of an unbribable tribunal: the account of profit and loss."[41] Thus, although the market may misjudge the future, there is little reason to think that public officials can foresee it as well as market participants whose very livelihood depends upon actions based on future conditions.[42] Regardless of whether the political decision makers are motivated by the "public interest," they are at a disadvantage

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in obtaining the information necessary to achieve the most productive pattern of land use, due to the separation of power and knowledge.

Although public land-use planning to preserve agricultural land ostensibly is based on widespread citizen participation, the decisions are reached through a political process dominated by special interest groups. Lower income groups are disadvantaged by this process and "goals committees, citizens advisory boards and endless public hearings" only compound the extent of the disadvantage.[43] Administrative land-use controls also favor large landowners who are better able to handle the application processes and to obtain legal counsel and other advice.

Inflexibility of Land-Use Controls

Land-use patterns quickly become obsolete in a society characterized by rapid changes in science and technology. Discoveries and new ways of viewing factual information cannot be predicted. Ecology, energy, pollution, and world hunger are examples of issues, largely ignored only a decade or so ago, which have more recently significantly altered attitudes toward land use.

In much of the literature advocating land-use controls, there is an implicit assumption that government agents who devise and implement policies to correct for market failure "act solely to maximize social efficiency without regard to their own utility, power, prestige, income or vote appeal."[44] Political decision makers, like other people, however, are aware of their own interests, and self-interest is likely to be associated with "playing it safe." The political process, therefore, is short-run oriented, since the political decision maker's position and power are frequently determined by the results of the next election.[45] Consequently, the problem of adjusting land-use patterns to changing economic conditions becomes increasingly difficult as land-use decisions are centralized at higher levels of government. Regulations resulting from this process are likely to be restrictive, inflexible, and partial to established interests.

Land-use planners also tend to minimize the importance of change in efficient resource use.[46] This view varies dramatically with Hayek's view that rational economic calculation must take into account the constantly changing tastes and interests of all affected interacting individuals.

> If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them.[47]

In summary, there is no known way in which the planner can determine the optimal amount of land in agriculture—either now or in the future. The demand for land for non-agricultural uses in a particular region depends, to a great extent, on domestic population growth. Yet, planners have not been notably successful in predicting population, age distribution, or areas of urban growth. The demand for U.S. agricultural output depends not only on domestic population growth but

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also on foreign demand which is influenced by trade restrictions and other governmental policies. Even in estimating future government actions, however, the planner has no obvious advantage. Here, too, the most important source of uncertainty lies not in existing plans and policies but in future plans and policies. The periodic Congressional fight over farm legislation highlights the fact that policies developed through the political arena, whatever their other effects may be, create an important new source of uncertainty about U.S. agricultural production and land use.

Conclusions and Implications

The key issues of the economic calculation debate are closely related to problems inherent in land-use controls (including the protection of agricultural land). In recent CAST and NALS studies which conclude that market forces will not adequately protect agricultural land, there is little recognition of the information and knowledge problems that lie at the heart of all questions concerning the relative merits of the market versus central direction in resource allocation. Since there are only two ways of making land-use decisions, viz. through the market and through administrative land-use controls, the protection of agricultural land beyond the level dictated by market forces implies the substitution of centralized authority for decentralized market forces. Centralization of authority implicitly assumes that there is an objective procedure through which planners will be able to discover, announce, and-enforce the socially correct pattern of land for all uses including agriculture. The history of economic regulation, including governmental attempts to "scientifically manage" natural resources, suggests that there are important limitations of this approach.

First, Hayek and Mises demonstrated that market prices are necessary for efficient resource use and that market socialism or marginal-cost pricing based on shadow prices is not a realistic alternative to the decentralized market. Sowell's recent work reinforces these conclusions as does a recent study by a proponent of socialist economics who, although discounting the importance of the Hayekian and Misesian insights from a theoretical standpoint, yet recognizes that it is an economic weakness of socialism that

> so far no rational and workable pricing system has been devised. Prices do not fully reflect factor costs . . . and furthermore different criteria for price-setting are used for different categories of products. As a result, prices do not, and cannot, perform a rational allocative function.[48]

Second, it is important to recognize political failure as an analogue of market failure. Conservation problems, externalities, and other imperfections in land use are frequently identified by comparing actual land markets against the "perfect market." Real-world land markets, however, will always appear to be inefficient if measured against a norm that assumes away uncertainty and information problems. Similarly, when government intervention is compared with that of an "ideal" polity, government failure is inevitable. Government intervention also encourages private firms to protect their interests through methods that produce more market

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distortion.[49] Legislation to restrict the conversion of agricultural land to other uses, for example, generates countermeasures by landowners in the form of lobbying, hiring of lawyers to find loopholes, and so forth—all of which are likely to be as important in administrative land-use controls as in other areas of central direction.[50] The conclusion is that real-world land markets should be compared with real world administrative land-use controls.

What are the implications of this paper for economic analysis? Specifically, what is the role of the economist in achieving the pattern of land use which conforms most closely with the underlying supply and demand conditions? In the approach suggested by the preceding analysis, the primary task of the economist is *not* to determine the optimal pattern of land use on a local, state, or national basis. In attempting to do so, the economist is stymied by information problems similar to those discussed in the economic calculation debate. Emphasis should instead be placed on the effects of alternative frameworks of institutions and rules in accommodating the multitude of demands for land services.[51] In land use, as in other policy areas, increased emphasis should be placed on political economy—on the principles of political and economic organization.[52]

NOTES

1. National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS), *Where Have the Farmlands Gone?* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).
2. Gordon Bjork, *Life, Liberty and Property* (Lexington, Mass: D. C. Heath and Co., 1980).
3. Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), *Preserving Agricultural Land: Issues and Policy Alternatives,* Report No. 90 (Ames, Ia.: CAST, 1981); and Council for Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST), *Soil Erosion: Its Agricultural, Environmental, and Sociological Implications,* Report No. 92 (Ames, Ia.: CAST, 1982).
4. Ludwig von Mises, *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis,* reprint ed. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1951).
5. Whereas Mises denied the possibility of economic calculation in the absence of market prices, Hayek emphasized that the question at issue related to the possibility of *successful planning.* See F. A. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 149.
6. Karen I. Vaughn, "Introduction" to T. J. B. Hoff, *Economic Calculation in the Socialist Society* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Press, 1981); and *idem,* "Economic Calculation Under Socialism: The Austrian Contribution," *Economic Inquiry* 18 (1980): 534–54.
7. This paper does not deal with externality problems. Many of the issues discussed, however, are also relevant in the analysis of land-use spillover problems. See E. C. Pasour, Jr., "Agricultural Land Protection: Is Government Intervention Warranted?" *Cato Journal* 3 (1982): 739–58.
8. The following summary of the debate relies heavily on two recent works by Karen Vaughn (see Note 6).
9. Ludwig von Mises, "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth" (1920), in F. A. Hayek, ed., *Collectivist Economic Planning* (1933; reprint ed., Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1975). The ideas presented in this 1920 article were incorporated into his full-length study of socialism originally published in 1922 in German. The English translation, Mises, *Socialism: An Economic and Sociological Analysis,* was first published in 1936.
10. Abram Bergson, "The Politics of Socialist Efficiency," *American Economist* 24 (1979): 7.
11. Oscar Lange and F. M. Taylor, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism,* ed. Benjamin E. Lippincott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1938).
12. Richard A. Musgrave, "National Economic Planning: The U. S. Case," *American Economic Review* 64 (1974): 5.

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13. Kenneth J. Arrow, "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," *American Economic Review* 64 (1974): 5.
14. Lionel Robbins, *The Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London: Macmillan, 1932).
15. See James M. Buchanan, *What Should Economists Do?* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979).
16. See James M. Buchanan and A. DiPierro, "Cognition, Choice and Entrepreneurship," *Southern Economic Journal* 46 (1980): 693–701.
17. "To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in which we assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists is to assume the problem away and to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world" (Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order*, p. 91).
18. Israel M. Kirzner, *Perception, Opportunity and Profit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).
19. Israel M. Kirzner, *Competition and Entrepreneurship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973).
20. W. J. Baumol, *Economic Theory and Operations Analysis*, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 512. "The socialism by price guidance proposal has come to be known by one of its characteristics, *marginal cost pricing*. Every firm would be forced to sell as much as it produced and to sell this output at a price equal to its marginal cost" (*ibid.*). Marginal-cost pricing is an inherent feature of Lange's "market socialism." It is also widely discussed as a regulatory solution in the control of "natural monopolies." In both cases, marginal-cost pricing assumes away information problems.
21. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order*.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 77–78.
23. Jack Hirshleifer, *Price Theory and Applications*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
24. E. C. Pasour, Jr., "Economic Efficiency and Inefficient Economics: Another View," *Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics* 4 (1982): 454–59.
25. See Arrow, "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis"; and Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order*.
26. Robert H. Nelson, *Zoning and Property Rights* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977).
27. "Although years of effort and large public expenditures have been devoted to the preparation of plans, very few of them have ever been followed. The current optimism that there will be improvements in this respect in all likelihood only mirrors similar expectations for improvement in the past. The chronic failures of land-use planning efforts are strong evidence that there has been something fundamentally missing in the thinking on which these efforts have been based" (*ibid.*, p. 192).
28. Robert H. Nelson, "Making Sense of the Sagebrush Rebellion: A Long-Term Strategy for the Public Lands" (paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Washington, D. C., October 23–25, 1981).
29. *Ibid.*
30. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order*, p. 83.
31. N. C. Land Policy Council (NCLPC), *A Land Resources Program for North Carolina* (Raleigh, N. C.: NCLPC, 1976).
32. Thomas Sowell, *Knowledge and Decisions* (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 217–18.
33. N. C. Land Policy Council, *A Land Resources Program*, pp. 2–3.
34. Barry Bracewell-Milnes, "Market Control Over Land-Use Planning," *Government and the Land* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1974).
35. "Of course . . . we do make comparisons between the satisfaction of different people . . . whenever we discuss distributional questions, we make our own estimates of the happiness afforded or the misery endured by different persons or groups of persons. But these are our estimates. There is no objective measurement conceivable" (Lionel Robbins, "Economics and Political Economy," *American Economic Review* 71 [1981]: 5).
36. Vaughn, "Introduction" to Hoff, *Economic Calculation*.
37. Sowell, *Knowledge and Decisions*, p. 216.
38. Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, *Preserving Agricultural Land*, p. 18.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

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40. John A. Baden and Richard L. Stroup, "The Environmental Costs of Governmental Action," *Policy Review* 4 (1978): 23–26.
41. Ludwig von Mises, *Bureaucracy* (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969), p. 35.
42. Pierre R. Crosson and R. B. Haas, "Agricultural Land," chap. 8, *Current Issues in Natural Resource Policy,* Paul R. Portney, ed. (Washington, D. C.: Resources for the Future, 1982), p. 269.
43. David E. Ervin, *et al., Land Use Control: Evaluating Economic and Political Effects* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977), p. 52.
44. John Burton, "Externalities, Property Rights and Public Policy: Private Property Rights or the Spoliation of Nature," *Epilogue,* in Steven N. S. Cheung, *The Myth of Social Cost* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1978), p. 81.
45. M. Bruce Johnson, "On the Economics of Environmental Extremism," in *The California Coastal Plain: A Critique* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1976), pp. 9–23.
46. "The criteria for approval of proposed amendments, however, should be very strict so as to discourage numerous amendments to the plans" (N. C. Land Policy Council, *A Land Resources Program,* p. 4–4).
47. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order,* pp. 83–84.
48. J. Wilczynski, *The Economics of Socialism,* 3rd ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977), p. 212.
49. Alan Peacock, "On the Anatomy of Collective Failure," *Public Finance* 35 (1980): 33–43.
50. Charles Wolf, Jr., "A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for Implementation Analysis," *Journal of Law and Economics* 22 (1979): 107–39.
51. Leland B. Yeager, "Economics and Principles," *Southern Economic Journal* 42 (1976): 559–71.
52. Robbins, *Economics and Political Economy.*

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

Social Contract as a Basis of Norms: A Critique*

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In this note I will argue that social contract theories aimed at establishing norms for personal and community life are inadequate. Briefly, I show that in Kant and Rawls the alleged contractual basis for the legitimacy of law and government is supplemented with the very strict requirement of self-consistency of the resulting norms. Once, however, Kant's and Rawls's own framework for the social contract thesis is abandoned, as it ultimately will have to be for various reasons, what is left is not a social contract but rationality as the basis of norms.

Kant stated explicitly that the "idea [of social contract] alone enables us to conceive of the legitimacy of the state."[1] He made clear that the social contract would be a "mere idea of Understanding, which has, nonetheless, its doubtless (practical) reality" in that it "obligates every lawgiver to advance his statutes so that they could have emerged from the united will of the whole people, and to consider every subject, as regards his desire for citizenship, as though he had been party to accepting that will. For that is the basis of the legitimacy of every public enactment."[2]

Kant's idea was recently revitalized by John Rawls by way of the hypothetical social contract that is to be conceived of as having been formed behind "a veil of ignorance."[3] There are other, more Hobbesian, versions of social contract theory, but the Kant-Rawls version has become most prominent among contemporary political philosophers.

Why is this idea so appealing to many of these philosophers? It seems to be suited to the task they have undertaken, namely, to provide an explanation of the moral content of the laws they prefer, because of some important assumptions. These assumptions arise from a long tradition of empiricist bias. They include such ideas as: that human actions must be explained by reference to motives (as distinct from purposes, for example); that nature provides no guidance to judging something good or bad; that morality is mainly a social institution; that people lack freedom

*The author wishes to thank the Reason Foundation for supporting some of the work on this paper.

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of the will, at least from the scientific, practical point of view, and their conduct is neither morally right nor morally wrong except as a matter of their relationship to certain social goals; etc.

This general empiricist-scientistic viewpoint favors the idea that prior to being bound by their own choices (which in the last analysis come to hypothetical revealed preferences, so as to accommodate empiricist standards), members of a social group are not bound by moral standards. With the demise of the classical idea of natural law, that human life has an end or purpose and that right conduct should further this, this hypothetical social contract had the best chance of resurrecting some semblance of respect for moral and legal principles.[4]

Yet even social contractarians seem to eschew simple conventionalisms of the kind this approach produces. This is one reason why, for many, Hobbes's approach is inadequate. A look at Kant and Rawls will illustrate the point.

Both Kant and Rawls invoke more than mere agreement in their efforts to make the contract supply us with moral and legal standards which can be considered binding. Kant believes that the contract which arises must be self-consistent. Rawls believes that it must be confirmed by intuitively acceptable moral conceptions placed in rational equilibrium.[5] Why is a mere agreement not sufficient? If no other source of norms is available—especially in the case of Rawls—why not simply insist that norms come from human choices, rational, self-consistent, irrational, arbitrary, or whatever?

In the case of Kant the "united will of a whole people" seems to be required only because he is convinced that this will secure the ingredient of consistency. Consistency appears to be a necessary feature of the source of moral norms, distinct in principle from the actual contract. For Kant the act of will on the part of everyone is one, while the unison among all of them is another indispensible feature of the social contract. For Kant consistency comes from the united act of consent, but in a non-Kantian philosophical framework it might come from some other source.

Rawls introduces the idea of the veil of ignorance so as to establish for himself a basis for consistency. Consistency would be thwarted if the contractors had important individual characteristics, so Rawls makes all the contractors uniform. At any rate, in Rawls the element of consistency comes from the veil of ignorance provision. The consent, in turn, seems to be based on the intuitions which Rawls imposes on the contractors.

Rawls clearly rejects any basis for morality other than the hypothetical social contract. From what we have seen, Kant would agree although he appears to be confining this view to how *social* morality and law must emerge. Despite this belief in the social contractarian foundation of at least political morality, both philosophers have built into the contract an element, namely, rationality, that could stand independent of contracts, at least when we approach the situation from different philosophical positions. Why do Kant and Rawls not simply rest their social and political morality on an analysis of rationality rather than bother about some admittedly illusive, fictional social contract?

Rawls and Kant both reject any sort of metaphysical or ontological grounds

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for morality. Rawls was very clear in his Eastern Division APA Presidential Address when he stated: "Now my thought is this: much of moral theory is independent from the other parts of philosophy."[6] Kant, too, locates morality in pure reason, without external foundations: "Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which it proceeds, is such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the will of each and all in action, according to a universal law."[7] With reference to social morality, Kant held, furthermore, that we should all "act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of the will may be able to coexist with the freedom of all others, according to a universal law."[8] (Kant wished to deduce every legal judgment from pure reason.) For example, "If a man and a woman have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoyment in accordance with their sexual nature, they *must* necessarily marry each other; and this necessity is in accordance with the juridical laws of pure reason."[9]

Now in Rawls's case the attempt to reject personal and social morality's dependence on other parts of philosophy cannot succeed for reasons I have noted elsewhere.[10] Briefly, any effort to explicate the Rawlsian task to specify the nature of moral obligation begs for philosophical clarification from the non-normative branches of the discipline.

In Kant, of course, the attempt to secure the foundations of morality in pure reason, removed from that impossible field, metaphysics, is much more complicated since Kant devotes the better part of his philosophical work to showing that metaphysics is inherently impossible. But after all is said and done, it seems to me that the Kantian endeavor must fail, too, mainly on grounds of self-refutation. To wit: the transcendental character of human understanding cannot be established without initial reference to independently existing, objectively real *other* human beings who, on the Kantian scheme, can be identified only if that transcendental human understanding has been established. For this and many other reasons, the Kantian social contract theory is not the only source of moral standards for social conduct.

So we have Rawls's failure to establish the independence of moral theory and Kant's failure to develop a conception of (human) reason that is independent of metaphysics. Their social contract theories are, in turn, open to the criticism that the (hypothetical) contract they invoke is unnecessary for grounding social morality. Instead, they could explicate the demands of reason or rationality, quite independently of any agreement behind a veil of ignorance or act of will of the whole people.

Now common sense already suggests one serious problem with all kinds of social contract theories, Kantian, Hobbesian, or Rawlsian. This is that they cannot escape the force of a form of Moore's open question argument. It is always perfectly intelligible to ask whether what people (would have) willed either behind a veil of ignorance, in unison, or at some great convention *should* have been willed by them in the first place. It might first be replied that the social contract theory of grounding norms will render that kind of question unintelligible. But this will not do in the present case since the very nature of morality or ethics requires that its

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provisions be applicable universally, which means that conduct preceding the social contract, including entering it, must be open to ethical assessment. In short, when someone considers entering a social contract, there must already be standards for making the right choice about doing so. That is an inherent requirement of ethics and social morality. (Rawls admits that some such standard might be discovered but he regards it obstructionist to wait for it.[11])

Then the fundamental egalitarian bias in social contract must be called into question. Why regard as equally worthwhile every will involved in forging the contract? If this were not a requirement, and if we took the possibility of prior standards seriously, then it might not be unthinkable that some social contracts were ill formed, should never have been entered into, etc. Thus one might provide oneself with the theoretical background for criticizing the Rawlsian system on grounds, at least in part, that no self-respecting individual should have agreed to the terms which grew out of the contract made behind the veil of ignorance—at least not until he or she became a bit more knowledgeable about various things.

The question that remains then is whether the social contract approach, given its shortcomings and given that from different philosophical perspectives it would not be necessary, is still required. Once the extreme pressure of empiricism and scientism has been lifted, I do not think so. Rawls's need for the contract stems from his view that people, driven by motives, cannot be placed under moral obligations to which they did not agree explicitly (within a hypothetical contract). And in Kant the phenomenal world of practical social life requires some sort of practical agreement for the law to be binding, even though that agreement must ultimately be based somehow on pure reason.

The orthodoxy of empiricism, in abandoning any hope for metaphysics, however, has lost not only its philosophical but also its social force. The field is wide open and new beginnings can be forged. It seems to me, in particular, that a reconsideration of the Greek conception of human nature, specifically Aristotle's, would provide greater promise for grounding justice than any such truncated approach as social contract theory.

What remains of social contract theory? Something very important: namely, the value of reaching agreement among human beings, and the justifiability of certain kinds of efforts to reach it. For instance, when participants in the *polis* (a human community guided by sound judgment) can agree on how to maintain and preserve the proper standards of social justice (and on who should administer the effort), something crucial to the lives of the participants may well be achieved—e.g., the efficient preservation of the conditions of proper social intercourse. But here the contract does not form the ultimate basis of norms. Instead it establishes the method by which norms can be upheld and interpreted in a social context. That method is always open to evaluation. When consented to, however, something enormously valuable has been achieved: the prospect of successful maintenance of social justice.[12]

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NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *Metaphysical Elements of Justice*, trans. John Ladd (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 80
2. Immanuel Kant, *Werke* (Bruno Cassier, 1914), 6:380–81. (My translation.)
3. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 36.
4. For a survey, see Shirley Robin Letwin, "Modern Philosophies of Law," *The Great Ideas Today, 1972* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1972), pp. 105–53.
5. Immanuel Kant, *The Philosophy of Law*, trans. W. Hastie (Edinburgh, 1887), reprinted in *Great Books of the Western World* (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), 42:436.
6. John Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware, 1975), p. 5.
7. Kant, *The Philosophy of Law*, p. 398.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 419.
10. T. R. Machan, "A Note on Independence," *Philosophical Studies* 30 (1976): 419–21. Natural law and rights theories achieve what the veil of ignorance aims for, namely the securement of moral equality, but only for the purposes of understanding political life. They focus on human nature, something we all share.
11. Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," p. 21.
12. For a full treatment, see T. R. Machan, "Individualism and the Problem of Political Authority," *The Monist* 66 (1983): 500–16. Why, for example, would it be wrong to contract for the use of some third party who has not consented? Because that party has rights and, independently of any contractual determination, it is wrong to violate rights.

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

Libertarians and Indians: Proprietary Justice and Aboriginal Land Rights

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Two remarks will serve to introduce my subject. Several years ago, Rosalie Nichols was asked if the Indians had ever had a title deed to North America. She responded, "Who should have issued them one, I don't know, unless it was the buffalo."[1] Secondly, Jonathan Hughes, in his book *The Governmental Habit,* contrasts the allodial and socage forms of land tenure. "Socage tenure was part of the feudal order" and was inevitably carried over by the English to their landholdings in North America. It was designed to protect the interests of the feudal donor ("transformed in our time into the state") by forcing "property owners to support the taxing power at all times" regardless of whether they desired or used state services. The property owner could never "withdraw his support" from the state by not paying real estate taxes. If he attempted to discontinue his payment, the state would confiscate his title and auction off his property to someone who would pay taxes. "This form of coercion is a product of history" and ultimately traces itself back to the principle of the Right of Discovery, upon which all European nations based their claims to land in North America.[2]

According to the international law of Europe during the fifteenth century, priority of discovery gave a nation supreme and unlimited right to the discovered territory.[3] Title to lands hitherto unknown to Europeans was based on the union of discovery and possession.[4] This meant that although numerous European nations claimed first discovery, actual sovereignty could only be established by effective colonization. (Since the English, in North America, generally proved themselves the most effective colonizers, succeeding comments will refer largely to the practice of the English.) The rights of the Crown were not merely those of head of state or feudal lord paramount. The King was the immediate owner and lord of the soil and exercised unlimited power in its disposition.[5] Theoretically, no settlement could be made without his consent, and if any settlement took place without his prior approval, then he could force it either to disband or to seek a royal charter to confirm its existence. Once the Crown established sovereignty over an area, it then enlarged its authority to include the right to extinguish any vestige of Indian title.[6]

Under international law, the Indians had only a right of uncivilized occupancy.[7] This meant that the natives had no right to dispose of their title except to the Crown

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or its proprietary agents. The Indians were consistently held incapable of alienating their lands to private parties.[8] By implication, the Crown took the position that if it cared to recognize any Indian title (to lands occupied by the Indians) at all, such title could be transferred only to the Crown. Any purchase of land made by settlers from the natives without the consent of the Crown was regarded and treated as absolutely void. It was a fundamental principle in the English colonial jurisprudence that all titles to land within the colonies passed to individuals only from the Crown or proprietary authorities.[9] No land title examined in the colonial or early state courts was ever admitted to depend upon any Indian deed of relinquishment.[10,11]

These views were confirmed by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, in which the territory still occupied by the Indians west of the Appalachian Mountains was disposed of without reference to the natives. The Crown's assumption was that the aboriginal tribes had neither title to the soil nor sovereignty. The Royal Proclamation reserved to the British government the exclusive right to purchase and extinguish the rights of the Indian tribes as occupants of the soil. Furthermore, it forbade European settlement on Indian Territory, until permission was granted by the Crown and until after the Indian right had been extinguished by conveyance to the Crown.[12]

The first European in North America to challenge the principle of the Right of Discovery and to uphold the native rights to the soil was Roger Williams. In 1633 he became an ardent proponent of the idea that King James had no right or power to claim ownership of North American lands occupied and used by the Indians. The King was granting things beyond his power to grant when, for example, he issued royal patents to Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, and other colonies. From Williams's point of view these patents were invalid. The English could justly occupy lands in North America only by purchasing those lands from their rightful owners, the Indians. Undoubtedly these claims caused alarm among the royal patriots, for they struck at the very foundations of the colonial governments which King James had authorized. Williams was banished from Massachusetts and left to establish his colony in Rhode Island, where he began by purchasing the land from the Indians.[13]

Williams asserted that the rights of the Indian stood upon the original principles of the law of nature, which meant that the lands they had occupied and used could not be alienated from them without their free consent.[14] Roger Williams pointed out that a modified form of private ownership of land did exist among the Indian tribes and that they did not simply live in a state of nature.[15] They had improved the land by burning the underbrush and had cleared the land where they lived, and their woodlands were no less useful than the King's parks in England.[16] John Winthrop, one of Williams's detractors, maintained that the unimproved lands of North America belonged to no one, and that whoever labored on unimproved and unclaimed land thereby made it his own. According to Winthrop, land became private property only through cultivation, manuring, and enclosure. Since by English standards the Indians had not noticeably improved their land or enclosed it, it was not rightfully theirs, but simply lay ownerless in the state of nature. Even though

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the Indians had not cultivated or enclosed their lands, Williams insisted that the colonists first purchase the right to the land from its original users and occupants, the Indians. Williams demanded that the Indians be dealt with on the principle of equality and maintained that so-called civilized states have no right, however nomadic or savage they (the Indians) might be, to divest the title to the soil from them.[17]

Misunderstanding arising from their differing concepts of property in land was one of the main causes of disputes between the Europeans and the Indians. The Indians did not recognize land appropriation by individual members of the tribe, and even Roger Williams recognized that landownership among the Indians was usually held by the tribe. Nevertheless, among the Indians articles of personal property were owned by the individual.[18] Each Indian tribe was perfectly well acquainted with the limits and bounds of its landholdings, even though these holdings were not enclosed in the normal European fashion.[19] Indian land tenure has been characterized 1) as a right of beneficial use and occupancy, rather than an exclusive ownership, and 2) as a group right rather than an individual one. It was probably difficult for the Indians to think of land as individual, private property, which could be sold or permanently alienated.[20]

Besides Roger Williams, there were others concerned with respecting Indian rights. In 1626 the West India Company instructed its New Netherland's agents to formally acquire title to lands, by purchase from the Indians. As early as 1623, records indicate that the Hollanders had purchased land of the Indians.[21] Thus Manhattan Island was purchased by the Dutch in 1626, for goods valued at 60 guilders.[22] This was a sum probably representing the real value of the land in that day, and the Indians made a good trade. The Dutch probably initiated the practice of purchasing lands from the Indians in order to counter the claims of the other European powers. They had little chance of sustaining themselves under the principle of Right of Discovery. They decided to argue, against the claims of the English, that the Indian tribes or nations were the true owners of the land discovered by the English and that title could be obtained from the natives only by gift or purchase. Interestingly enough, when the Swedes arrived in 1638, they recognized the claims of the Dutch, to lands purchased of the Indians. Likewise, the Dutch formally admitted the validity of Swedish titles, when a deed or transfer from the Indians could be produced.[23] The only English colonists to emulate the Dutch and Swedish practice were the Quakers in Pennsylvania; practically all the other English settlers refused to recognize Swedish or Dutch claims since the Indian title had no standing in English law.

The Quakers were the only group of European settlers to have their hands free from the blood of innocent Indians.[24] They never deliberately schemed for the extermination of the Indians and were nearly always concerned to do full justice to Indian claims.[25] They were an unimaginative, pecuniary people, who thought that justice to the Indian consisted in doing him no harm, paying him for his land, and letting him go.[26]

The curious aspect of William Penn's approach was that his chief object seems

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to have been to extinguish Indian claims and to give satisfaction to the natives for their possessory rights, rather than to fix definite and accurate boundaries of the land purchased. The wording of the deeds implies that the intent was to cover all possible claims of those making the grants to Penn. Hence it was of little importance that these deeds overlapped and included areas obtained from other claimants.[27] Thus, practically the whole of Pennsylvania was purchased of the Indians, and some of it several times over.[28] The price of these land purchases seems as nothing now, but it was a fair price in those days in the minds of both parties. It took centuries for the white people to learn the value of land in America. In every instance when Penn dealt with the Indians, so long as the bargain was fairly made, the Indians returned to their wigwams satisfied.[29]

What seems to have impressed the Indians was the fact that Penn insisted on purchase at the first and all subsequent agreements as being an act of justice, to which both parties were to give their assent voluntarily. They also felt that the price was ample to extinguish their claims, and that no advantages were taken by plying them with drink or cheating them with false maps. The treaties were open and honorable contracts, and not characterized by sharpness and chicanery. As the Indians reflected on them at their leisure, they saw nothing to repent of and everything to admire in the conduct of Penn, and they preserved inviolably the terms to which they had solemnly agreed.[30]

Even before Penn arrived in his colony, land was purchased of the Indians, under his instructions, as early as 1682. As a Quaker and quasi-pacifist and as a proprietary of the Crown, Penn had a dual role to fulfill as colonial leader. As in many of the other colonies, to resort to buying the lands of the natives may have been an act of expediency, for it must have been much cheaper and easier to purchase the lands of the Indians than to attempt to take them away by force.[31] Liberty and peace were the two main elements of Penn's Holy Experiment and could be obtained only if no aggression were made on the rights, real or supposed, of the native inhabitants.[32] Penn's Quaker conscience inspired him to buy not only the Indian lands, but those of all claimants in order to quiet all possible land disputes. It should be noted, however, that regardless of Penn's concern for justice, Pennsylvania law prohibited purchase of Indian land by individual Quakers or other settlers. Quieting title was a government monopoly which Penn held for himself.[33]

It has been urged by Penn's critics that neither he nor any other European colonist could with perfect integrity and honesty purchase the land of the aboriginal natives of America, for several reasons. First, savages can never, for any consideration, enter into contracts obligatory upon them. They stand by the law of nations, when trafficking with the civilized part of mankind, in the situation of infants, incapable of entering into contracts, especially for the sale of their country. Second, should this be denied, it may then be asserted that no monarch or chief of a nation has the power to transfer by sale the soil of the nation over which he rules. Neither William Penn nor any other European since made a purchase of lands from any Indian nation other than through the agency of their sachems or head men, who certainly could have no more right to sell their country than

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any European monarch has to sell theirs. Third, should these objections be overruled, then it may be safely asked, what could William Penn or at least what did he give which should be considered from any point of view as a consideration or a compensation to those aborigines for their land?[34]

Before dealing with these critical points, let it be said that the Indian land issue ought to be viewed from the standpoint of man's natural and inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property.[35] This means that, since the Indians were human beings, they had the same rights as Caucasians. This means they had the right to control their own minds and bodies free of coercive interference and to own the land on which they and their ancestors had lived since time immemorial. Thus, when "discovered" by the Europeans, parts of the North American continent were not ownerless. The American Indians, by virtue of being first users and occupiers of parts of the continent, were its rightful owners.[36] Since legitimate property owners have an unrestricted right to make arrangements for the disposition of their property, this effectively disposes of the first argument that savages cannot enter into obligatory contracts.

Since the Indians did not hold the land as individuals, but as collective tribal entities, it is difficult to determine whether or not land allocations (under the tribal regime) were more just than the English land grab which took place under the guise of discovery.[37] However, it is plain that private collective ownership is perfectly valid and moral, as long as it is voluntary and there is no violation of individual rights.[38] Private collective ownership must originate in the ability of the individual to own property, which he then cooperatively pools with the property of others. However in the case of the Indians, it has never been asserted that tribal title rested on the agglomeration of individual titles. The actual settler—the first transformer of the land—whether white or Indian—had to fight his way past a nest of arbitrary land claims by others.[39] Were the tribes, in effect, voluntary associations of individuals who consented to their collective ownership of the land? The fact that no form of tribute or taxes was ever collected among the Indian tribes inhabiting what is now the United States lends some credence to the view that the tribes were voluntary organizations.[40]

As voluntary associations, the tribes could, and in fact did, historically, sell their rights to the soil by allowing their chiefs to represent tribal interests. These chiefs were authorized to make and execute deeds on behalf of the tribe, to receive for the tribe the consideration for the deeds, and to divide such consideration among the individuals of the tribe. The authority of the chiefs, so acting for the whole tribe, is attested by the presence and assent of the individuals composing the tribe and by their receipt of their respective share of the price.[41] Thus could the Indian tribes deal with the Europeans for the sale of their lands, and granted that the chiefs had this authority, it must be admitted that they were capable of determining what in their opinion would be ample compensation for their lands.

With these preliminary concerns out of the way, it must now be determined whether or not the bulk of Indian claimed land was actually used and occupied, settled and transformed by the tribes claiming them. If it be admitted that the tribal

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organizations were voluntary and that Indian landownership was just, then it is plain that European intervention into the allocation of property was a usurpation and a crime against the rightful Indian owners. If the Europeans settling in North America had operated in a free-market or even semi-free-market framework, then the British government would have refrained from claiming sovereignty over the unused domains of America. It would have denounced the principle of the Right of Discovery, and recognized that true ownership could only be established under the principle of "first ownership by the first user" (whether white or Indian).[42]

What exactly does first occupation and use mean? What are the criteria by which the principle of first ownership by the first user is to be interpreted? The crux of the dispute over whether Indian claimed lands were truly owned by the Indians or actually ownerless stems from the failure to distinguish between cultivation and other forms of use. If cultivation and enclosure are deemed to be the hallmarks of establishing occupancy and use, then that large portion of the Indian claimed land which was never "homesteaded" must be viewed as actually ownerless (and thus open to settlement by the actual first user).

Claiming that the American Indians, by virtue of being the first users and occupiers of the continent, were its rightful owners, Rosalie Nichols maintains that "use" is decided upon according to the condition and natural resources of the land, the level and particular type of technology of the occupants, and the desires of the owner.[43] Undoubtedly, the Indians rightfully owned the land that they cultivated and upon which they erected their wigwams and shelters. *The main question to settle is whether they rightfully owned the land upon which they regularly or sporadically hunted.*

Lysander Spooner in the mid-nineteenth century asserted that those lands which the Indians merely roamed over in search of game, could not be said to have been rightfully owned by them.[44] Rightful ownership of unoccupied lands is established by either actually living upon the land, or improving it, or bestowing other useful labor upon it. "Nothing short of this actual possession can give any one a rightful ownership of wilderness lands, or justify him in withholding it from those who wish to occupy it." He based his assertions on the principle that occupation and use meant more than standing upon a portion of the North American continent and claiming possession of it. To establish ownership a person must bestow some valuable labor upon the land. In these cases he holds the land in order to hold the labor which he had put into it.[45] Similarly, Rothbard has written that the bulk of Indian claimed land was not settled and transformed by the Indians, and that the new European settlers were justified in ignoring the Indians' vague abstract claims because they knew they were the first to actually cultivate and enclose the lands upon which they settled.[46]

The fact that the Indians and Europeans did not share a common technology seems to be of no import in establishing legitimate property titles. To live, all people (regardless of their technology) must occupy certain places on the land, and whoever first establishes a homestead becomes its rightful owner. Unless the Indians bestowed some form of valuable labor over the wilderness areas they hunted, their claims

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of ownership were unsubstantiated. At most, they could claim the wild animals they killed and the trails that they cleared. The fact that the tribes each had their own hunting areas does not disprove this and indicates that they only wished to live in peace with one another. If and where the Indians attempted to bound off their hunting lands, so that no one else could enter and game could not escape, and where they made efforts to help propagate game, then their ownership would be valid.

Thus game preserves or wilderness areas could exist in a free society. It is also important to understand that land once cultivated, even if allowed to go wild, does not become ownerless. Once a piece of land has passed into just ownership, the owner cannot be divested of title without his consent. Thus even though a piece of land is not currently being farmed, but is perhaps being used for cycle racing or as a rifle range, it is still owned, so long as sometime in the past a rightful possession took place. The present owner is the rightful owner so long as he can trace his title through a historical chain of voluntary transfers from the first occupier and user.[47] The fact that certain forest areas, desert lands, and open ranges, even at this late date (four hundred years after the European discovery of the continent) have never been homesteaded or cultivated means that they are still rightfully ownerless and will probably remain so because of their uneconomic value.[48]

Thus granting that some Indian claims were valid and others invalid, what were the Europeans to do when they discovered America? Even though there were probably few areas which the Indians did not claim, were the Europeans under the necessity of abandoning the country and relinquishing their own pompous claims established under the principle of Right of Discovery?[49] All unjust claims—by the Indians and the European powers—should have been ignored. "The English who colonized this country had no right to drive the Indians from their homes; but on the other hand, there being here an abundance of unoccupied land, the colonists had a right to come and settle on it, and the Indians had no right to prevent them from doing so."[50] I believe that the history of Quaker settlement proves that this policy was possible and furthermore believe that until the latter stages of settlement, the Indians were not as concerned to establish their title to hunting lands as we might think.

If Penn had not been a representative of the Crown, but only a private Quaker or the recognized leader of a corporate body of Friends, his conduct toward the Indians would serve as an example of how a libertarian colonization process could have worked. The fact remains that the Indian tribes he dealt with voluntarily relinquished their claims to him (and in this respect, his position as a Crown representative was unimportant). The Europeans did not need to abandon the continent upon discovering that parts of it were inhabited. Individual settlers or groups of settlers could have quieted Indian claims and extinguished Indian titles much as Penn did. Thus it is conceptually possible that the bulk of Indian landholdings could have passed legitimately into non-Indian control. This is not to say that all tribes would have alienated all their lands, but at least historically some Indians did willingly relinquish their land.[51] Thus the historical picture clearly demonstrates that liber-

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tarians and Indians could have lived peacefully together under a regime of proprietary justice.

NOTES

1. Rosalie Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale of Non-Recognition of Indian Rights," *The Indian Historian* 3 (Spring 1970): 27.
2. Jonathan Hughes, *The Governmental Habit* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. 233.
3. James E. Ernst, *The Political Thought of Roger Williams* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1929), p. 95.
4. Melville Egleston, *The Land System of the New England Colonies*, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 4th ser., vols. 11–12 (Baltimore, 1886), p. 4.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Ernst, *Political Thought of Roger Williams*, p. 95.
7. Alpheus Snow, *The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921), p. 25.
8. Alfred N. Chandler, *Land Title Origins* (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1945), p. 36.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Snow, *The Question of Aborigines*, p. 121.
11. Several interesting questions are raised by the case of Johnson and Granham's Lessee vs. William McIntosh (8 Wheaton 543) which was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1823. This was an action by Johnson and others to eject McIntosh from lands granted to them by the Piankeshaw Indians during the 1770's. The land claimed by Johnson was part of the Indian territory claimed by the State of Virginia and then ceded to the federal government in 1783. Although the plaintiffs had petitioned the U. S. Congress numerous times to recognize their conveyance from the Piankeshaw, the federal government granted McIntosh title to the identical piece of land in 1818. In concluding that the Indian deed was of no value and that the grant from the United States government was paramount, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that: "The person who purchases land from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. If they annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceeding. We know of no principle which can distinguish this case from a grant made to a native Indian, authorizing him to hold a particular tract in severalty [that is, to hold the land as a separate individual, apart from the tribe]. As such a grant could not separate an Indian from his nation, nor give a title which our courts could distinguish from the title of his tribe, we can perceive no legal principle which will authorize a court to say that different consequences are attached to this purchase because it was made by a stranger. By the treaties concluded between the United States and the Indian nations, whose title the plaintiffs claim, the country comprehending the lands in controversy had been ceded to the United States without any reservation of their title. These nations had been at war with the United States, and had an unquestionable right to annul any grant they had made to American citizens. Their cession of the country without any reservation of this land affords a fair presumption that they considered it as of no validity," (8 Wheaton 593–94). Query 1) Why would an Indian grant to a member of the tribe to hold the land in severalty be incapable of separating the Indian from his tribe? Query 2) By what "unquestionable right" did the Indian tribes have the right to annul grants made to outside parties (whether such parties be American citizens or not)? Would the fact that a grant was made to an enemy citizen prior to the commencement of war entitle the Indians to cancel their conveyance after the war had begun? Query 3) Would Marshall have decided the case differently had the Indians actually made a reservation in their treaty with the United States, whereby they recognized the existence of a prior grant of land to Johnson? The presumption that the Indians annulled their former conveyance would have been overcome. Then to rebut the presumption thus created in favor of Johnson's title, Marshall would have had to revert to the principle of the Right of Discovery.
12. Snow, *The Question of Aborigines*, p. 19.
13. William C. Macleod, *The American Indian Frontier* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 199.
14. Ernst, *Political Thought of Roger Williams*, p. 96.

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15. Macleod, *American Indian Frontier,* p. 19. There is some discrepancy between Ernst and Macleod over Roger Williams's recognition of landownership by the Indians. For the conflicting discussion see *ibid.,* pp. 18–19, and Ernst, *Political Thought of Roger Williams,* p. 104.
16. William B. Scott, *In Pursuit of Happiness: American Conceptions of Property from the Seventeenth Century to the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 16.
17. Ernst, *Political Thought of Roger Williams,* p. 105.
18. *Ibid.,* p. 102.
19. Chandler, *Land Title Origins,* p. 30.
20. John Provinse, "Tenure Problems of the American Indians," in Ken H. Parsons, ed., *Land Tenure* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956), p. 421.
21. Macleod, *American Indian Frontier,* p. 194.
22. Marshall Harris, *Origin of the Land Tenure System in the United States* (Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1953), p. 165. Also see Macleod, *American Indian Frontier,* p. 194.
23. *Ibid.,* pp. 195–96. Macleod also footnotes the interesting and similar practice of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape in South Africa: "forced by virtue of desire to avoid an immediate issue of arms with the Hottentot Africans," the Dutch East India Company during the 1660's, were "holding formal treaties with the native tribes, giving them money or goods in exchange for land and privileges, and even paying a stated tax to the local tribe for each ship entering the harbour at the Cape" (*ibid.,* p. 196). The Dutch claimed that outright conquest and subjugation of the natives would entitle the invaders to the land of the conquered, but apparently the Dutch never adopted this unlibertarian practice.
24. *Ibid.,* p. 376.
25. This was true while William Penn lived (until 1748). The story of his son's fraudulent interpretation of Indian deeds is related in William J. Buck, *History of the Indian Walk* (Philadelphia: Edwin S. Stuart, 1886).
26. Macleod, *American Indian Frontier,* p. 376.
27. Cyrus Thomas, "Introduction," in Charles C. Royce, comp., *Indian Land Cessions in the United States,* 18th Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1899), p. 599.
28. Isaac Sharpless, *A History of Quaker Government in Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: T. S. Leach & Company, 1900), 1:162.
29. Rayner W. Kelsey, *Friends and the Indians* (Philadelphia: The Associated Executive Committee of Friends on Indian Affairs, 1917), pp. 45–46.
30. Sharpless, *A History of Quaker Government,* pp. 157–58.
31. Buck, *History of the Indian Walk,* pp. 31–32.
32. Rufus M. Jones, *The Quakers in the American Colonies* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1911), p. 470.
33. Royce, *Indian Land Cessions,* p. 597.
34. John L. Bozman, *The History of Maryland* (Baltimore: James Lucas & K. E. Deaver, 1837), pp. 569–70.
35. Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," p. 26.
36. Rosalie Nichols, "An Open Letter to an American Author," *The Indian Historian* 1 (Spring 1968): 17. Also see Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," pp. 29–30. Ms. Nichols takes the position that the various Indian tribes owned every part of the continent, not just parts of it.
37. Murray N. Rothbard, *Conceived in Liberty* (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1975), 1: 187.
38. Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," p. 32.
39. Rothbard, *Conceived in Liberty,* 1:187.
40. Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," p. 33. Referring to the Comanches, Ms. Nichols remarks, "There was no Internal Revenue Service to come after him [the Indian hunter]" (*ibid.,* p. 32).
41. Johnson vs. McIntosh, 8 Wheaton 550.
42. Rothbard, *Conceived in Liberty,* 1:49.
43. Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," pp. 29, 31.
44. Lysander Spooner, *Address of the Free Constitutionalists to the People of the U. S.* (Boston: Thayer and Eldridge, 1860), p. 33.
45. Lysander Spooner, *The Law of Intellectual Property* (Boston: Bela Marsh, 1855), pp. 21–22.

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46. Rothbard, *Conceived in Liberty*, 2:54.
47. Thus comments Murray N. Rothbard, *Man, Economy, and State* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), 1:147–48: "There is no requirement, however, that land continue to be used in order for it to continue to be a man's property. Suppose that Jones uses some new land, then finds it unprofitable, and lets it fall into disuse. Or suppose that he clears new land and therefore obtains title to it, but then finds it is no longer useful in production and allows it to remain idle. In a free society, would he lose title? No, for once his labor is mixed with the natural resources, it remains his owned land. His labor has been irretrievably mixed with the land, and the land is therefore his or his assigns' in perpetuity." Also see Carl Watner, *Towards a Proprietary Theory of Justice* (Baltimore: by the author, 1976), p. 8.
48. Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," p. 30. Neither does the federal government rightfully own such land as has never been homesteaded and which falls within the so-called public domain.
49. Royce, *Indian Land Cessions*, p. 538, and Johnson vs. McIntosh, 8 Wheaton 590.
50. Benjamin Tucker, *Liberty*, Whole No. 360 (March 1899), p. 1.
51. Even Ms. Nichols, an advocate of Indian rights to all the land, implies that some holdings by Europeans of Indian land were justly acquired. Otherwise, how could she write: "Fraud also was used by European invaders to obtain land that they could not obtain by voluntary consent" (Nichols, "Right-Wing Rationale," p. 26).

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The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Spring 1983)

The Literature of Isolationism, 1972–1983: A Bibliographical Guide

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In this essay, the author updates his monograph *The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930–1972* (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Ralph Myles, 1972). Only rarely will material from the earlier volume be repeated here. This essay supplements, not replaces, the earlier work. It was originally written in 1980 for a seminar sponsored by the World Without War Council, Berkeley, California, but it is updated even further.

To be called an isolationist wins no popularity contests, and no politician can afford the label. Indeed, the indiscriminate use of this word has done much over the years to cloud serious debate over foreign policy. However, because of American disillusionment with the Vietnam War, it is safe again to express skepticism concerning the nature and scope of United States commitments overseas.

In fact, concern over the current direction of American policy cannot help but color the way many movements in the past are interpreted, and the so-called isolationist movement is no exception. During at least the last twenty years, many scholars have been able to free themselves from the bitter polemics surrounding World War II and have been able to research the movement with fresh eyes. Often the result is a more balanced and thorough appraisal.

The collective efforts of these scholars show a movement of infinite diversity. In their ranks, isolationists included libertarians such as Albert Jay Nock and Frank Chodorov, conservatives such as Herbert Hoover and Robert A. Taft, liberals such as Chester Bowles and Charles A. Beard, socialists such as Norman Thomas, collectivist elitists such as Lawrence Dennis. If financier Joseph P. Kennedy was an isolationist, so was labor leader John L. Lewis. Indeed no element of American society was immune to isolationist sentiments.

Definition

During the 1970's, practically no historian wrestled with the basic nature of isolationism—that is, focused on its causes and explanations—as had such earlier commentators as Ray Allen Billington, Wayne S. Cole, and Samuel Lubell. One

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major exception, Raymond A. Eustus, "Isolationism and World Power," *Diplomatic History* 2 (Spring 1978): 117–29, deals with the period between 1898 and 1914. Yet we have reached a workable consensus on its definition, one ably expressed by Manfred Jonas: "the avoidance of political and military commitments to, or alliances with, foreign powers, particularly those of Europe." Jonas outlines the isolationist posture in his article entitled "Isolationism," published in the second volume of Alexander De Conde, ed., *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas* (New York: Scribner's, 1978), pp. 496–506.

Bibliography

Over the past decade, Justus D. Doenecke has contributed several essays covering research on isolationism: *The Literature of Isolationism* (previously cited); "Isolationism of the 1930's and 1940's: An Historiographical Essay," in R. Sellen and T. Bryson, eds., *American Diplomatic History: Issues and Methods* (Carrollton, Ga.: West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences, 1974), pp. 5–40; and "Beyond Polemics: An Historiographical Re-Appraisal of American Entry into World War II," *History Teacher* 12 (February 1979): 21–52. In "The Anti-Interventionist Tradition: Leadership and Perceptions," *Literature of Liberty: A Review of Contemporary Liberal Thought* 4 (Summer 1981): 7–67, Doenecke combines a review of the scholarly literature with extensive discussion of prominent isolationist leaders and their published works.

Other historians have made efforts to place scholarly literature on isolationism into a wider context. Exceptionally good are Ernest C. Bolt, Jr., "Isolation, Expansion, and Peace: American Foreign Policy Between the Wars," and Gerald K. Haines, "Roads to War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941," both in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, eds., *American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), pages 133–57 and 158–77 respectively. No student of foreign policy should be without Richard Dean Burns and the Society for the Historians of American Foreign Relations, eds., *Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC Clio, 1983). For an imaginative approach, see "The Problem of American Entry into Twentieth Century World War: A Study in Conflicting Historiography" (Ph.D. diss., University of Idaho, 1982), written by William Dixon Newall.

General Studies—The Thirties and World War II

Wayne S. Cole's new volume, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1934–45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), is definitive on Roosevelt's relationship to the most prominent and influential isolationist leaders. The product of over thirty years of research, it is particularly strong on the midwestern progressives whom Cole sees as the backbone of the movement. Manfred Jonas's *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966) has achieved almost classic status for the years it covers.

General Studies—Cold War Era

Many opponents of American participation in World War II remained active

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in the early Cold War years, and Justus D. Doenecke has told their story in *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era* (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1979). His interpretation concerning this group can also be found in: "The Strange Career of American Isolationism," *Peace and Change* 3 (Summer-Fall 1975): 79–83; "Conservatism: The Impassioned Sentiment: A Review Essay," *American Quarterly* 23 (Spring 1977): 601–19; "The Isolationists and a Usable Past: A Review Essay," *Peace and Change* 5 (Spring 1978): 67–73; and "The Legacy of Cold War Isolationism," *USA Today* 109 (July 1980): 64–65. In all these works Doenecke finds the isolationist legacy an ambivalent one, but not one without vision or insight.

Another work casts a wider net than these studies do, for it is not limited to those active in the dispute over Roosevelt's foreign policy. In Tad Galen Carpenter's "The Dissenters: American Isolationists and Foreign Policy, 1945–1954" (Ph. D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1980), the author finds the Cold War gradually eroding the isolationists' ranks. He concludes that, despite their ideological and organizational limitations, they offered relevant and sometimes prophetic criticism of American intervention.

Specific Issues of the Twenties, Thirties, and Early Forties

Certain incidents and issues have received special focus. For discussion of a theme long stressed by isolationists, see David A. Richards, "America Conquers Britain: Anglo-American Conflict in Popular Media during the 1920s," *Journal of American Culture* 3 (Spring 1981): 95–103. In his "Victory in Defeat: The Senatorial Isolationists and the Four-Power Treaty," *Capital Studies* 2 (Spring 1973): 23–38, Thomas N. Guinsburg finds long-term isolationists picking up some surprising allies. Harry Dahlheimer, "The United States, Germany and the Quest for Neutrality, 1933–1937" (Ph. D. diss., University of Iowa, 1976), claims that there was little continuity between the isolationists of the thirties and those of the previous decade. The classic account of the neutrality acts remains Robert A. Divine, *The Illusion of Neutrality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Ernest C. Bolt, Jr.'s *Ballots before Bullets: The War Referendum Approach to Peace in America, 1914–1941* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977) is definitive on its topic. For an able treatment of the 1940 election, see Charles Joseph Errico, "Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Election of 1940" (Ph. D. diss., University of Maryland, 1973). A general discussion of "American Isolationism, 1939–1941" is found in Doenecke's article of that title, *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 6 (Summer/Fall 1982): 201–15.

World Court

The World Court is re-emerging as an object of study. Here two scholars stand out. Gilbert N. Kahn has written "Pressure Group Influence on Foreign Policy Making: A Case Study of United States Efforts to Join the World Court—1935" (Ph. D. diss., New York University, 1972), as well as "Presidential Passivity on a Nonsalient Issue: President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the 1935 World Court Fight," *Diplomatic History* 4 (Spring 1980): 137–60. The other historian is Robert

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D. Accinelli, who has written his dissertation on "The United States and the World Court, 1920–1927" (University of California at Berkeley, 1968). Among Accinelli's numerous published articles, those most important to the historian of isolationism are: "Peace Through Law: The United States and the World Court, 1923–1935," *Canadian Historical Association—Historical Papers, 1972,* pp. 249–61; "The Hoover Administration and the World Court," *Peace and Change* 4 (Fall 1977): 26–36; and "The Roosevelt Administration and the World Court Defeat," *Historian* 40 (May 1978): 463–78.

The Nye Committee and Senator Gerald P. Nye

Major works on Nye and his committee remain John E. Wiltz, *In Search of Peace: The Senate Munitions Inquiry, 1934–1936* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965), and Wayne S. Cole, *Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962). Cole summarizes his analysis of Nye in John N. Schacht, ed., *Three Faces of Midwestern Isolationism* (Iowa City, Iowa: Center for the Study of the Recent History of the United States, 1981), pp. 1–10. Specialized articles include: Lawrence H. Larsen, "Gerald Nye and the Isolationist Argument," *North Dakota History* 47 (Winter 1980): 25–27; J. Garry Clifford, "A Note on the Break Between Senator Nye and President Roosevelt in 1939," *ibid.,* 49 (Summer 1982): 14–17; Robert Jones Leonard, "The Nye Committee: Legislating Against War," *ibid.,* 41 (Fall 1974): 20–28; and Wayne S. Cole, "A Tale of Two Isolationists—Told Three Wars Later," *Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 5 (March 1974): 2–16.

Negotiated Peace

For isolationist dreams of a peace between Hitler and the Western powers, see Doenecke, "Germany in Isolationist Ideology, 1939–1941: The Issue of a Negotiated Peace," in Hans L. Trefousse, ed., *Germany and America: Problems of International Relations and Immigration* (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1981), pp. 215–26. Isolationists occasionally put their hopes in Britain's former prime minister, David Lloyd George, whose views are summarized in A. J. P. Taylor, ed., *Lloyd George: Twelve Essays* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971).

Interventionism

No bibliographical essay devoted to isolationism can offer a thorough account of interventionism as well. One must, however, note Robert Dallek's comprehensive *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), which offers good explanations as to why the movement was long so powerful in Congress.

In his seminal work, *The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), David Reynolds deals with many issues focused on by isolationists. He claims that in 1939, when war broke in Europe, Roosevelt first believed that Allied strategic bombing would preclude the need for another American Expeditionary Force. According to Reynolds, Roosevelt's Charlottesville speech (prom-

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ising major aid to the Allies) was more inspirational than substantive, the mission of Sumner Welles centered on mobilizing neutral Europe behind a compromise peace, and Washington policy-makers, including FDR, initially doubted Churchill's sobriety and balance. When lend-lease was first passed, it was neither outstandingly novel, notably attractive, nor particularly important.

Some new essays are quite suggestive. Charles J. Errico, "The New Deal, Internationalism, and the New American Consensus, 1938–1940," *Maryland Historian* 9 (Spring 1978): 17–31, offers material on convergence between foreign policy internationalism and belief in a welfare state. For the interventionist belief in social control, see Stephen J. Sniegoski, "Unified Democracy: An Aspect of American World War II Interventionist Thought, 1939–1941," *ibid.*, pp. 33–48. Mark M. Lowenthal, "INTREPID and the History of World War II," *Military Affairs* 41 (April 1977): 88–90, debunks later claims by the British security leader in America, William Stevenson, who did much boasting in his *A Man Called Intrepid* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976).

Specific Issues of the Cold War Era

Thomas M. Campbell's *Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944–1945* (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1973) sees a resurgence of isolationism just before and after the Yalta conference. Richard Paul Hedland, "Congress and the British Loan, 1945–1946" (Ph. D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1976), covers one of the first postwar debates that had Cold War overtones. Matthew Edwin Mantell, in his "Opposition to the Korean War: A Study in American Dissent" (Ph. D. diss., New York University, 1973), surveys a variety of dissenters, ranging from pacifists to such senators as William Langer.

Douglas MacArthur

As many isolationists supported MacArthur's presidential ambitions, Carolyn Jane Mattern's "The Man on the Dark Horse: The Presidential Campaign for General Douglas MacArthur, 1944 and 1948" (Ph. D. diss., University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1976) is extremely significant. By tracing conflicts within his campaign organization, Mattern shows that MacArthur's political supporters could not be stereotyped as mere reactionaries and isolationists. One should also note Howard B. Schonberger, "The General and the Presidency: Douglas MacArthur and the Election of 1948," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 57 (Spring 1974): 201–19. MacArthur's 1944 campaign is also covered in D. Clayton James's second volume of *The Years of MacArthur, 1941–1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975). William Manchester's *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880–1964* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978) is often superficial and should be used with caution.

Bricker Amendment

John W. Bricker offers his own reminiscences on his ill-fated efforts to change American treaty law in his "John W. Bricker Reflects upon the Fight for the Bricker Amendment," ed. Marvin R. Zahniser, *Ohio History* 87 (Summer 1978): 322–33. Terence L. Thatcher offers an extensive legal discussion in his "The Bricker Amendment: 1952–54," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly* 69 (Summer 1977): 107–20. Duane

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Arden Tananbaum, "The Bricker Amendment Controversy" (Ph. D. diss., Columbia University, 1980), shows that the dispute made senators examine treaties more carefully and seek a greater share in decision-making.

Organizations

Groups too have been surveyed. Wayne S. Cole's history of the America First Committee, entitled *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), remains definitive. Works had been done on other groups as well. Justus D. Doenecke has examined several bodies, presenting their strengths and weaknesses. See his "Verne Marshall's Leadership of the No Foreign War Committee, 1940," *Annals of Iowa* 41 (Winter 1973): 1153–73; "Noninterventionism of the Left: The Keep America Out of the War Congress, 1938–41," *Journal of Contemporary History* 12 (April 1977): 221–36; and "Toward an Isolationist Braintrust: The Foundation for Foreign Affairs," *World Affairs* 143 (Winter 1980–81): 264–77. Marshall's group, led by the editor of the *Cedar Rapids Gazette*, suffered from bad leadership and disappeared within a few months. The KAOWC was a socialist-pacifist coalition in which Norman Thomas was strong. The FFA was established in 1945 to offer alternatives to Truman foreign policy. Samuel Walker tells the story of the leading front of the Communist Party, U. S. A. in his "Communists and Isolationism: The American Peace Mobilization, 1940–1941," *Maryland Historian* 4 (Spring 1973): 1–12. For a study of a group active during the early Cold War, see Gail Quentin Unruh, "Ultraconservative Distortion: Merwin K. Hart and the National Economic Council" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oregon, 1982). An even more extreme group is described in Frank Paul Mintz, "Liberty Lobby: Vanguard of a Dispossessed Right" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1983).

The Lindberghs

No isolationists have been subject to as much writing as have the Lindberghs. During the heated debate that took place from 1939 to 1941, the prominent aviator Charles A. Lindbergh was subject to more attack than any other leading foe of intervention. Anne Morrow Lindbergh supplements her husband's diary, *The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), with her own diaries: *The Flower and the Nettle: Diaries and Letters, 1936–1939* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976); and *War Within and Without: Diaries and Letters, 1939–1944* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980). In these two volumes, Charles's wife reveals her hatred of Nazism, sympathy for Jews and other subject people, and anger concerning the vilification to which her family was subject. Charles's own memoirs, *Autobiography of Values* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), is disappointing to a historian of anti-interventionism, for it reveals little concerning his own isolationism and the reasoning behind it. For the actual memos of the man who arranged Lindbergh's trips to Germany, see Robert Hessen, ed., *Berlin Alert: The Memoirs and Reports of Truman Smith* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). Smith was American military attaché to Hitler's Reich and a close friend of Lindbergh.

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Wayne S. Cole has done much demythologizing. In his book *Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), Cole disproves long-held beliefs concerning the Lone Eagle's supposed racism, fascism, and anti-Semitism. Indeed, in some ways, Cole finds Lindbergh a prophetic figure, with his "warnings against presidential power, secrecy, and deception in foreign affairs quite relevant to today's world." For Cole's comparison of Lindbergh and Senator Nye, see "A Tale of Two Isolationists—Told Three Wars Later" (previously cited).

Because of the controversy long surrounding him, Lindbergh has been subject to bad history as well as good. One should use Leonard Mosley's *Lindbergh: A Biography* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1976) with extreme care, as the author offers few references, is given to highly colored prose, and occasionally engages in a running debate with his subject. Raymond H. Fredette's "Lindbergh and Munich: A Myth Revived," *Missouri Historical Society Bulletin* 30 (April 1977): 197–202, effectively challenges Mosley's claim that Lindbergh's reports on German strength helped foster the Munich Pact.

The Kennedys

Like the Lindberghs, the Kennedys still engage biographers. Fresh coverage on the man whom Richard J. Whalen calls "the founding father" is offered in David E. Koskoff, *Joseph P. Kennedy: A Life and Times* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), and Michael Beschloss, *Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance* (New York: Norton, 1980). The latter work is based on the Joseph P. Kennedy Papers and hence superior to all other accounts. We now have two dissertations on Kennedy's London years: Roger C. W. Bzerk, "Kennedy and the Court of St. James: The Diplomatic Career of Joseph P. Kennedy, 1938–1940" (Washington State University, 1971); and Jane K. Vieth, "Joseph P. Kennedy: Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1938–1940" (Ohio State University, 1975). In her article "The Donkey and the Lion: The Ambassadorship of Joseph P. Kennedy at the Court of St. James, 1938–1940," *Michigan Academician* 10 (Winter 1978): 273–81, Vieth finds Kennedy a failure as a diplomat. Another essay contributed by Vieth is her "Joseph P. Kennedy and British Appeasement: The Diplomacy of a Boston Irishman," in Kenneth Paul Jones, ed., *U. S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919–1941* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC Clio, 1981), pp. 165–82. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. touches upon the Kennedys' isolationism in his *Robert Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978). The brief flirtation of John F. Kennedy with isolationism is covered in Herbert S. Parmet, *Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Dial, 1980), and Joan and Clay Blair, Jr., *The Search for J. F. K.* (New York: Berkley, Putnam, 1976).

John Foster Dulles

In 1939, when he wrote *War, Peace and Change* (New York: Harpers, 1939), John Foster Dulles argued for recognizing the needs of "have-not" nations. No efforts at collective security could work, he went on, that did not permit alteration of the status quo. Ronald W. Preussen, *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power*

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(New York: Free Press, 1982), is usually most thorough, but it underplays Dulles's isolationist sentiments before Pearl Harbor. So too do both Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), and Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1973). Surprisingly enough, Albert N. Keim, "John Foster Dulles and the Protestant World Order Movement on the Eve of World War II," *Journal of Church and State* 21 (Winter 1979): 73–89, conveys far more than the title suggests, for it notes how Dulles fell increasingly into the anti-interventionist camp.

Herbert Hoover

Two recent biographies of Hoover touch on his isolationism, though far more is needed. Joan Hoff Wilson, *Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), relates her subject's anti-interventionism to Hoover's domestic vision of a decentralized but corporatist society. David Burner, *Herbert Hoover: A Public Life* (New York: Knopf, 1979), puts Hoover's isolationism in a broader context, one that notes Hoover's initial support for American entry into World War I and for American entry into the League. Wilton Eckley, *Herbert Hoover* (Boston: Twayne, 1980), offers a useful overview of Hoover's own writings. For the most comprehensive treatment of Hoover's rich career when he left the White House, a career that revealed an isolationism seldom seen before, see Gary Dean Best, *Herbert Hoover: The Postpresidential Years, 1933–1964,* 2 vols. (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Press, 1983). Best summarizes some findings in his "Totalitarianism or Peace: Herbert Hoover and the Road to War, 1939–1941," *Annals of Iowa* 44 (Winter 1979): 519–29. For a detailed look at Hoover during the Cold War, see Donald J. Mrozek's "Progressive Dissenter: Herbert Hoover's Opposition to Truman's Overseas Military Policy," *ibid.*, 43 (Spring 1976): 275–91. For an essay that focuses on "The Anti-Interventionism of Herbert Hoover," see the paper on that topic by Justus D. Doenecke, delivered at a conference on the Hoover presidency at the Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, on April 13, 1982. The paper is scheduled for publication under auspices of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association. Needed now is a book on Hoover's National Committee on Food for the Small Democracies, an effort Hoover promoted to feed occupied Europe in the two years before Pearl Harbor.

Revisionism

Since 1970, there have been studies of several scholars who were extremely critical of American intervention in World War II. Frederick Lewis Honhart III, "Charles Callan Tansill: American Diplomatic Historian" (Ph. D. diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1972), finds Tansill's opposition to World Wars I and II partially rooted in his deep ties to the Old South, a region he perceived as strongly committed to a stable social order. Robert Hobbs Myers, "William Henry Chamberlin: His Views of the Soviet Union" (Ph. D. diss., Indiana University, 1973), finds the militant anti-communism of this noted journalist to be based upon his skepticism towards all state-imposed solutions to economic disorder. Far

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more is needed on Chamberlin, however, for he commented on much aside from Russia and offered more learned rationales of his isolationism than Myers deals with.

For recent treatment of the nation's leading revisionist, see Thomas C. Kennedy, *Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy* (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1975); John Braeman, "The Historian as Activist: Charles A. Beard and the New Deal," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 79 (Autumn 1980): 364–74; Braeman, "Charles A. Beard: Historian and Progressive," in Marvin C. Swanson, ed., *Charles A. Beard: An Observance of the Centennial of His Birth* (Greencastle, Ind.: De Pauw University Press, 1976), pp. 74–77; and Ellen Nore, *Charles A. Beard: A Biography* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983). In her work, which includes a doctoral dissertation of the same title (Stanford University, 1980), Nore shows much appreciation of Beard's anti-interventionism.

For the arguments of two prominent scholars of international law, see Justus D. Doenecke, "Edwin M. Borchard, John Bassett Moore, and Opposition to American Intervention in World War II," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 6 (Winter 1982): 1–34. Moore's name was almost synonymous with scholarship in the field; he served on the Columbia faculty from 1891 to 1924, edited the famous *Digest of International Law* (1906), and was the first United States judge on the Permanent Court of International Justice. Borchard, professor at Yale University Law School from 1917 to 1950, was best known among isolationists for his *Neutrality for the United States* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1937; rev. 1940). In the essay, Doenecke notes that isolationists usually did not avail themselves of arguments based on the absolutist concept of international law espoused by Borchard and Moore; they preferred to argue on the basis of more "practical" economic and social reasons.

Harry Elmer Barnes

Much work has been done on Harry Elmer Barnes, one of the most polemical of the revisionists. Through his long career, Barnes was a perennial iconoclast, backing a diversity of reforms ranging from Sweden's mixed economy to the abolition of capital punishment. Toward the end of his life, Barnes went so far in his revisionism as to attempt to establish that Roosevelt had foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor, that Hitler was lenient towards Poland on the eve of the Danzig incident, and that the Nazis never had a systematic policy of exterminating the Jewish people.

Foremost in research on Barnes is Roy Carroll Turnbaugh's doctoral dissertation, "Harry Elmer Barnes: The Quest for Truth and Justice" (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977), a full-scale biography that includes extensive discussion of his isolationism. Turnbaugh's work is often critical of Barnes, but does much with Barnes's seldom-treated columns in the *New York World-Telegram.* For more of Turnbaugh's detailed work on Barnes, see his "Harry Elmer Barnes and World War I Revisionism: An Absence of Dialogue," *Peace and Change* 5 (Fall 1978): 63–69; and "The FBI and Harry Elmer Barnes: 1936–1944," *Historian* 42 (May 1980): 385–98. Justus D. Doenecke addresses issues of Barnes's World War II revisionism and historical "presentism" in "Harry Elmer Barnes," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 56 (Summer 1973): 311–23, and "Harry Elmer Barnes:

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Prophet of a 'Usable' Past,'' *History Teacher* 8 (Fall 1975): 265-76. As if to prove that some aspects of Barnes's revisionism are not dead, the Cato Institute published selected essays under the title *Revisionism: A Key to Peace* (San Francisco, 1980).

Pearl Harbor

It is hardly surprising that the Pearl Harbor attack still generates much controversy. John Toland, *Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1982), presents the view held by many old isolationists, namely that Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the attack. On the other hand, Gordon W. Prange, *At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981), sees no such conspiracy. Prange places the bulk of the blame—though not all—on the American commanders in Hawaii. Hans L. Trefousse, *Pearl Harbor: The Continuing Controversy* (Malibar, Fla.: Robert E. Krieger, 1982), systematically challenges one revisionist claim after another. *On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson* (Washington, D. C.: Naval History Division of the Department of the Navy, 1973), is uneven but illuminating. For a scholarly discussion of an issue once emphasized by isolationists and one that Toland tried to link to the Pearl Harbor attack, see Warren F. Kimball and Bruce Bartlett, ''Roosevelt and Prewar Commitments to Churchill: The Tyler Kent Affair,'' *Diplomatic History* 5 (Fall 1981): 291–311. They find little to the ''exposés'' claimed by Kent, a decoding clerk in the American embassy in London in 1940.

After years of neglect, we have several works on the various investigations into the disaster. The theme of Bruce R. Bartlett's *Cover-Up: The Politics of Pearl Harbor, 1941–1946* (Westport, Conn.: Arlington House, 1979), is aptly conveyed in the book's title. For two studies on the investigations that had their roots in doctoral research, see Martin V. Melosi, *The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Political Controversy over the Surprise Attack* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1977), and William Paul Iles, ''In Quest of Blame: Inquiries Conducted 1941–1946 into American Involvement in the Pacific War'' (Ph. D. diss., University of Iowa, 1978). Melosi also offers some findings in ''Political Tremors from a Military Disaster: 'Pearl Harbor' and the Election of 1944,'' *Diplomatic History* 1 (Winter 1977): 79–95, and ''National Security Misused: The Aftermath of Pearl Harbor,'' *Prologue* 9 (Summer 1977): 75–89.

Conservative and Rightist Spokesmen

No student of American conservatism can afford to neglect George H. Nash's balanced and thorough book *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945* (New York: Basic Books, 1976). Nash notes, even if in passing, the opposition many of his subjects had to American entry into World War II. Furthermore, he traces the long-standing differences between the more isolationist libertarians of the early Cold War and the more interventionist conservatives and militant anti-Communists. The transformation is shown on the political level in David W. Reinhard, *The Republican Right since 1945* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983). For another treatment of this transformation, see Michael M.

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Miles, *The Odyssey of the American Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980). Hawkish sentiments among elements of the population that were once strongly isolationist are found in Jonathan Martin Kolkey, "The Radical Right, 1960–1968" (Ph. D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 1979), and William F. Crandell, "A Party Divided Against Itself: Anticommunism and the Transformation of the Republican Right, 1945–1956" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1983).

Certain individuals in particular have been the subject of fresh research. Michele Flynn Stenehjem, *An American First: John T. Flynn and the America First Committee* (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1976), ably captures the passion surrounding the interventionist controversy of 1940–41 while empathizing with Flynn himself. Students should not neglect the superb doctoral dissertation by Richard C. Frey, Jr., "John T. Flynn and the United States in Crisis, 1928–1950" (University of Oregon, 1969), a more analytical work than Stenehjem's and one that places Flynn's career in a much wider context.

For a provocative treatment of five prominent isolationists, see Ronald Radosh's *Prophets on the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). In his discussion of Flynn, Beard, Senator Robert A. Taft, journalist Oswald Garrison Villard, and elitist commentator Lawrence Dennis, Radosh stresses their anti-interventionism. He writes, "We will learn much from their journeys and courage." Radosh has also written an appreciative preface to Flynn's *As We Go Marching* (1944; New York: Free Life, 1973), a book that claimed that Roosevelt was leading the United States towards fascism.

Justus D. Doenecke offers two detailed studies of the foreign policy views of Lawrence Dennis, who is often represented in the popular press as a "fascist" intellectual. See Doenecke's "The Isolationist as Collectivist: Lawrence Dennis and the Coming of World War II," *Journal of Libertarian Studies* 3 (Summer 1979): 191–208, and "Lawrence Dennis: Revisionist of the Cold War," *Wisconsin Magazine of History* 55 (Summer 1972): 275–86. Doenecke will discuss Dennis's newsletters *The Weekly Foreign Letter* and *The Appeal to Reason* in the forthcoming anthology *The American Conservative Press*, edited by Ronald Lora and William H. Longton.

Other dissenters are being examined. In John Muresianu's unpublished dissertation, "War of Ideas: American Intellectuals and the World Crisis, 1938–1945" (Harvard University, 1982), the author discusses such isolationists as Dwight Macdonald, William Henry Chamberlin, and Charles Clayton Morrison. Denials that H. L. Mencken ever sympathized with National Socialism are offered in Frank Turaj, "Mencken and the Nazis: A Note," *Maryland Historical Magazine* 67 (Summer 1972): 176–78, and Dean Banks, "H. L. Mencken and 'Hitlerism,' 1933–1941: A Patrician Libertarian Besieged," *ibid.*, 71 (Winter 1976): 498–515. Michael Wreszin, *Superfluous Anarchist: Albert Jay Nock* (Providence, R. I.: Brown University Press, 1972), gives a critical view of a rightist libertarian. For the story of an exciting intellectual relationship, see Charles G. Nitsche, "Albert Jay Nock and Frank Chodorov: Case Studies in Recent American Individualist and Anti-Statist Thought" (Ph. D. diss., University of Maryland, 1981). Some of Chodorov's

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isolationist essays are included in Charles H. Hamilton, ed., *Fugitive Essays: Selected Writings of Frank Chodorov* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1980). Hamilton's essay on Chodorov's journal *analysis*, a weekly that even betrayed its individualism by putting the first letter in lower case, will appear in the Lora-Longton anthology, *The American Conservative Press* (previously cited). In his *Ezra Pound: The Last Rower* (New York: Viking, 1976), C. David Heymann draws upon recently released files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to offer a political profile of the famed poet, a man who broadcast pro-fascist messages from Italy during World War II. See also "Ezra Pound's Anti-Semitism" by Ben D. Kimpel and T. C. Duncan Eaves in the *South Atlantic Quarterly* 81 (Winter 1982): 56–69. Fresh material on a German-American propagandist is found in Elmer Gertz, *Odyssey of a Barbarian: The Biography of George Sylvester Viereck* (Buffalo, N. Y.: Prometheus Books, 1979).

Isolationist radio commentators Boake Carter and Fulton Lewis, Jr. are covered with the more powerful interventionist counterparts in David H. Culbert, *News for Everyone: Radio and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976). To follow the conversion of a prominent broadcaster who once had isolationist leanings, see Alfred Haworth Jones, "The Making of an Interventionist on the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News, 1939–1941," *Pacific Historical Review* 42 (February 1973): 74–93.

With the passage of time, more anti-interventionists have contributed their memoirs. Felix Morley's *For the Record* (South Bend, Ind.: Regnery/Gateway, 1979) shows the former editor of the *Washington Post* a strong opponent of both World War II and Cold War involvements. For more on Morley's relation to the *Post*, see Chalmers M. Roberts, *The Washington Post: The First Hundred Years* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977). John Chamberlain's *A Life with the Printed Word* (Chicago: Regnery, Gateway, 1982) indicates how an anti-interventionist could still stay close to journals published by Henry Luce. One should not neglect Frank Annunziata's fine interpretive essay, "The Political Thought of John Chamberlain: Continuity and Conversion," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 74 (Winter 1975): 53–73. Henry Regnery's *Memoirs of a Dissident Publisher* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979) reveals that one can be revisionist on the Second World War while hawkish concerning the Cold War. In George T. Eggleston's *Roosevelt, Churchill, and the World War II Opposition: A Revisionist Autobiography* (Old Greenwich, Conn.: Devin-Adair, 1979), the former editor-in-chief of *Scribner's Commentator* gives his view of the controversial isolationist digest and his prosecution by the Roosevelt administration.

Nazi and Fascist Activities

In the past decade, much work has been done on domestic fascism. Leland V. Bell's *In Hitler's Shadow: The Anatomy of American Nazism* (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat, 1973) and Sander A. Diamond's *The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924–1941* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974) find little strength within any American brand of National Socialism. Students should also note: Ronald W. Johnson, "The German-American Bund and Nazi Germany: 1936–1941,"

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Studies in History and Society 6 (Spring 1975): 31–45; Arthur L. Smith, Jr., "The Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party and the United States, 1931–39"; and Sander A. Diamond, "The Bund Movement in the United States: An Overview," the latter two in Trefousse, *Germany and America* (previously cited), pages 173–82 and 183–98 respectively. Finally published is Gaetano Salvemini's report of 1943, *Italian Fascist Activities in the United States,* ed. Philip V. Cannistraro (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1977), in which a distinguished Italian medievalist and politician combines a thorough account with impassioned rhetoric. For the story of an American who was in the pay of the Japanese puppet government of "Manchukuo," see Frederick B. Hoyt, "George Bronson Rea: From Old China Hand to Apologist for Japan," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 69 (April 1978): 61–70.

Father Coughlin

Father Charles E. Coughlin has been the subject of several new studies. In his *Father Coughlin: The Tumultuous Life of the Priest of the Little Flower* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), Sheldon Marcus updates the traditional picture of the radio priest. For a balanced treatment of Coughlin's early career, see Alan Brinkley, *Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and the Great Depression* (New York: Knopf, 1982). Richard A. Davis's doctoral thesis, "Radio Priest: The Public Career of Father Charles Edward Coughlin" (University of North Carolina, 1974), delves into his relationship with the Roman Catholic Church. Philip V. Cannistraro and Theodore P. Kovaleff, "Father Coughlin and Mussolini: Impossible Allies," *Journal of Church and State* 13 (Autumn 1971): 445–64, describes Coughlin's abortive overtures to the Italian dictator. Coughlin looks back on his own career in a special interview in Robert S. Gallagher, "The Radio Priest," *American Heritage* 23 (October 1972): 39–41, 100–109. Fresh scholarship is found in Mary Christine Athons, "The Fahey-Couglin Connection: Father Denis Fahey, C.S.S.P., Charles E. Coughlin, and Religious Anti-Semitism in the United States, 1938–1954" (Ph. D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, 1982).

Domestic Demagogues

Coughlin, of course, was not the only populist demagogue. Geoffrey S. Smith's *To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1973) covers Coughlin, Bundist leader Fritz Kuhn, and Silver Shirt leader William Dudley Pelley. In the process, Smith notes the success of the Roosevelt administration in linking mainline anti-interventionists to the lunatic fringe. See also Smith's "Isolationism, the Devil, and the Advent of World War II: Variations on a Theme," *International History Review* 4 (February 1982): 55–89.

In his book *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Right from the Great Depression to the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), Leo P. Ribuffo examines the careers of Pelley, Gerald L. K. Smith, and Gerald Winrod. He attempts to understand such extremism in light of certain fundamentalist and cultic strains in their thinking, and in the process he describes what he calls the "brown scare" of the 1940's. Ribuffo also offers some preliminary findings in his "Fascists, Nazis

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and the American Mind: Perceptions and Preconceptions," *American Quarterly* 26 (October 1974): 417–32.

For a journalistic account of the latter career of Gerald L. K. Smith, see John Fergus Ryan, "Twilight Years of a Kindly Old Hatemonger," *Esquire* 70 (August 1968): 88–91. One should also note two dissertations: John McIntire Werly, "The Millenarian Right: William Dudley Pelley and the Silver Legion of America" (Syracuse University, 1972); and Gail Ann Sindell, "Gerald B. Winrod and the *Defender:* A Case Study of the Radical Right" (Case Western Reserve University, 1973).

The Congress—The Thirties and World War II

Superior work continues to be done on isolationism and the Congress. For a specialized study on the interwar period, see Thomas N. Guinsburg, *The Pursuit of Isolationism in the United States Senate from Versailles to Pearl Harbor* (New York: Garland, 1982). Here Guinsburg covers such topics as the League of Nations, the Four Power Pact (1921), the World Court, the Kellogg Pact, the neutrality acts, and lend-lease. Guinsburg has drawn upon interviews with various isolationist leaders in the "Ebb Tide of American Isolationism: The Senate Debate on the Arms Embargo, 1937–1939," *Canadian Historical Association—Historical Papers, 1972,* pp. 313–34. David L. Porter has contributed two fine books: *Congress and the Waning of the New Deal* (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat, 1980); and *The Seventy-sixth Congress and World War II, 1939–1940* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1979). The latter is particularly important for students of isolationism, for it examines neutrality revision, aid to Finland, and selective service. One dissertation, John A. Dreier's "The Politics of Isolationism: A Quantitative Study of Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, 1937–1941" (University of Kentucky Press, 1977), finds political partisanship the single most important determinant in foreign policy voting; division over intervention followed logically from division over the New Deal. We now have a collective biography, one that includes a host of isolationists: William E. Borah, Charles McNary, Peter Norbeck, Lynn Frazier, Henrik Shipstead, Gerald P. Nye, and Robert M. La Follette, Jr. This is Ronald L. Feinman, *Twilight of Progressivism: The Western Republican Senators and the New Deal* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981).

The Congress—The Cold War Era

Serious work is now being done on Cold War Congresses. Congressional isolationists are skillfully covered in several dissertations: Joan Lee Bryniarski, "Against the Tide: Senate Opposition to the Internationalist Foreign Policy of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, 1943–1949" (University of Maryland, 1972); Thomas Philipose, "The 'Loyal Opposition': Republican Leaders and Foreign Policy, 1943–1946" (University of Denver, 1972); and David R. Kepley, "Challenge to Bipartisanship: Senate Republicans and American Foreign Policy, 1948–1952" (University of Maryland, 1979). Mary K. Atwell's dissertation, "Congressional Opponents of Early Cold War Legislation" (St. Louis University, 1974), focuses on the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. For treatment of such Great

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Plains isolationists as William Langer, William F. Lemke, and Usher L. Burdick, see Robert Griffith, "Old Progressives and the Cold War," *Journal of American History* 66 (September 1979): 334–47. John T. Rourke indicts what he calls congressional parochialism in his "Congress and the Cold War," *World Affairs* 139 (Spring 1977): 259–77, an essay dealing with the years 1945–1947. Richard S. Grimmett asks for more accurate labeling of a number of senators mistakenly called isolationists, among them Joseph R. McCarthy, Styles Bridges, Bourke H. B. Hickenlooper, and William F. Knowland. See his "Who Were the Senate Isolationists?" *Pacific Historical Review* 49 (November 1973): 479–98.

Robert A. Taft

At long last, after two decades of polemical literature, we have a thorough and balanced account of Robert Taft in James T. Patterson's *Mr. Republican: A Biography* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972). Patterson notes the haunting questions Taft raised concerning such issues as presidential power and military alliances, but finds him expediential—particularly during the Cold War—on Asian policy and loyalty issues. In addition, Patterson has written two articles on the Ohio senator: "Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1945," in Leonard P. Liggio and James J. Martin, eds., *Watershed of Empire: Essays on New Deal Foreign Policy* (Colorado Springs, Colo.: Ralph Myles, 1976), pp. 183–207; and "Alternatives to Globalism: Robert A. Taft and American Foreign Policy, 1939–1945," *Historian* 36 (August 1974): 670–88. Here Patterson sees Taft guilty of the same excessive moralism he was quick to perceive in others.

Others too have written on Taft. Samuel De John, in his doctoral dissertation "Robert A. Taft, Economic Conservatism, and Opposition to United States Foreign Policy, 1944–1951" (University of Southern California, 1976), argues that anxieties over the fate of local government and free enterprise caused Taft to oppose Truman's collective security policies, policies that the Ohio senator sought to replace by air power and control of sea lanes. To Geoffrey Matthews, a Taft presidency in the 1940's and 1950's would have provided insufficient world leadership. However, he finds that much of Taft's constitutional position was justified. See Matthews, "Robert A. Taft, the Constitution, and American Foreign Policy, 1939–53," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17 (July 1982): 507–22. Leonard P. Liggio presents the argument that Taft's view of the international system was gained from his close friend Herbert Hoover. Note Liggio, "A New Look at Robert A. Taft" (Paper delivered at a joint session of the American Historical Association and the Conference on Peace Research in History, San Francisco, December 28, 1973).

Arthur H. Vandenberg

Arthur H. Vandenberg remains the subject of much research. C. David Tompkins, *Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: The Evolution of a Modern Republican, 1884–1945* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970), remains standard on the period it covers. Thomas Michael Hill finds Vandenberg's transformation from isolationist to internationalist less complete than it appeared, for the

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Michigan senator still opposed the expansionist objectives of liberal internationalism and rejected power politics as the basis of international relations. See Hill, "Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Politics of Bipartisanship, and the Origins of Anti-Soviet Consensus, 1941–1946," *World Affairs* 138 (Winter 1975–1976): 219–41. For limits upon his bipartisanship, note James A. Fetzer, "Senator Vandenberg and the American Commitment to China, 1945–1950," *Historian* 36 (February 1974): 283–303. In his article "Senator Vandenberg, Bipartisanship and the Origins of United Nations' Article 51," *Mid-America* 60 (April 1978): 163–69, Philip J. Briggs shows Vandenberg retaining his strong nationalism. For a more traditional picture, one stressing Vandenberg's "conversion" to internationalism, see James A. Gazell, "Arthur H. Vandenberg, Internationalism, and the United Nations," *Political Science Quarterly* 88 (September 1973): 375–94.

Hiram Johnson

More is now being published on the volatile California senator, Hiram Johnson, though a full-scale biography is still needed. Here one should begin with Howard A. De Witt, "Hiram Johnson and American Foreign Policy" (Ph. D. diss., University of Arizona, 1972). De Witt indicates wide divergencies between Johnson and William E. Borah in his "Hiram Johnson and Early New Deal Diplomacy, 1933–1934," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 53 (Winter 1974): 377–86. In an article "The 'New' Harding and American Foreign Policy: Warren G. Harding, Hiram W. Johnson, and Pragmatic Diplomacy," *Ohio History* 86 (Spring 1977): 96–114, De Witt notes that Johnson was unable to criticize Harding's more internationalist foreign policy effectively, as the president skillfully manipulated public opinion and politics alike.

De Witt is not the only Johnson scholar. Richard Coke Lower finds that Johnson opposed U. S. entry in the League not so much because of anxieties concerning sovereignty as out of fear of continual participation in international strife. See Lower's "Hiram Johnson: The Making of an Irreconcilable," *Pacific Historical Review* 48 (November 1972): 505–26. For efforts to tie Johnson's isolationism to his progressivism, see Peter G. Boyle, "The Roots of Isolationism: A Case Study," *Journal of American Studies* 6 (April 1972): 41–50.

The La Follettes

David P. Thelen summarized the career of the most famous member of the La Follette family in his *Robert M. La Follette and the Insurgent Spirit* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976). Patrick J. Maney's *"Young Bob" La Follette: A Biography of Robert M. La Follette, Jr., 1895–1953* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978) discusses his isolationism, which the author finds rooted in hostility to both Europe and presidential power. For new background on La Follette's brother, see John Edward Miller, *Governor Philip La Follette, the Wisconsin Progressives, and the New Deal* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1982). Miller notes how World War II split the La Follettes' Progressive Party, thereby weakening any efforts to secure a national political realignment.

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Jeanette Rankin

Much work has been done on Congresswoman Jeanette Rankin: Hannah Josephson, *First Lady in Congress: Jeanette Rankin* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1974); Ted Carlton Harris, "Jeanette Rankin: Suffragist, First Woman Elected to Congress, and Pacifist" (Ph. D. diss., University of Georgia, 1972); Joan Hoff Wilson, " 'Peace is a Woman's Job . . . . ': Jeanette Rankin and American Foreign Policy," *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 30 (Winter 1980): 39–53; and Helen L. W. Bonner, "The Jeanette Rankin Story" (Ph. D. diss., Ohio University, 1982). Rankin was prominent not just for her general peace and suffrage work, but for having cast the sole Congressional vote against American entry into the Second World War.

Political Figures

Though space does not permit extensive coverage of the World War I era, one should note the several new studies of Henry Cabot Lodge. William C. Widenor, *Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), finds Lodge governed by far more than political expediency. See also David Mervin, "Henry Cabot Lodge and the League of Nations," *Journal of American Studies* 4 (August 1972): 201–14. Kendrick A. Clements offers a fresh interpretation of the Great Commoner in his *William Jennings Bryan, Missionary Isolationist* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983). John Milton Cooper, Jr., *The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and World War I, 1914–1917* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1969), and Ralph Stone, *The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations* (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 1970), remain definitive on their subjects.

Certain individual members of Congress have been studied. Senator William Langer, probably the most consistent isolationist of the early Cold War Congresses, is the subject of Glenn H. Smith's *Langer of North Dakota: A Study in Isolationism, 1940–1959* (New York: Garland, 1979). Donald E. Spritzer, "Senators in Conflict," *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 23 (April 1973): 16–33, discusses the fight between isolationist Burton K. Wheeler and interventionist James Murray. Far more detail on Wheeler is offered in John T. Anderson, "Senator Burton K. Wheeler and United States Foreign Relations" (Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 1982). Here Anderson argues that Wheeler's lifelong anti-interventionism proceeded logically from his progressive political convictions. David L. Porter, "Ohio Representative John M. Vorys and the Arms Embargo in 1939," *Ohio History* 84 (Spring 1974): 110–13, shows Vorys far more hawkish towards Japan than towards Germany. Studies of various other legislators include: John W. Partin, "The Dilemma of a 'A Good, Very Good Man': Capper and Noninterventionism, 1936–1941," *Kansas History* 2 (Summer 1979): 86–95; and Mary W. Atwell, "A Conservative Response to the Cold War: Senator James P. Kem and Foreign Aid," *Capital Studies* 4 (Fall 1976): 53–65. Justus F. Paul's *Senator Hugh Butler and Nebraska Republicanism* (Lincoln: Nebraska State Historical Society,

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1976), stresses Butler as politico. Jerome E. Edwards discusses a powerful senator who combined his isolationism with red-baiting in his *Pat McCarran: Political Boss of Nevada* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1982). However, one should not neglect Von Veron Pittman's "Senator Patrick A. McCarran and the Politics of Containment" (Ph. D. diss., University of Georgia, 1979). One of the more staunch Congressional isolationists is discussed in John A. Samosky, "Congressman Noah Morgan Mason: Illinois Conservative Spokesman," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 76 (Spring 1983): 35–48. The early and spotty views of a man once junior senator from Missouri are covered in Wilson S. Miscamble, "The Evolution of an Internationalist: Harry S. Truman and American Foreign Policy," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 23 (August 1977): 268–83.

Doctoral dissertations continue to be extremely valuable. Peter Baldwin Buckley's "Daniel A. Reed: A Study in Conservatism" (Clark University, 1972) looks at the influential and feisty congressman from upstate New York in terms of a declining rural environment. In Richard Rollin Chenoweth's "Francis Case: A Political Biography" (University of Nebraska, 1977), the author notes that, even during the Cold War, the Dakota congressman continued to oppose long-term international commitments. Coverage of a far more extreme isolationist is found in Paul Poder, "The Senatorial Career of William E. Jenner" (University of Notre Dame, 1976), and Rodney Joel Ross, "Senator William E. Jenner: A Study in Cold War Isolationism" (Pennsylvania State University, 1974). John Raymond Taylor's "Homer E. Capehart: United States Senator, 1944–1962" (Ball State University, 1977) and William B. Pickett's "Homer E. Capehart: The Making of a Hoosier Senator" (Indiana University, 1974) tell of a manufacturer-politician who never ventured from Taft Republicanism. Donald Edwin Walker's "The Congressional Career of Clare E. Hoffman, 1935–1963" (Michigan State University, 1982) traces the career of a strong isolationist and foe of organized labor thought to be more conservative than his constituents.

Not all isolationists were in Congress. For the life of a Utah politician who received national attention for his attacks on the United Nations, see Devins L. Lythgee, *Let 'Em Holler: A Political Biography of J. Bracken Lee* (Salt Lake City: Utah State Historial Society, 1982). And for the early isolationism of a man who later became an impassioned internationalist, see J. Samuel Walker, "Henry A. Wallace as Agrarian Isolationist, 1921–1930," *Agricultural History* 49 (July 1975): 532–48. A leading State Department figure is discussed, if far too briefly and simplistically, in Martin B. Hickman and Ray C. Hillam, "J. Reuben Clark, Jr.: Political Isolationism Revisited," *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 7 (Spring 1972): 37–46.

Converts to Intervention

Arthur Vandenberg was not the only political figure to convert to a more interventionist position. For two works on a famous politician who, before Pearl Harbor, could sound quite isolationist, see Barry K. Beyer, *Thomas E. Dewey, 1937–1947: A Study in Political Leadership* (New York: Garland, 1979), and Richard Norton Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times* (New York: Simon and

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Schuster, 1982). For another transition, see Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, "Senator Everett M. Dirksen and American Foreign Policy: From Isolationism to Cold War Internationalism," *The Old Northwest* 7 (Winter 1981–1982): 359–72. Other material on Dirksen includes "Everett M. Dirksen of Pekin: Politician Par Excellence," by the Schapsmeiers, and "Everett McKinley Dirksen: The Roots of an American Statesman," both in *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 76 (Spring 1983), pp. 3–16, 17–34 respectively.

An earlier about-face is traced in Thomas N. Guinsburg's "The George W. Norris 'Conversion' to Internationalism, 1939–1941," *Nebraska History* 53 (Winter 1972): 477–90. The definitive work on Norris is Richard Lowett's *George W. Norris,* 3 vols. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963–1978). Harl A. Dalstrom's "The Defeat of George W. Norris in 1942," *Nebraska History* 59 (Spring 1978): 231–58, shows how the Nebraska senator lost to the more isolationist Kenneth S. Wherry.

Business

We have additional material on business aspects of isolationism, though far more needs to be done. Justus D. Doenecke notes how isolationists stressed national self-sufficiency at the expense of Asian, European, and Latin American markets. See his "Power, Markets, and Ideology: The Isolationist Response to Roosevelt Policy, 1940–1941," in Liggio and Martin, *Watershed of Empire* (previously cited), pp. 132–61. Doenecke also describes the career of the prominent Chicago merchant who headed the America First Committee in "General Robert E. Wood: The Evolution of a Conservative," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 71 (August 1978): 162–75, and in an essay on Wood in Schacht, *Three Faces of Midwestern Isolationism* (previously cited), pp. 11–22. For a first-class dissertation on its topic, see Jonathan Evers Boe, "American Business: The Response to the Soviet Threat, 1933–1947" (Stanford University, 1979). William Arthur Weinrich, "Business and Foreign Affairs: The Roosevelt Defense Program, 1937–1941" (Ph. D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1971), offers many citations from the business press.

Labor

If business still needs extensive study, labor requires even more. Le Roy J. Lenburg's "The CIO and American Foreign Policy, 1935–1955" (Ph. D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1973) finds that the often divided Congress of Industrial Organizations had little effect on American foreign relations. In their book *John L. Lewis: A Biography* (New York: Quadrangle, 1977), Melvin Dubovsky and Warren Van Tine question any stress laid on the CIO founder's supposed ties to Germany. For additional analysis, see Dubovsky's essay on Lewis in Schacht, *Three Faces of Midwestern Isolationism* (previously cited), pp. 23–33. Hugh Ross discusses Lewis's isolationism in his "John L. Lewis and the Election of 1940," *Labor History* 17 (Spring 1976): 160–89. A wider focus is found in Timothy Roger Dzierba, "Organized Labor and the Coming of World War II, 1937–1947" (Ph. D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1983).

The Democratic Left

Donald L. Miller's *The New American Radicalism: Alfred M. Bingham and*

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Non-Marxian Insurgency in the New Deal Era (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat, 1979) gives us the first major study of the founder of the radical monthly *Common Sense*. In a particularly trenchant chapter, Miller shows how the interventionists of World War II laid the ideological foundation for a tough-minded Cold War stance based upon a "gloomy neo-realism." S. A. Longstaff, "*Partisan Review* and the Second World War," *Salmagundi,* no. 43 (Winter 1979), pp. 108–29, discusses such left isolationists as Dwight Macdonald. Alexander M. Bloom's doctoral thesis, "The New York Intellectuals: The Formation of a Community," (Boston College, 1979), also focuses on the *Partisan Review.* For the story of V. F. Calverton's journal, see Haim Genizi, "The *Modern Quarterly,* 1923–1940: An Independent Radical Magazine," *Labor History* 15 (Spring 1974): 199–215.

Some individuals have been the subject of special attention. In his autobiography *A Child of Two Centuries* (New York: Stein and Day, 1981), Bertram D. Wolfe concludes by noting his opposition to American entry into World War II. Stephen J. Whitefield's *Scott Nearing: Apostle of American Radicalism* (New York: Catholic University Press, 1974) tells of the odyssey of a utopian thinker whose activities involved communism, socialism, and pacifism. For able treatment of the nation's leading philosopher, see Charles F. Howlett, *Troubled Philosopher: John Dewey and the Struggle for World Peace* (Port Washington, N. Y.: Kennikat, 1977), and John P. Diggins, "John Dewey in Peace and War," *American Scholar* 50 (Spring 1981): 213–30. Will and Ariel Durant, *A Dual Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977), touches upon their opposition to war. In David E. Shi's *Matthew Josephson, Bourgeois Bohemian* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), the isolationism of a prominent muckraker is fully explored.

Norman Thomas

James Duram offers a brief sketch of a man who was once the nation's leading Socialist in his *Norman Thomas* (New York: Twayne, 1974). For a more thorough if meandering biography, see W. A. Swanberg, *Norman Thomas: The Last Idealist* (New York: Scribners, 1976). A respectful critique of Thomas's anti-interventionism is found in Frank A. Warren, *An Alternative Vision: The Socialist Party in the 1930's* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974). Thomas is also the subject of John Dennis McGreen, "Norman Thomas and the Search for the All-Inclusive Socialist Party" (Ph. D. diss., Rutgers University, 1976). Here the author claims that, had the Socialist Party been more realistic in responding to fascism, it would have avoided internal schism and survived as an independent force. Stephen Mark Gens, "Paranoia Bordering on Resignation: Norman Thomas and the American Socialist Party, 1939–1948" (Ph. D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1982), argues that the Soviet Union, the Communist Party, U.S.A., and the two-party system doomed the American Socialist Party.

Stalinists and Trotskyists

Several recent studies have been made of Trotkyists and Stalinists. Constance Ashton Myers, *The Prophet's Army: Trotskyists in America, 1928–1941* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), covers her topic well. Samuel Walker tells the

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story of the leading isolationist front of the Communist Party, U. S. A. in his "Communists and Isolationism: The American Peace Mobilization, 1940–1941," *Maryland Historian* 4 (Spring 1973): 1–12. Maurice Isserman's *Which Side Were You On?: The American Communist Party during the Second World War* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1982) discusses the party's opposition to "the second imperialist war."

Military Aspects of Isolationism

Historians should pay more attention to military aspects of isolationism, and much work in particular should be done on air power, for isolationists often centered their military strategy on the air arm. Charles Vaughn Reynolds, Jr., "America and a Two-Ocean Navy, 1933–1941" (Ph. D. diss., Boston University, 1978), covers Congressional opposition to naval expansion. In *Harry H. Woodring: A Political Biography of FDR's Controversial Secretary of War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1975), Keith D. McFarland gives an account of one Roosevelt appointee who thought that FDR's defense policies endangered national security. For treatment of a leading isolationist in the military, see Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy during the Second World War," *Diplomatic History* 6 (Summer 1982): 303–21. The works of military theorists J. F. C. Fuller, B. H. Liddell Hart, Hoffman Nickerson, Alfred Vagts, and Quincy Wright are covered in Bobby Leon Roberts, "The Relationship between War and Society as Reflected in the Writings of Five Military Historians, 1941–1945" (Ph. D. diss., University of Arkansas, 1978). Isolationists were particularly delighted with the suspicion of mass armies shown by Hart and Nickerson.

Public Opinion

As public opinion possesses a somewhat amorphous nature, it is one of the most difficult of topics of study. Yet there are historians who have assumed this task. In many ways, the best place to begin is Ralph B. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918–1978* (New York: William Morrow, 1978). In his doctoral dissertation, "Opinion-Makers and Foreign Policy: The Concept of America's Role in World Affairs, the 1920's" (Michigan State University, 1977), Michael James Conwell focuses on the reaction of opinion elites to the League, the World Court, and the Kellogg Pact. For extensive treatment of the first major assault upon the world system established at the Versailles and Washington conferences, see Justus D. Doenecke, *When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion-Makers and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1933* (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1983). In Michael Leigh's *Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937–1947* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), the author notes that opinion polls of 1939–41 were ambivalent and therefore did not constrain Roosevelt's policies. Public opinion concerning Italy is contained in Wayne Clayton Jordan, "America's Mussolini: The United States and Italy, 1919–1936" (Ph. D. diss., University of Virginia, 1972), though John F. Diggins, *Mussolini and Fascism: The View from America* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press,

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1972) remains the classic account. Ralph B. Levering's *American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939–1945* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976) combines the tracing of public opinion with a critique of American leaders, who—according to Levering—did not sufficiently prepare the public for Soviet expansion.

Propaganda

Few government policies disturbed the isolationists as much as propaganda, and anti-interventionists were equally alarmed about private efforts to influence public opinion in a more interventionist direction. One can contrast government propaganda efforts in the two world wars by comparing findings revealed in two excellent works: Stephen L. Vaughn, *Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and the Committee on Public Information* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); and Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). Other aspects of government-initiated propaganda are shown in Michael Eric Hanin, "War on Our Minds: The American Mass Media in World War II" (Ph. D. diss., University of Rochester, 1980). Political science models are used in Thomas Raymond Fedyszyn, "Liberal America and War Entry: A Study of the Propaganda Campaign Conducted Prior to the American Intervention in World War II" (Ph. D. diss., John Hopkins University, 1978). For good material on how motion pictures switched from isolationism to interventionism, see Peter Roffman and Jim Purdy, *The Hollywood Social Problems Film: Madness, Despair, and Politics from the Depression to the Fifties* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981). Rodney Dale Smith, "A Study of the International Political Events and Commentary in Selected American Comic Strips from 1940–1970," covers the foreign policy of such figures as *Smilin' Jack* and *Terry and the Pirates* (Ed. D., Ball State University, 1979). See also Roger Miller, "Up Front with the Comics," *Southwest Review* 57 (Autumn 1972): 288–99. Thomas Stuart Jackson's massive doctoral thesis, "Historical and Ideological Aspects of the American World War II Novel" (University of California at Los Angeles, 1978), notes that much literature of the Second World War remained anti-militarist in the tradition of Hemingway and Dos Passos. For a fascinating study that focuses on the political and cultural context of novels ranging from Kathleen Winsor's *Forever Amber* to Ernest Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea,* see Theodore Yale Blumoff, "Popular Fiction and the Creation of a Cold War Consensus, 1943–1952" (Ph. D. diss., Saint Louis University, 1976).

Much research has been done on American attitudes towards the Soviets. Thomas R. Maddux, "Red Fascism, Brown Bolshevism: The American Image of Totalitarianism in the 1930s," *Historian* 40 (November 1977): 85–103, finds much of the American press perceptive in recognizing, even before the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the affinity between the Communist and National Socialist systems. The article challenges arguments made in Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s," *American Historical Review* 75 (April 1970): 1046–1064. One of the leading experts in the whole subject of public opinion and

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foreign policy, Melvin Small, has contributed two articles on the World War II era: "How We Learned to Love the Russians: American Media and the Soviet Union during World War II," *Historian* 36 (May 1974): 455–78; and "Buffoons and Brave Hearts: Hollywood Portrays the Russians, 1939–1944," *California Historical Quarterly* 4 (Winter 1973): 326–37.

Religious and Ethnic Groups

Alfred O. Hero, Jr. has made a massive study of the laity in his *American Religious Groups View Foreign Policy: Trends in Rank-and-File Opinion, 1937–1969* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1973). Hero notes that the American Jewish population has been more internationalist than other groups; that Roman Catholics of Irish, German, and particularly Italian descent were hostile to Roosevelt's foreign policy; and that black Christians were less enthusiastic about World War II and Cold War involvements than their white counterparts. Additional information can be found in Leo Vincent Kanawada, Jr., *Franklin D. Roosevelt's Diplomacy and American Catholics, Italians, and Jews* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Research Press, 1982).

The McCormick and Patterson Press

While we still lack a serious and comprehensive study of Captain Joseph Medill Patterson, founder of the *New York Daily News*, two other members of the famous publishing dynasty still hold fascination for writers: Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, and Eleanor Medill ("Cissy") Patterson, publisher of the *Washington Times-Herald*.

In his book on Colonel McCormick, Joseph Gies argues that "looking back today it is difficult to argue the superior common sense of the [Theodore] Roosevelt–[Franklin] Roosevelt position over the McCormick-Patterson." See Gies's *The Colonel of Chicago* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1979). Jerome Edwards's *The Foreign Policy of Col. McCormick's Tribune, 1929–1941* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1971) is more detached, though the author cannot help but note that those who later were most critical of McCarthyism "were among the most active in affixing the charge of 'pro-Hitler' and 'Nazi' upon McCormick." In a large and thorough volume entitled *Chicago Tribune: The Rise of a Great American Newspaper* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979), Lloyd Wendt looks at McCormick's career in terms of Chicago press rivalries. The *Tribune*'s Washington correspondent Walter Trohan combines his recollections with more than a touch of gossip in his *Political Animals: Memoirs of a Sentimental Cynic* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1975).

Ralph G. Martin's *Cissy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979) is strong on Cissy Patterson's personality, weak on her politics.

William Randolph Hearst

Although we still need much more work on Hearst, Rodney P. Carlisle, *Hearst and the New Deal: The Progressive as Reactionary* (New York: Garland, 1981), gives some background on international events. See also Carlisle, "The Foreign

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Policy Views of an Isolationist Press Lord: W. R. Hearst and the International Crisis, 1936–41," *Journal of Contemporary History* 9 (July 1974): 217–27, and "William Randolph Hearst: A Fascist Reputation Reconsidered," *Journalism Quarterly* 50 (Spring 1973): 125–33. Carlisle shows Hearst as long suspicious of Britain, France, Japan, and Soviet Russia. In 1939, the San Simeon press lord organized his own pressure group, the Mothers of America. Yet he supported defense spending, calling in particular for aircraft development. For a discussion of how Hearst ran his papers, see William Quayle Parmenter, "The News Control Explanation of News Making: The Case of William Randolph Hearst, 1920–1940" (Ph. D. diss., University of Washington, 1979).

Civil Liberties and Isolationism

The issue of harassment of isolationists has only recently come to the fore. In his book *War and Society: The United States, 1941–1945* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972), Richard Polenberg writes, "From the start, the administration was prepared to curb the freedom of speech of right-wingers." Efforts to intimidate opponents of entry into World War II are discussed in several of Wayne S. Cole's major works—the books on Lindbergh, the America First Committee, and the general study on Roosevelt and the isolationists.

In "Franklin D. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics," *Political Science Quarterly* 44 (Spring 1979): 15–32, Richard W. Steele finds continued attempts to silence or discredit the president's critics. Roosevelt used the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Communications Commission as political instruments. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his commentary on Steele's article, claims that Steele has neglected the sense of emergency existing in the forties. According to Schlesinger, the president did not conduct "a systematic campaign to extirpate free speech and brand all Roosevelt critics as traitors." Schlesinger offers further comment in his article "Desperate Times," a review of Cole's *Roosevelt and the Isolationists* (previously cited) in the *New York Review of Books* (November 24, 1983), pp. 36–38. To see how both sides used the conspiracy motif, see Geoffrey S. Smith, "Isolationism, the Devil, and the Advent of the Second World War: Variations on a Theme," *International History Review* 4 (February 1982): 55–89.

For new material on FBI intimidation of dissenters, see Kenneth O'Reilly, "A New Deal for the FBI: The Roosevelt Administration, Crime Control, and National Security," *Journal of American History* 64 (December 1982): 638–58. More material on FBI conduct is found in David J. Williams, "'Without Understanding': The FBI and Political Surveillance, 1908–1941" (Ph. D. diss., University of New Hampshire, 1981).

Pacifism—General

Pacifist movements receive perceptive treatment in two essays: Charles Chatfield, "Pacifism," and Robert H. Ferrell, "Peace Movements," both in De Conde, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* (previously cited), 2: 722–29, and 3: 752–62, respectively. Harold Josephson is editing a *Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press) that will include

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numerous portraits of American pacifist leaders. For a new history of the peace movement, see Charles De Benedetti, *The Peace Reform in American History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).

Pacifism—The Twenties

In reference to the question of pacifism in the twenties, one must note various essays of De Benedetti: "Borah and the Kellogg Pact," *Pacific Northwest Quarterly* 63 (January 1972): 22–29; "The Origins of Neutrality Revision: The American Plan of 1924," *Historian* 35 (November 1972): 75–89; "Alternatives Strategies in the American Peace Movement in the 1920's," in Charles Chatfield, ed., *Peace Movements in America* (New York: Schocken, 1973), pp. 57–67; and "The American Peace Movement and the State Department in the Era of Locarno," in Solomon Wank, ed., *Doves and Diplomats: Foreign Offices and Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978), pp. 202–16. For definitive work on slightly earlier periods, see C. Roland Marchand, *The American Peace Movement and Social Reform, 1898–1918* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), and David S. Patterson, *Toward a Warless World: The Travail of the American Peace Movement, 1887–1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976).

Pacifism—The Thirties and the Forties

Chatfield summarizes his findings in "Alternative Antiwar Strategies of the Thirties," in Chatfield, *Peace Movements in America* (previously cited), pp. 68–80. A serious student must not fail to consult Glen Zeitzer's "The American Peace Movement During the Second World War" (Ph. D. diss., Bryn Mawr, 1978). Zeitzer supplies detailed information on the leading pacifist group in "The Fellowship of Reconciliation on the Eve of the Second World War: A Peace Organization Prepares," *Peace and Change* 3 (Summer-Fall 1975): 46–51. Justus D. Doenecke traces an early division within pacifist ranks in "The Debate over Coercion: The Dilemma of America's Pacifists and the Manchurian Crisis," *ibid.*, 2 (Spring 1974): 265–76. Theodore Richard Wachs's dissertation, "Conscription, Conscientious Objection, and the Context of American Pacifism, 1940–1945" (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1976), discusses the role of pacifist groups as well as problems dealing with alternative service. New light on a theme stressed by many pacifists is found in Judith Papachristos, "An Exercise in Anti-Imperialism: The Thirties," *American Studies* 15 (Spring 1974): 61–78. Michael Young offers significant treatment of Jews in "Facing a Test of Faith: Jewish Pacifists During the Second World War," *Peace and Change* 3 (Summer-Fall 1975): 34–40. Charles De Benedetti has contributed "The American Peace Movement and Asia, 1941–1961," *Pacific Historical Review* 50 (May 1981): 192–214. For a more comprehensive article by De Benedetti, see "The American Peace Movement and the National Security State, 1941–1971," *World Affairs* 142 (1978): 118–29. The standard work on pacifism during World War II and the Cold War remains Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

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More general histories of the peace groups are needed. Daniel William Barthell's "The Committee on Militarism in Education, 1925–1940" (Ph. D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1972) covers a group that fought military training in the schools. The best history of the War Resisters League comes in the form of a senior thesis completed at Brown University in 1975. See Michael David Young, "'Wars Will Cease When Men Refuse to Fight': The War Resisters League, 1925–1950." For other material on the WRL, see Mary Jezer, *Fifty Years of Non-Violent Resistance* (New York: War Resisters League, 1973), and Susan Dion, "Pacifism Treated as Subversion: The FBI and the War Resisters League," *Peace and Change* 9 (Spring 1983): 43–54.

Although historians are writing biographies of prominent peace leaders, a good bit more is needed. For discussion of the founder of the National Council for the Prevention of War, see George Peter Marabell, "Frederick Libby and the American Peace Movement, 1921–1941" (Ph. D. diss., Michigan State University, 1975). And for Libby's role in the controversial Malmedy affair, a case involving alleged American torture of German prisoners of war, see Doenecke, "Protest Over Malmedy: A Question of Clemency," *Peace and Change* 5 (Spring 1977): 28–33. Jo Ann Ooiman Robinson, *Abraham Went Out: A Biography of A. J. Muste* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1982), is definitive on its subject. See also Robinson's "A. J. Muste and the Ways to Peace," in Chatfield, *Peace Movements in America* (previously cited), pp. 81–94. Brief memoirs of a host of peace leaders are found in *Against the Tide: Pacifist Resistance in the Second World War,* an oral history edited by Denna Hurwitz and Craig Simpson (New York: War Resisters League, 1983). Still more material is located in Robert Cooney and Helen Michalowski, *The Power of the People* (Culver City, Calif.: Peace Press, 1977).

Roman Catholic Pacifism

The leading Catholic pacifist group, the Catholic Worker Movement, is the subject of several studies: William D. Miller, *A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement* (New York: Liveright, 1973); Mel W. Piehl, "The Catholic Worker and the Origin of Catholic Radicalism in America" (Ph. D. diss., Stanford University, 1980); John L. Le Brun, "The Role of the Catholic Worker Movement in American Pacifism, 1933–1972" (Ph. D. diss., Case Western Reserve University, 1973); and Nancy Lee Roberts, "Dorothy Day and 'The Catholic Worker,' 1933–1982" (Ph. D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1982). Gordon C. Zahn's *Another Part of the War: The Camp Simon Story* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1979) offers a depressing first-hand account of a Catholic conscientious objector camp during World War II.

University Opinion

University opinion is still a topic far too neglected. Joseph Louis Jaffe's "Isolationism and Neutrality in Academe, 1938–1941" (Case Western Reserve University, 1979) concentrates upon three university presidents: Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago, Alan Valentine of the University of Rochester, and Henry Noble MacCracken of Vassar College. He also discusses the American Youth Con-

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gress and the American Student Union, as well as the small but effective isolationist student group at Yale, which played a significant role in the formation of the America First Committee. Pathbreaking essays include: Patti McGill Peterson, "Student Organizations and the Antiwar Movement in America, 1900–1960," in Chatfield, *Peace Movements in America* (previously cited), pp. 116–32; Dennis Mihelich, "Student Antiwar Activism During the Nineteen Thirties," *Peace and Change* 2 (Fall 1974): 29–40; and Eileen M. Eagan, " 'War is Not Holy'—The American Student Peace Movement in the 1930s," *ibid.*, pp. 41–47. Eagan has also written *Class, Culture, and the Classroom: The Student Peace Movement of the 1930s* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980).

Protestant Anti-Interventionism

There has been less research done on Protestant anti-interventionism during the past decade than there had been earlier. Still much needed is a scholarly treatment of the critics of Reinhold Niebuhr's "Christian realism" and the way in which they engaged the prominent neo-orthodox theologian. Similarly a full-scale study of such figures as Charles Clayton Morrison, Paul Hutchinson, Harold E. Fey, E. Stanley Jones, and Kirby Page would be in order. Alden B. Pearson has made a start on Morrison in his "A Christian Moralist Responds to War: Charles Clayton Morrison, *The Christian Century*, and the Manchurian Crisis, 1931–1933," *World Affairs* 139 (Spring 1977): 296–307. For the decline of pacifism by 1941, see Edward W. Orser, "World War II and the Pacifist Controversy in the Major Protestant Churches," *American Studies* 14 (Fall 1973): 5–24.

Some doctoral theses have proven interesting. Pedro Manuel Arrambide, "The Reaction of the Protestant and Catholic Churches of the U. S. A. to the Spanish Civil War" (Memphis State University, 1976), sees both groups under an illusion: Catholics ignored the brutal repression by the Nationalists; Protestants were incorrect in associating the Republic's cause with that of democracy. Elston J. Hill, "Buchman and Buchmanism" (University of North Carolina, 1972), describes a man and a group that briefly sought rapport with Hitler. In his dissertation, "The Attitudes of American Protestantism Toward War and Military-Related Affairs Involving the United States, 1945–1953" (Tulane University, 1977), Jerrold Lee Brooks finds the churches possessing little discernible influence. Though they would always stress peace, they could argue both sides of a controversy with equal vigor.

Roman Catholic Anti-Interventionism

Roman Catholicism has been the subject of several able studies. For a fine integrative essay, see Wilson D. Miscamble, "Catholics and American Foreign Policy from McKinley to McCarthy: A Historiographical Survey," *Diplomatic History* 4 (Summer 1980): 223–40. George Q. Flynn continues his studies with *Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937–1945* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), a book that covers such topics as the neutrality acts, the Spanish Civil War, the interventionist controversy of 1939–41, and aid to the Soviet Union. Much material concerning liberal Catholic opinion can be found in Rodger Van Allen, *The Commonweal and American Catholicism: The Magazine, the Move-*

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ment, the Meaning (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974), though one should also consult Robert B. Clements, "The Commonweal, 1924–1928: The Williams-Shuster Years" (Ph. D. diss., University of Notre Dame, 1972). Gary McDonogh is contributing an essay on the equally isolationist, but far more conservative, *Catholic World* to the forthcoming Lora-Longton anthology, *The American Conservative Press* (previously cited). Esther Josephine MacCarthy's "The Catholic Periodical Press and Issues of War and Peace: 1914–1946" (Ph. D. diss., Stanford University, 1977) notes how church leaders adhered to the concept of the just war on the abstract level, while neglecting it on the practical one. She covers such journals as *Commonweal, America,* and *Catholic World,* focusing on various historical crises.

Regional Studies

Several regional studies have been made. Bryon Andrew Powell Parham, "Isolationism in Missouri" (Ph. D. diss., University of Missouri, 1972), traces the state's gradual shift to an interventionist sentiment. In an examination of selected newspapers published between 1918 and 1935, Warren F. Kuehl finds such a high degree on internationalism that he writes, "Perhaps it is time to start talking about the internationalist Middle West." See his "Midwestern Newspapers and Isolationist Sentiment," *Diplomatic History* 3 (Summer 1979): 283–306. Kuehl's study is borne out in Dixie Lee Williams Ehrenreich's "Newspapers, Public Opinion, and Neutrality: 1935–1939" (Ph. D. diss., University of Idaho, 1977). Covering Idaho, Oregon, and Washington State as a group, Ehrenreich notes that the press, as a unit, did not advocate isolation. In his dissertation, "The Anxieties of Neutrality: Chicago Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy" (University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1979), James Covill Schneider denies that reactionary business dominated America First, although he claims that its spectacular success in attracting members masked weaknesses in organization, tactics, and strategy. For reasons for one area's indifference to a major crisis, see Shirley G. Kulevksy, "Facets of Isolationism: North Dakota's Reaction to the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939," *North Dakota Quarterly* 46 (Autumn 1978): 5–20.

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

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1984, Volume 21 (6 issues)
Institutional rate: Dfl. 190,– / US $ 76.00 including postage and handling
Private rate: Dfl. 65,– / US $ 26.00 including postage and handling
Private subscriptions should be sent direct to the publishers.

D. Reidel Publishing Company
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands
190 Old Derby St., Hingham, MA 02043, U.S.A.

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